Sharper v. South Carolina Department of Corrections

Full title: Henry Sharper # 219950, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of…

Court: United States District Court, D. South Carolina

Date published: Apr 2, 2009

C/A No. 2:09-777-JFA-RSC (D.S.C. Apr. 2, 2009)

Opinion

C/A No. 2:09-777-JFA-RSC.

April 2, 2009

Report and Recommendation

ROBERT CARR, Magistrate Judge

This is a civil action filed pro se by a state prison inmate.¹ Henry Sharper (Plaintiff) seeks damages from three named Defendants because he is not (or was not, assuming he no longer works) getting paid as much from his prison industry work as other inmates who work in prison industry at other institutions. He claims that Defendant South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) "discriminates" against some institutions and prison industries and in favor of others. He claims that he suffered "emotional distress" when he was fired from his prison job in 2001. There are minimal, vague, and conclusory allegations in the Complaint indicating that Plaintiff might currently be involved in state court litigation in the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (ALC) or some state appellate court over the unequal pay and/or job loss issues. He complains that Defendant Judge Gossett, a former ALC judge, gave the law firm which he also names as a Defendant time to appeal her decision "two months ago." There is no indication what that "decision" was about, nor is there any indication of whether or not a appeal of it is currently pending in a different State of South Carolina court. Plaintiff seeks "$6 million" in damages, but states that he would "settle out of court for $180 thousand and time served in prison." Compl. 4.

1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and D.S.C. Civ. R. 73.02(B)(2)(e), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e); 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se Complaint filed in this case. This review has been conducted pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) ( en banc); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979).

Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N. Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Complaint filed in this case is subject to summary dismissal under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

To the extent that Plaintiff's allegations may be liberally construed as asking this Court to review the proceedings in a South Carolina ALC case, to overturn the rulings made in that case by Defendant Gossett, and/or to review the manner of participation of Defendants SCDC and Malone, Thompson, Summers, Ott as a party and/or attorneys in that case, Plaintiff's claims are subject to summary dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The proceedings and rulings made in the ALC cannot be reviewed or set aside by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina in this case. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983) (a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts because such review can only be conducted by the Supreme Court of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.).² See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). This prohibition on review of state court orders by federal district courts is commonly referred to as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or the Feldman-Rooker doctrine. See, e.g., Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transport., 434 F.3d 712 (4^th Cir. 2006); Ivy Club v. Edwards, 943 F.2d 270, 284 (3d Cir. 1991). Because the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is jurisdictional it may be raised by the Court sua sponte. American Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4^th Cir. 2003). According to the Fourth Circuit, "the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies . . . when the loser in state court files suit in federal district court seeking redress for an injury allegedly caused by the state court's decision itself." Davani v. Virginia Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006); cf. Ruttenberg v. Jones, 2008 WL 2436157 (4^th Cir. June 17, 2008) (reversing a Rooker/Feldman dismissal). In this case, with regard to Defendant Gossett's ruling that SCDC and the other Defendant could file an appeal, Plaintiff stands in this Court as the "loser" in the ALC and claims injury from that particular ruling.

2 Appeals of orders issued by lower state courts must go to a higher state court. Secondly, the Congress, for more than two hundred years, has provided that only the Supreme Court of the United States may review a decision of a state's highest court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (since 1988, such Supreme Court review is discretionary by way of a writ of certiorari and is not an appeal of right); see Ernst v. Child and Youth Servs., 108 F.3d 486, 491 (3d Cir. 1997). In civil, criminal, and other cases, the Supreme Court of the United States has reviewed decisions of the Supreme Court of South Carolina that were properly brought before it under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 or that statute's predecessors. E.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1991) (an example of a South Carolina Supreme Court case that was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court).

Longstanding precedents preclude the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina from reviewing the findings or rulings made by the South Carolina State Courts. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine applies to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction even when a challenge to state court decisions or rulings concerns federal constitutional issues such as Plaintiff appears to be attempting to raise in this case. See Arthur v. Supreme Court of Iowa, 709 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Iowa 1989). The doctrine also applies even if the state court litigation has not reached a state's highest court. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 nn. 3-4 (9th Cir. 1986); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (federal court must accord full faith and credit to state court judgment); Robart Wood Wire Prods. v. Namaco Indus., 797 F.2d 176, 178 (4th Cir. 1986).

Plaintiff's submission of the Complaint in this case, claiming a right to damages from state court personnel, opposing counsel, and/or opposing parties does not alter the fact that Plaintiff is, in reality, attempting to have this Court review the proceedings that took place before the South Carolina ALC. See Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 262, 263 (10th Cir. 1986) ("[I]t is well settled that federal district courts are without authority to review state court judgments where the relief sought is in the nature of appellate review."); see also Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1984) (collecting cases). Plaintiff is clearly claiming that he has been injured by the state court decisions, see Willner v. Frey, No. 06-1432, 2007 WL 222778 (4^th Cir. August 3, 2007), and to rule in favor of Plaintiff on his constitutional claims would, necessarily, require this Court to overrule (or otherwise find invalid) various orders and rulings made in the ALC. Such a result is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. Davani, 434 F.3d at 719-20; see Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. at 293-94; Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d at 201.

Furthermore, even if Rooker/Feldman did not bar Plaintiff's claims in their entirety, the case would still be subject to summary dismissal as to Defendant SCDC due to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Eleventh Amendment divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts. SCDC, as a South Carolina state agency, is an integral part of the state and, thus, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. As a result, to the extent that Plaintiff sues SCDC, this case is subject to partial summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 61-71 (1989); Bellamy v. Borders, 727 F. Supp. 247, 248-50 (D.S.C. 1989); Coffin v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs., 562 F. Supp. 579, 583-585 (D.S.C. 1983); Belcher v. South Carolina Bd. of Corrections, 460 F. Supp. 805, 808-09 (D.S.C. 1978); see also Harter v. Vernon, 101 F.3d 334, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1996); Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (although express language of Eleventh Amendment only forbids suits by citizens of other States against a State, Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a State filed by its own citizens).

Under Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99n. 9, a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. The State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in a federal court. Section 15-78-20(e) of the South Carolina Code of Laws (Cum. Supp. 1993), is a statute in the South Carolina Tort Claims Act which expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another state. See McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1985) (Opinion abolishing sovereign immunity in tort "does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities."). Cf. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121 ("[N]either pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment.").

Also, Defendant Gossett is immune from Plaintiff's claims for damages because the only "wrongdoing" alleged against her is that she ruled that the other Defendants could file an appeal from her ALC decision. Obviously, in making her ruling, Gossett was performing her judicial role and exercising her judicial duties as a member of the ALC. As a result, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Gossett are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. As the Fourth Circuit has stated relevant to the reasons for the doctrine of absolute immunity for judges:

The absolute immunity from suit for alleged deprivation of rights enjoyed by judges is matchless in its protection of judicial power. It shields judges even against allegations of malice or corruption. . . . The rules is tolerated, not because corrupt or malicious judges should be immune from suit, but only because it is recognized that judicial officers in whom discretion is entrusted must be able to exercise discretion vigorously and effectively, without apprehension that they will be subjected to burdensome and vexatious litigation.

McCray v. Maryland, 456 F.2d 1, 3 (4^th Cir. 1972) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds, Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 77 (4^th Cir. 1995).

The doctrine of absolute immunity for acts taken by a judge in connection with his or her judicial authority and responsibility is well established and widely recognized. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (judges are immune from civil suit for actions taken in their judicial capacity, unless "taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction."); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) ("A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors."); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (a suit by South Carolina inmate against two Virginia magistrates); Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) ("It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions."); see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (immunity presents a threshold question which should be resolved before discovery is even allowed); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (safeguards built into the judicial system tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (absolute immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability").

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for implied constitutional violations from Defendant Malone, Thompson, Summers, Ott, a law firm that apparently represented SCDC in the ALC case, the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted and should be summarily dismissed. In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendants deprived him or her of a federal right, and (2) did so under color of state law. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); see also Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1980). Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes "state action." See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002 (1982). To qualify as state action, the conduct in question "must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible," and "the party charged with the [conduct] must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); see U.S. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, 941 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1991). An attorney, whether retained, court-appointed, or a public defender, does not act under color of state law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Deas v. Potts, 547 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1976) (private attorney); Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1980) (court-appointed attorney); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-24 (1981) (public defender); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement . . . also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed."). Other than possible, though, as stated above, non-viable claims under § 1983, no other potential basis for the exercise of federal question jurisdiction in this case is evident from the face of the pleadings. It is obvious that there is no basis for this Court to exercise diversity jurisdiction in this case since Plaintiff and all Defendants are South Carolina residents. M I Heat Transfer Prods, Ltd. v. Willke, 131 F. Supp. 2d 256, 260 (D. Mass. 2001) (complete diversity rule requires that, to maintain a diversity suit in federal court, no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants).

Recommendation

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the Complaint in this case without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Denton v. Hernandez; Neitzke v. Williams; Haines v. Kerner; Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-04 (4th Cir. 1993); Boyce v. Alizaduh; Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d at 74; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal).

Furthermore, since Plaintiff seeks damages from two immune Defendants, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(2) applies in this case. Hence, I also recommend that this case be deemed a "strike" for purposes of the "three strikes" rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court judge need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must "only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Diamond v. Colonial Life Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4^th Cir. 2005).

Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk

United States District Court

P.O. Box 835

Charleston, South Carolina 29402

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).