However, the appellate courts of our state have on several occasions considered what is an appearance for purposes of notice requirements and the entry of a default judgment under the code of civil procedure, K.S.A. 60-255(a). See Jones v. Main, 196 Kan. 91, Syl. p 3, 410 P.2d 303 (1966) (litigant who has apprised opponent, through court, of his denial of the claim against him has appeared); Sharp v. Sharp, 196 Kan. 38, Syl. p 2, 409 P.2d 1019 (1966) (request for bill of particulars constituted appearance); Midland Bank of Overland Park v. Rieke, 18 Kan.App.2d 830, 834, 861 P.2d 129 (1993) (informal contacts with plaintiff not an appearance); Hood v. Haynes, 7 Kan.App.2d 591, Syl. p 1, 644 P.2d 1371 (1982) (informal contact with the court sufficient to constitute an appearance). The factual situation most similar to the case before us is Midland Bank, 18 Kan.App.2d 830, 861 P.2d 129.
In Simmon, our court reversed a judgment entered on the pleadings for the trial court's failure to allow defendant to file an answer out of time, noting that the trial court "could not" have granted a default judgment because the three-day notice of K.S.A. 60-255(a) had not been given. Simmon was a direct appeal by the losing defendant and the issue whether the judgment was void or voidable simply was not reached. See also Sharp v. Sharp, 196 Kan. 38, 409 P.2d 1019 (1966); Hood v. Haynes, 7 Kan. App. 2d 591, 598, 644 P.2d 1371 (1982). Rather, we find this case similar to Becker v. Roothe, 184 Kan. 830, 339 P.2d 292 (1959), which was an appeal from a trial court's order refusing to open a default judgment for the trial court's failure to take evidence of plaintiff's claims for unliquidated damages in compliance with a former default judgment statute, G.S. 1949, 60-3109.