Shapiro v. Cooke

13 Citing cases

  1. Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Multijurisdiction Practice v. Berch

    973 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (D. Ariz. 2013)   Cited 8 times
    Finding judicial immunity not available to defendants because they had been sued only in their official capacity

    See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 60 L.Ed.2d 250 (1979) (party challenging validity of rule bears of burden of showing that it discriminates against interstate commerce). Plaintiffs must show “that the rule favors residents vis-a-vis non-residents, either on its face or in its practical effects.” Shapiro v. Cooke, 552 F.Supp. 581, 588 (D.C.N.Y.1982). When a state regulation promotes a legitimate local public interest that has only incidental effects on commerce, the regulation is constitutional unless the burden on commerce is excessive compared to the local benefits.

  2. Sestric v. Clark

    765 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1985)   Cited 16 times
    Rejecting privileges and immunities challenge to state requirement that nonresident attorneys seeking admission to state bar must pass bar exam, although nonresident attorneys moving to state could be admitted by motion, and concluding that "privilege" to be evaluated under privileges and immunities clause is not the general privilege to practice law, but merely the privilege to practice law without taking state bar exam

    Several decisions, one by this court, uphold the constitutionality of continuous-practice requirements. See Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983); Salibra v. Supreme Court of Ohio, 730 F.2d 1059, 1062-64 (6th Cir. 1984); Shapiro v. Cooke, 552 F. Supp. 581 (N.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd on the district court's opinion, 702 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam). And Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir. 1974), upholds the denial of the continuous-practice exemption to a lawyer whose state of licensing does not reciprocate the exemption.

  3. Lowrie v. Goldenhersh

    716 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983)   Cited 25 times
    Upholding Illinois rule allowing admittance of foreign-licensed attorneys only if applicant has resided and actively practiced law in the outside jurisdiction for five of the seven years immediately preceding application

    Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly found that the rational basis for the years-of-practice requirement in Rule 705(a)(1) was a concern for the character and fitness of Rule 705(a)(1) applicants. Accord Shapiro v. Cooke, 552 F. Supp. 581 at 586-587 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Lowrie raises four additional arguments related to his equal protection claims.

  4. Solomon v. Emanuelson

    586 F. Supp. 280 (D. Conn. 1984)   Cited 7 times

    The defendant state bar officials and court clerk, charged with enforcement of the six months' residence rule in the first instance, do request abstention, but there are no exceptional circumstances warranting a refusal to act on the merits of a claim of denial of constitutional rights — i.e., no ongoing state judicial proceedings, compare Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 [ 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116] (1982), no potentially dispositive question of state law, cf. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [ 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971] (1941). See, e.g., Shapiro v.Cooke, 552 F. Supp. 581, 584-585 (N.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 46 (2 Cir. 1983) ( per curiam). Turning to the merits, defendants ultimately offer no adequate rationale for the six months' residence rule in question, which imposes a waiting period during which the veteran lawyer moving to Connecticut cannot even begin to apply for admission to practice before the state courts.

  5. In re Conner

    181 Vt. 555 (Vt. 2006)   Cited 6 times

    Accordingly, we find no Commerce Clause violation. See Schumacher, 965 F.2d at 1265 n. 4 (rejecting claim that Pennsylvania statute requiring graduation from accredited law school imposed burden on out-of-state attorney's right to compete across state borders); Giannini, 911 F.2d at 358-59 (holding that it was not "an unreasonable interference with commerce for attorneys of other states to be required to take the California bar to be able to practice in California"); Shapiro v. Cooke, 552 F. Supp. 581, 589 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that the "Commerce Clause is not offended by a rule which permits some, but not all, out-of-state attorneys to be admitted on waiver of the examination"), aff'd, 702 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1983). The United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States. . . ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.

  6. Scariano v. Justices of the Supreme Court

    38 F.3d 920 (7th Cir. 1994)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that "[t]he right to practice law without taking a bar examination is not a fundamental right for equal protection purposes"

    Notice that we do not suggest that Indiana has carte blanche to regulate merely because it could require the bar exam from everyone if it chose. Courts have found such reasoning persuasive in the past. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Cooke, 552 F. Supp. 581, 588 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). There is also some authority suggesting that reasoning like this is unobjectionable in the context of the Commerce Clause despite being problematic in other constitutional frameworks.

  7. Goldfarb v. Supreme Court of Virginia

    766 F.2d 859 (4th Cir. 1985)   Cited 17 times
    Finding rational an exemption from a state bar exam for out-of-state lawyers who moved to Virginia to practice full time even though bar applicants generally must take the bar exam before being licensed

    And because the availability of the bar examination helps to define the extent of that assertion in a way that it cannot define the independent existence of identical treatment, we include the examination alternative in our Commerce Clause calculus although we ignore it for equal protection purposes. Cf. Shapiro v. Cooke, 552 F. Supp. 581 (N.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd 702 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1983) ("if a state may constitutionally require all applicants to take the examination, the Commerce Clause is not offended by a rule which permits some, but not all, out-of-state attorneys to be admitted on waiver of the examination.") While indulging Goldfarb's equal protection concerns with imaginary Rules 1A:1(4)(d) that discriminate on the basis of race or religion, it is perhaps appropriate to note that the real Rule 1A:1(d) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Brown v. Supreme Court of Virginia, 359 F. Supp. 549 (E.D.Va.), aff'd mem. 414 U.S. 1034, 94 S.Ct. 534, 38 L.Ed.2d 327 (1973).

  8. Shapiro v. Cooke

    702 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1983)   Cited 8 times

    This is an appeal from a memorandum-decision and order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, Roger J. Miner, J., denying appellant's motion for summary judgment and granting appellees' cross-motion for summary judgment. Judge Miner's opinion is reported at 552 F.Supp. 581 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). Appellant alleges that 22 NYCRR § 520.9(a), which sets forth the standards governing admission to the New York State bar without examination, denies him various constitutional rights.

  9. Schoenefeld v. State

    1:09-CV-0504 (LEK/RFT) (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2010)   Cited 3 times

    Thus, the Court need only inquire as to whether the restrictions contained in § 470 are rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. See Shapiro v. Cooke, 552 F. Supp. 581, 586 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). While this Circuit has not specifically addressed the Constitutionality of § 470, other Circuits have found office requirements to have a rational basis.

  10. Scariano v. Jus. of S. Ct. of St. of Ind., (S.D.Ind. 1994)

    852 F. Supp. 708 (S.D. Ind. 1994)   Cited 3 times

    "If a state may constitutionally require all applicants to take the examination, the Commerce Clause is not offended by a rule which permits some, but not all, out-of-state attorneys to be admitted on waiver of the examination." Shapiro v. Cooke, 552 F. Supp. 581 (N.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd., 702 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Attwell v. Nichols, 466 F. Supp. 206 (N.D.Ga. 1979), aff'd, 608 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 612 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1980).