Shapiro v. Hruby

26 Citing cases

  1. In re Application of County Treasurer

    214 Ill. 2d 253 (Ill. 2005)   Cited 40 times

    Young, 20 Ill. 2d at 511. In Shapiro v. Hruby, 21 Ill. 2d 353 (1961), the court also clarified that collateral attacks, rather than direct attacks, on orders for issuance of tax deeds are impermissible. The court observed that "[b]y its enactment of section 266 of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, chap. 120, par. 747), the legislature intended to render tax titles incontestable except by direct attack, unless the circumstances are such as to warrant the application of section 72 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, chap. 110, par. 72), or unless the order directing the issuance of deed was utterly void."

  2. In re Application of County Collector

    48 Ill. App. 3d 572 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 23 times

    (Southmoor Bank and Trust Co. v. Willis, 15 Ill.2d 388; Cherin v. The R. C. Company, 11 Ill.2d 447.)" (Emphasis added.) 21 Ill.2d 353, 358, 172 N.E.2d 775, 778. See also Stanley v. Bank of Marion (1961), 23 Ill.2d 414, 178 N.E.2d 367; Farlow v. Oliver (1963), 29 Ill.2d 493, 194 N.E.2d 262.

  3. Smith v. D.R.G., Inc.

    63 Ill. 2d 31 (Ill. 1976)   Cited 46 times
    Holding that once a court finds that the required notices have been given, the tax deed order may only be challenged by direct appeal or by a showing of fraud

    First, there was error by the appellate court in holding that the trial court did not have jurisdiction because, according to the appellate court, William Smith was not served with notice. The trial court did have jurisdiction to order the issuance of a tax deed, for it is clear that a tax sale proceeding is in rem and not in personam and that the court acquires jurisdiction over the land when the county collector makes his application for judgment and order for sale. ( First Lien Co. v. Markle, 31 Ill.2d 431, 436; Urban v. Lois, Inc., 29 Ill.2d 542, 546; Shapiro v. Hruby, 21 Ill.2d 353, 358; Cherin v. R. C. Co., 11 Ill.2d 447, 454.) And this court has held: "Once acquired the county court retains jurisdiction to make all necessary findings and enter all necessary orders supplemental to the original tax sale."

  4. Dahlke v. Hawthorne, Lane Co.

    36 Ill. 2d 241 (Ill. 1966)   Cited 33 times
    In Dahlke v. Hawthorne, Lane Co. (1966), 36 Ill.2d 241, the court noted that fraud implies "a wrongful intent โ€” an act calculated to deceive" (36 Ill.2d 241, 245) and was not established despite the fact that not all of the occupants of the property had been served with notice.

    . 1963, chap. 110, par. 72,) instituted the present suit to set aside the tax deed alleging, among other things, that he had received no prior notices of the sale or issuance of the deed; that he had no actual notice of the sale or deed; that any notices served had been delivered to his wife who, being mentally ill, had hid them so that they were only recently discovered by the petitioner; that the other persons in possession of the premises, viz., Fazio and Little, had not been notified of the tax proceedings as required by statute; and that such omissions constituted fraud warranting the vacation of the order for deed. Respondent's answer denied such allegations and, after a hearing on the merits, the petition was denied. We have repeatedly held that in a tax-deed proceeding section 72 of the Civil Practice Act may not, in the absence of fraud, be used to again put in issue questions previously passed upon by the trial court, ( Southmoor Bank and Trust Co. v. Willis, 15 Ill.2d 388; Shapiro v. Hruby, 21 Ill.2d 353), such prior determinations being conclusive upon all parties and immune from collateral attack. ( Cherin v. R. C. Company, 11 Ill.2d 447; Clark v. Zaleski, 253 Ill. 63.

  5. Urban v. Lois, Inc.

    29 Ill. 2d 542 (Ill. 1963)   Cited 47 times
    In Urban v. Lois, Inc., 29 Ill. 2d 542 (1963), this court explained the rationale for limiting collateral attacks on tax deed orders by noting it " 'would defeat the desired conclusiveness of the county court's order for the issuance of a tax deed.

    ( People ex rel. Astle v. Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Co. 315 Ill. 536, 539; People ex rel. Thaxton v. Coal Belt Electric Railway Co. 311 Ill. 29, 33.) It is the jurisdiction over the land itself, acquired in the original application for judgment and order of sale that gives to the county court the power to act. ( Shapiro v. Hruby, 21 Ill.2d 353, 358; Cherin v. The R. C. Company, 11 Ill.2d 447, 454.) Once acquired the county court retains jurisdiction to make all necessary findings and enter all necessary orders supplemental to the original tax sale.

  6. Stanley v. the Bank of Marion

    23 Ill. 2d 414 (Ill. 1961)   Cited 19 times
    In Stanley, our supreme court held, with regard to taxes subsequent to a tax sale, that "[i]t is not mandatory that the certificate holder pay such taxes; rather, it is necessary only that they be paid prior to the issuance of deed."

    Section 266 of the Revenue Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, chap. 120, par. 747) provides that tax deeds issued pursuant thereto shall be incontestable except by appeal from the order of the county court directing the county clerk to issue the same. By this enactment, the legislature intended that such titles should be subject only to direct attack unless the circumstances are such as to warrant the application of section 72 of the Civil Practice Act, or unless the order for deed was utterly void. ( Shapiro v. Hruby, 21 Ill.2d 353.) Section 72 may not be used to again put in issue a factual question previously adjudicated but is available only to correct errors appearing upon the face of the record or to bring before the court facts not appearing in the record nor previously determined which, if known to the court at the time the judgment or decree was entered, would have prevented its rendition.

  7. In re Application of County Collector

    241 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968)   Cited 5 times

    [5] Petitioners also contend that it was error to proceed to trial until it appeared of record that a guardian ad litem had been appointed for the minors. None of the cases cited by petitioners in support of their contention were actions brought under the Revenue Act. By its enactment of section 266 of the Revenue Act of 1939 the legislature intended to render tax titles incontestable except by direct attack, unless the circumstances were such as to warrant the application of section 72 of the Civil Practice Act or unless the order directing the issuance of the deed was utterly void. Shapiro v. Hruby, 21 Ill.2d 353, 172 N.E.2d 775; Stanley v. Bank of Marion, 23 Ill.2d 414, 178 N.E.2d 367; Freisinger v. Interstate Bond Co., 24 Ill.2d 37, 179 N.E.2d 608. [6] To warrant the application of section 72 in a tax proceeding, the petitioner must allege and prove fraud.

  8. In re Application of County Collector

    67 Ill. App. 2d 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966)   Cited 3 times

    [1-3] It is well settled in tax deed proceedings that section 72 of the Civil Practice Act may not be used to relitigate any issue which has been passed upon by the trial court, in absence of fraud. Remer v. Interstate Bond Co., 21 Ill.2d 504, 510, 173 N.E.2d 425; Shapiro v. Hruby, 21 Ill.2d 353, 358, 172 N.E.2d 775. As stated in the case of Urban v. Lois, Inc., 29 Ill.2d 542, at page 548, 194 N.E.2d 294, "While Section 263 of the Revenue Act regarding the giving of notices must be complied with, a finding that such notices were duly given cannot be disputed in a collateral proceeding."

  9. McMillen v. Rydbom

    56 Ill. App. 2d 14 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965)   Cited 16 times

    Such order judicially determined the performance of conditions precedent to the issuance of a tax deed relative to notice and directed that such deed issue. These statutes were construed by the Illinois Supreme Court in a gamut of cases beginning with Cherin v. R. C. Company and ending with Urban v. Lois, Inc., to wit: Urban v. Lois, Inc., 29 Ill.2d 542, 194 N.E.2d 294 (1963); People ex rel. Wright v. Doe, 26 Ill.2d 446, 187 N.E.2d 222 (1962); Freisinger v. Interstate Bond Co., 24 Ill.2d 37, 179 N.E.2d 608 (1962); Stanley v. Bank of Marion, 23 Ill.2d 414, 178 N.E.2d 367 (1961); Shapiro v. Hruby, 21 Ill.2d 353, 172 N.E.2d 775 (1961); Remer v. Interstate Bond Co., 21 Ill.2d 504, 173 N.E.2d 425 (1961); Southmoor Bank and Trust Co. v. Willis, 15 Ill.2d 388, 155 N.E.2d 308 (1958); and Cherin v. R. C. Co., 11 Ill.2d 447, 143 N.E.2d 235 (1957). On January 1, 1964, jurisdiction over cases involving a freehold was transferred from the Supreme to the Appellate Court by the New Judicial Article. (Ill Const art VI, ยง 9, of 1870.)

  10. In re McKeever

    166 B.R. 648 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that a mere cursory search of phone directories to ascertain the correct address did not amount to fraud

    In addition, the tax purchaser testified that a diligent search for interested parties had been made in telephone directories. It turned out, however, that he had searched only Chicago listings, and failed to search a suburban telephone book where the former owners were listed. The court stated that the tax purchaser:. . . claimed that he had checked the listings in Chicago, which is the largest urban unit within Cook County. His failure to inspect the remaining telephone directories, which list many of that county's telephone subscribers, is no more indicative of deception than was the failure to check the Torrens records in Shapiro v. Hruby, 21 Ill.2d 353, 172 N.E.2d 775.Id.