Opinion
No. CV 99-0922 (RR)
July 10, 2001
Dora Buell, Plaintiff, Pro Se.
Honorable Alan Vinegrad, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Michael Goldberger, Assistant U.S., Attorney for Defendants.
Memorandum and ORDER
This action by Glendora Buell was initially filed in New York State court against Cablevision Systems, Inc., a cable company with which Ms. Buell has had long-standing disputes, see, e.g., Glendora v. Cablevision Systems. Inc., CV 93-8344 (S.D.N.Y.); Glendora v. Malone, CV 96-140 (S.D.N.Y.); Glendora v. Telecommunications. Inc., CV 96-4270 (S.D.N.Y.), Glendora v. Magness, CV 96-7515 (S.D.N.Y.), as well as numerous other individuals and entities. The complaint also names federal Judges Amalya Kearse, Jose Cabranes, William C. Conner, Charles L. Brieant, Barbara S. Jones, Jed S. Rakoff, and Denny Chin; federal Magistrate Judge Mark D. Fox; and Thomas A. Tormey, a former law clerk of Judge Brieant, all of whom appear to have presided over or worked on one of the above-cited lawsuits. Also named as defendants are Magistrate Judges Joan M. Azrack and Robert M. Levy; Assistant United States Attorney Edgardo Ramos; and United States Pretrial Services Officers Phillip Bigger and William Brennan, all of whom played roles in proceedings relating to plaintiffs 1997 prosecution in this district for an assault on a security officer at the Uniondale, Long Island federal courthouse. See United States v. Buell, CR 97-0228 (E.D.N.Y.).
On behalf of all judicial officers, as well as Messrs. Tormey, Ramos, Bigger, and Brennan (hereafter "federal defendants"), the United States Attorney transferred the case from state to federal court and now moves for an order of dismissal. Having carefully reviewed the parties' submissions, this court finds that Ms. Buell's challenge to the transfer of her case is patently without merit substantially for the reasons stated by the United States Attorney in the excellent memoranda filed on behalf of the federal defendants in this case.
The court further agrees with the United States Attorney that plaintiffs case must be dismissed as against all federal defendants. Nothing in plaintiffs complaint suggests that she is suing any of the named judicial officers for conduct unrelated to the proper exercise of their judicial discretion in presiding over cases involving Ms. Buell or her husband Franklyn. The named judges and magistrate judges are, of course, absolutely immune from suit for actions performed in their judicial capacities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam); Stump v. Sparkman 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967). This absolute "judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice." Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 554). Neither can a judge "be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error . . . or was in excess of his authority." Id. at 13 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 362).
The court's decision to dismiss plaintiffs suit against all judicial officers on grounds of absolute immunity necessarily warrants dismissal of the suit against Mr. Tormey. Plaintiffs only claims against this defendant appear to relate to his conduct as Judge Brieant's law clerk, and "for purposes of absolute judicial immunity, judges and their law clerks are as one." Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying absolute immunity to claim against district judge's law clerk).
The court similarly dismisses Ms. Buell's claim against Edgardo Ramos, the Assistant United States Attorney who successfully prosecuted plaintiff for criminal assault, as well as her claim against Pretrial Services Officers Bigger and Brennan, who apparently recommended against pre-trial diversion of the criminal charges against Ms. Buell and her husband. Ms. Buell's pending complaint raises no claims against Messrs. Ramos, Bigger, or Brennan that are distinguishable from those previously considered and dismissed by Judge Allyne R. Ross in Glendora v. Azrack, CV 97-0564 (July 31, 1998) and Buell v. Brennan, CV 98-1567 (July 31, 1998) on grounds of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Collateral estoppel bars plaintiffs attempt to relitigate claims already decided against her. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
It appears that similar claims against Mr. Ramos were also dismissed in 1998 by Judge Eugene H. Nickerson in Glendora v. Ken, CV 97 1131, CV 98 421 (March 31, 1999) (noting the court's earlier dismissal of the Buells' claims against Mr. Ramos and an FBI agent on immunity grounds).
As the United States Attorney correctly observes, Judge Ross also dismissed Ms. Buell's claims against Magistrate Judges Azrack and Levy, which appear to form the basis for plaintiffs pending suit against these defendants. Thus, collateral estoppel as well as judicial immunity supports dismissal in favor of these defendants.
In moving to dismiss, the United States Attorney further moves for an order barring plaintiff from filing additional civil actions of any kind without prior leave of the court. The Second Circuit has identified the factors relevant to such an application. First, does the litigant have a history of filing vexatious, harassing, or duplicative lawsuits? Second, does the litigant have an objective good faith expectation of prevailing in the litigation pursued? Third, does the litigant have the assistance of counsel? Fourth, has the litigant caused needless expense to other parties or has she posed and unnecessary burden on the courts and their personnel? Finally, are there other sanctions that would adequately protect the courts and potential adverse parties from vexatious proceedings? See Safir v. United States Lines Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir. 1986). Unfortunately for Ms. Buell, these factors weigh heavily against her. The United States Attorney cites twenty-six different civil actions brought by Ms. Buell or her husband in the last five years. Many of these claims are duplicative, as evidenced by the fact that the Supreme Court has enjoined plaintiff from filing future in forma pauperis petitions in noncriminal cases. See Glendora v. Porzio, 523 U.S. 206, 207 (1998) (per curiam). Similarly, the Second Circuit, on January 14, 1998, enjoined Ms. Buell from filing further appeals with that court without first obtaining leave. C.f. Glendora v. Bd. of Directors, 152 F.3d 918 (2d Cir. May 29, 1998) (table), 1998 WL 386023, at *1 (unpublished opinion referring to January 14, 1998 order). Further, Judge Eugene H. Nickerson of this court enjoined Ms. Buell from filing additional lawsuits in this district based on the facts underlying her criminal conviction. Glendora v. Ken, CV 97-1131, 98 CV 421 (E.D.N.Y.).
Despite Ms. Buell's well-established reputation for vexatious and often unintelligible filings, see, e.g., Glendora v. Pinkerton Security and Detective Servs., No. 98 Civ. 5123, 1999 WL 46633, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 1999) (Sweet, J.) ("Glendora's flurry of incomprehensible papers in this case is an abuse of the judicial process. . . . Granted, a litigant appearing pro se . . . is not expected to be well-versed in the law. However, someone like Glendora, who has extensive experience with our legal system due to her litigious nature is expected, at the very least, to make some effort to become acquainted with the elements required to make out a cause of action. . . . Glendora's blatant disregard for the law should not be abided."), this court declines to grant the broad relief presently sought by the United States Attorney. In large part, this decision is informed by the fact that the Board of Judges has recently selected a magistrate judge, Hon. Lois Bloom, who will focus particularly on pro se cases. As a part of her routine review of newly filed cases, the magistrate judge will issue orders to pro se litigants who file seemingly frivolous claims directing them to show cause why their suits should not be dismissed. This procedure should minimize, if not totally eliminate, the burden on adversaries that was endured by the federal defendants in this case. Should this process prove inadequate to deter vexatious filings by Ms. Buell or any other litigant, the magistrate judge can certainly recommend more stringent limitations.
Conclusion
The court hereby rejects plaintiffs claim that this case was improperly transferred from state to federal court. Plaintiffs complaint is dismissed as against Judges Amalya Kearse, Jose Cabranes, William C. Conner, Charles L. Brieant, Barbara S. Jones, Jed S. Rakoff, and Denny Chin; federal Magistrate Judges Mark D. Fox, Joan M. Azrack, and Robert M. Levy; Thomas A. Tormey; Assistant United States Attorney Edgardo Ramos; and United States Pretrial Services Officers Phillip Bigger and William Brennan for the reasons stated in this memorandum. The court denies the United States Attorney's motion to bar Ms. Buell from filing further lawsuits with this court without obtaining prior leave. This denial is without prejudice to renew should future circumstances warrant.
The docket sheet in this case indicates no action by plaintiff to prosecute her claims against the remaining parties. Ms. Buell is directed to show cause in writing on or before August 15, 2001 why her claims against the remaining parties should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
SO ORDERED.