Opinion
Case No.: 01-72353-DT
September 17, 2001
OPINION
On June 22, 2001, pro se Plaintiff Vinod Sharma filed this action against Defendant, the City of Detroit, on behalf of himself and other city employees. Plaintiffs allege that the City of Detroit violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 ("Section 1981"), the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1), and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, by providing a paid lunch hour to city Water and Sewage employees in some locations but not providing a paid lunch hour to Plaintiffs, city employees who work at other locations. On July 18, 2001, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion to dismiss shall be granted.
The Court notes that Plaintiffs' pro se complaint alleges a violation of " 42 U.S.C. § 1881, et Seq." (Compl. at 1). However, in light of the substance of the other statutes Plaintiffs allege Defendant violated, and in light of the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 1881 pertains to the award of the National Medal of Science, the Court believes that Plaintiffs intended to refer to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in the complaint.
Background
Plaintiffs state that their "complaint is against the City of Detroit by Vinod Sharma and others, who through the course of years were denied paid lunch time while other employees in the same classifications received paid lunch time." (Compl. at 1-2). Plaintiffs further explain that:
This disparity was introduced by the City of Detroit mainly in its Water and Sewerage Department requiring engineers and draftsmen in the Wastewater Treatment Plant located at 9300 W. Jefferson, Industrial Waste Control at Livernois Center, etc. to work 8 hours and to have 1/2 hour of unpaid lunch time (total 8-1/2 hours/day), while engineers and draftsmen working in downtown area had to work only 7 hours and receive 1 (one) hour of paid lunch time (total 8 hours/day).
(Compl. at 2).
Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(6) addresses the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The familiar standard for reviewing dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) is that the factual allegations in the complaint must be regarded as true. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988). The claim should not be dismissed unless "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
Discussion
Title VII, Section 1981 Equal Pay Act Claims
In this action, Plaintiffs allege that the City of Detroit violated Title VII, § 1981, and the Equal Pay Act when it discriminated against Plaintiffs on the basis of "work location." ( See Pls.' Resp. at 3). More specifically, Plaintiffs' claim that the City has provided a paid lunch hour to city employees at one work site, but has not provided a similar paid lunch hour to city employees at other locations. These allegations, even if true, do not state a valid claim under Title VII, § 1981 or the Equal Pay Act.
Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 1981 provides that all persons shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts, and to enjoy all conditions of the contractual relationship regardless of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from paying an employee at a rate less than that paid to employees of the opposite sex for equal work. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
Plaintiffs' complaint fails to allege that the Plaintiffs have been subject to any disparate treatment due to discrimination on the basis of any of the protected classes addressed by the above statutes (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Title VII, § 1981 and Equal Pay Act claims must be dismissed.
Constitutional Claims
In their complaint, Plaintiffs also state that they "charge the City of Detroit for compensation discrimination" in violation of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Compl. at 1). Nowhere in their complaint do Plaintiffs explain the basis of their claim that the City of Detroit's alleged compensation discrimination based on work location violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. With respect to these alleged constitutional violations, in their response Plaintiffs simply state, "Equal Protection clause surely extends to this case, where substantive discrimination has occurred." (Pls.' Resp. at 5).
However, "[a] person bringing an action under the Equal Protection Clause must show intentional discrimination against him because of his membership in a particular class, not merely that he was treated unfairly as an individual." Shealy v. Caldwell, 2001 WL 873626 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Juebsehen v. Department of Health Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1983)). As discussed supra, Plaintiffs have not alleged that they were denied a paid lunch hour because of their membership in any protected class. Rather, Plaintiffs have simply alleged that the city employees at a different work site were treated differently in that they were given a paid lunch hour while the Plaintiffs were not. The Court is therefore satisfied that Plaintiffs have failed to state a valid equal protection claim. See Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1357 (6th Cir. 1990)("In short, [plaintiffs'] equal protection claim boils down to the assertion that "he was treated one way and everyone else another,' which "has never been thought to raise an equal protection claim.'").
The Court is also satisfied that Plaintiffs have failed to state a valid claim under the Thirteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment provides that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States." U.S. Const. amend. XIII. In their complaint, Plaintiffs have not alleged any conduct on the part of the City of Detroit that could possibly be construed as "slavery" or "involuntary servitude."
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's motion to dismiss shall be granted and Plaintiffs' complaint shall be dismissed. A Judgment consistent with this Opinion and Order shall issue forthwith.