Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen

19 Citing cases

  1. Amend v. 485 Properties, LLC

    443 F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 2006)

    See, e.g., Lifestyle Family v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 256 Ga.App. 305 ( 568 S.E.2d 171) (2002); Centre Pointe Investments. v. Frank M. Darby Co., 249 Ga.App. 782 ( 549 S.E.2d 435) (2001); Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, 243 Ga.App. 584 ( 533 S.E.2d 136) (2000); Ideal Realty Co. v. Storch, 124 Ga.App. 271 ( 183 S.E.2d 520) (1971); Erwin v. Wender, 78 Ga.App. 94 ( 50 S.E.2d 244) (1948); Hendrix v. Crosby, 76 Ga.App. 191 ( 45 S.E.2d 448) (1947); Mendenhall v. Adair Realty Loan Co., 67 Ga.App. 154 ( 19 S.E.2d 740) (1942); Johnson v. Lipscomb-Weyman-Chapman Co., 46 Ga.App. 798 ( 169 S.E. 266) (1933). See, e.g., Killearn Partners v. Southeast Properties, 266 Ga.App. 508 ( 597 S.E.2d 578) (2004); Christopher Investment Properties v. Cox, 219 Ga.App. 440 ( 465 S.E.2d 680) (1995); Futch v. Guthrie, 176 Ga.App. 672 ( 337 S.E.2d 384) (1985); Nestlé Co. v. J.H. Ewing Sons, 153 Ga.App. 328 ( 265 S.E.2d 61) (1980); Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga.App. 672 ( 244 S.E.2d 622) (1978). It would appear that the contrary view was first expressed in Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga.App. 672 ( 244 S.E.2d 622) (1978).

  2. Amend v. 485 Properties

    280 Ga. 327 (Ga. 2006)   Cited 22 times

    See, e.g., Lifestyle Family v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 256 Ga. App. 305 ( 568 SE2d 171) (2002); Centre Pointe Investments v. Frank M. Darby Co., 249 Ga. App. 782 ( 549 SE2d 435) (2001); Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc., 243 Ga. App. 584 ( 533 SE2d 136) (2000); Ideal Realty Co. v. Storch, 124 Ga. App. 271 ( 183 SE2d 520) (1971); Erwin v. Wender, 78 Ga. App. 94 ( 50 SE2d 244) (1948); Hendrix v. Crosby, 76 Ga. App. 191 ( 45 SE2d 448) (1947); Mendenhall v. Adair Realty c. Co., 67 Ga. App. 154 ( 19 SE2d 740) (1942); Johnson v. Lipscomb-Weyman-Chapman Co., 46 Ga. App. 798 ( 169 SE 266) (1933). See, e.g., Killearn Partners v. Southeast Properties, 266 Ga. App. 508 ( 597 SE2d 578) (2004); Christopher Investment Properties v. Cox, 219 Ga. App. 440 ( 465 SE2d 680) (1995); Futch v. Guthrie, 176 Ga. App. 672 ( 337 SE2d 384) (1985); Nestle Co. v. J. H. Ewing Sons, 153 Ga. App. 328 ( 265 SE2d 61) (1980); Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672 ( 244 SE2d 622) (1978). It would appear that the contrary view was first expressed in Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672 ( 244 SE2d 622) (1978).

  3. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc. v. Nodvin

    598 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. Ga. 1984)   Cited 1 times

    It is undisputed that the parties entered into an express contract that detailed the parties' obligations before a commission would have to be paid. The defendant claims that there can be no recovery in quantum meruit when the parties have entered into an express contract. Although there are Georgia cases which support this proposition, e.g., Bean, supra, there are also numerous Georgia cases which have allowed plaintiffs to assert both breach of contract and quantum meruit in the same lawsuit. E.g., Steinemann, supra; Starling, Inc., et al. v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, 170 Ga.App. 858, 318 S.E.2d 728 (1984); Stowers v. Hall, 159 Ga.App. 501, 283 S.E.2d 714 (1981); Sharp-Boylston Company, et al. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga.App. 672, 244 S.E.2d 622 (1978). The Lundeen case is extremely similar to the present action.

  4. Nestle' Co. v. J. H. Ewing Son, Inc.

    153 Ga. App. 328 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)   Cited 37 times

    Tomlin v. Bickerstaff, 85 Ga. App. 48, 51-52 ( 68 S.E.2d 224) (1951), citing Gresham v. Connally, 114 Ga. 906, 909 ( 41 S.E. 42) (1902). See also Wilcox v. Wilcox, 31 Ga. App. 486 (3) ( 119 S.E. 445) (1923); Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672, 673 ( 244 S.E.2d 622) (1978). The evidence was ample to make out a prima facie case for the recovery of a commission based on the above principles.

  5. Harden v. TRW, Inc.

    959 F.2d 201 (11th Cir. 1992)   Cited 6 times
    In Harden v. TRW, Inc., 959 F.2d 201 (11th Cir. 1992), the court said that quantum meriut is precluded if the court finds "the existence of an express contract, as a matter of law...."

    Harden's purported authority to the contrary is clearly distinguishable. Harden's reliance on Sharp-Boylston v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672, 244 S.E.2d 622 (1978), is misplaced because the plaintiff sought recovery for services rendered that were clearly beyond the terms of the contract. 244 S.E.2d at 624. Such is not the case here.

  6. Trust Co. Bank v. C S Trust Co.

    260 Ga. 124 (Ga. 1990)   Cited 26 times

    Trust Co. correctly argues that Hartrampf cannot recover under both claims, see Futch v. Guthrie, 176 Ga. App. 672, 674 (3) ( 337 S.E.2d 384) (1985), but it is clear that when the evidence is construed in favor of the nonmovant, Hartrampf has a claim for quantum meruit if the factfinder should find that there was no oral agreement. See Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672, 674-75 ( 244 S.E.2d 622) (1978). In this quantum meruit claim, as well as in the breach of contract claim, the mere fact alone that the trustees have changed during the time of any agreement or receipt of services will not operate to defeat the claims against the trust.

  7. Insignia/ESG, Inc. v. Reproductive Biology Associates, Inc.

    603 S.E.2d 434 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)   Cited 2 times

    Based on these facts, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Insignia had no basis to claim a contractual right to a commission. Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672, 673-674 ( 244 SE2d 622) (1978); Lifestyle Family, L.P. v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 256 Ga. App. 305, 308-309 ( 568 SE2d 171) (2002). Not only was there a lack of evidence to show an agreement on payment of a relocation commission, the evidence shows that, despite making efforts as a nonexclusive broker to find relocation space for SFI, Insignia failed to do so and was not a party to the negotiations between SFI and the landlord which culminated in the lease.

  8. Perimeter Realty v. GAPI, Inc.

    243 Ga. App. 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 40 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding two closings relating to acquisition of property were part of one transaction and did not constitute pattern of racketeering activity

    Therefore, the trial court correctly denied summary judgment to Anderson Defendants on these issues, and a jury should decide whether the brokers are entitled to a recovery in quantum meruit. See generally Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672, 674 ( 244 S.E.2d 622) (1978). 12.

  9. Walston Associates, Inc. v. City of Atlanta

    224 Ga. App. 482 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 7 times

    The fact that Walston Associates may have performed only part of the work on some claims which were completed by others and paid to the City after Walston Associates ceased working on the claims, does not preclude a quantum meruit action for the reasonable value to the City, if any, of the services provided. Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672, 673-675 ( 244 S.E.2d 622) (1978). Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

  10. Atlanta Apartment Investments v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.

    469 S.E.2d 831 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 1 times

    The authorities cited by plaintiff AAI to show a jury question as to a broker's claim in quantum meruit are distinguishable since it appears in every instance cited there was an underlying express listing agreement. See Christopher Investment Props. v. Cox, 219 Ga. App. 440 ( 465 S.E.2d 680) (where a seller entered into an exclusive First Multiple Listing Services agreement which "notif[ied] all other real estate agents that the property was available for sale and that agents could earn a commission for its sale."); and Sharp-Boylston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672 ( 244 S.E.2d 622) (Lundeen orally "asked [his broker son-in-law] to locate a building to house a printing brokerage business which he [Lundeen] intended to open soon."); and Martin v. Hendrix, Waddell c. Co., 140 Ga. App. 557, 558 ( 231 S.E.2d 526) (where an "oral listing was obtained. . . .") See also Galloway v. McKinley, 73 Ga. App. 381, 383 (2) ( 36 S.E.2d 485), interpreting Code Anno. § 4-213, now OCGA § 10-6-32, and holding that "the statute and the decisions [of the Supreme Court and this Court] presuppose the existence of an agency between the real-estate broker and the property owner before the broker can collect a commission." In the case sub judice, the record is devoid of evidence that plaintiffs' efforts were the procuring cause of the eventual sale of the property by the owner at its initial asking price of $14,500,000.