Therefore, appellants' defense is not in the nature of recoupment and thus is barred by the Act's statute of limitations. Accord, Hewlett v. John Blue Employees Federal Credit Union, 344 So.2d 505 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976); Hodges v. Community Loan Investment Corp., 133 Ga. App. 336, 210 S.E.2d 826 (1974), rev'd on other grounds, 234 Ga. 427, 216 S.E.2d 274 (1975); Waggoner Chapman, Truth-in-Lending Statute of Limitations and Recoupment, 31 Personal Finance L.Q. Report 76 (1977); see Basham v. Finance America Corp., 583 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1128, 99 S.Ct. 1046, 59 L.Ed.2d 89 (1979); cf. Gillis v. Fisher Hardware Co., 289 So.2d 451 (Fla.App. 1974) (a claim under the Act must be brought within one year); Shaw v. First National Bank, 143 Ga. App. 416, 238 S.E.2d 719 (1977) (a claim under the Act must be brought within one year); Shannon v. Carter, 282 Or. 449, 579 P.2d 1288 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090, 99 S.Ct. 873, 59 L.Ed.2d 57 (1979) (a recoupment defense is not allowed unless it would be unfair or unjust to hold otherwise). We note that other jurisdictions have reached contrary results to that reached by us in the present case.

See also Reliable Fin. Corp. v. Iacona, CCH Consumer Credit Guide ¶ 97,953 (D.R.I. 1977). Contra, Hewlett v. John Blue Employees Fed. Credit Union, 344 So.2d 505 (Ala.Civ.App. 1976); Hodges v. Community Loan Inv. Corp. of North Ga., 133 Ga. App. 336, 210 S.E.2d 826 (1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 234 Ga. 427, 216 S.E.2d 274 (1975); Beneficial Fin. Co. of Atlantic City v. Swaggerty, CCH Consumer Credit Guide ¶ 97,958 (N.J. Atlantic County Ct. 1978); Lincoln First Bank of Rochester v. Sielawa, 91 Misc.2d 778, 398 N.Y.S.2d 654 (N.Y. City Ct. 1977); Shannon v. Carter, 282 Or. 449, 579 P.2d 1288 (1978); Household Consumer Discount Co. v. Vespaziani, 255 Pa. Super. 367, 387 A.2d 93 (1978). II. Setoff of Attorney's Fees

The Oregon Supreme Court has applied the American Pipe rule on two occasions, both in the context of same-jurisdictional tolling. See, e.g., Bergquist v. Int'l Realty, Ltd., 537 P.2d 553, 562 (Or. 1975) (tolling the statute of limitations where both the class action and the individual claims arose under Oregon law); Shannon v. Carter, 579 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Or. 1978) (same for federal law). Plaintiffs have cited no law, and I am aware of none, suggesting that the Oregon courts would apply American Pipe tolling differently depending upon whether the prior class action was filed in a foreign federal or state court.

This list is also representative only. Gillis v. Fisher Hardware, 289 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Shannon v. Carter, 282 Or. 449, 579 P.2d 1288 (1978); Ken-Lu Enterprises, Inc. v. Neal, 29 N.C. App. 78, 223 S.E.2d 831 (1976); Hodges v. Community Loan and Investment Corp. of North Georgia, 133 Ga. App. 336, 210 S.E.2d 826 (Ga.App. Div.1); aff'd, as mod., 234 Ga. 427, 216 S.E.2d 274 (1975); Beneficial Finance Co. of Atlantic City v. Swaggerty, 159 N.J.Super. 507, 388 A.2d 647 (1978); Lincoln First Bank of Rochester v. Sielawa, 91 Misc.2d 778, 398 N.Y.S.2d 654 (1977).

435 F. Supp. 359 (D.Neb. 1977).Shannon v. Carter, 282 Or. 449, 579 P.2d 1288 (1978) cert. den. 439 U.S. 1090, 99 S.Ct. 873, 59 L.Ed.2d 57 (1979) (Recoupment not allowed); Continental Acceptance Corp. v. Rivera, 50 Ohio App.2d 338, 40 Ohio Op.3d 287, 363 N.E.2d 772 (1976) cert. den. 434 U.S. 857, 98 S.Ct. 180, 54 L.Ed.2d 129 (1978) (Recoupment allowed). In any event, there is nothing that the court can do in this adversary proceeding to give the debtors the benefit, whatever it is, of the trustee's right to sue.

Many courts have, however, considered the related question of whether the one year statute of limitations contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1982) may be used defensively to defeat a plaintiff's claim for damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1982). Compare Wood Acceptance Co. v. King, 18 Ill. App.3d 149, 309 N.E.2d 403 (1974) (limitations period does not bar counterclaim based on 15 U.S.C. § 1640) and Household Finance Corp. v. Hobbs, 387 A.2d 198 (Del.Super.Ct. 1978); with Shannon v. Carter, 282 Or. 449, 579 P.2d 1288 (1978) (defense of recoupment based upon violation of TILA barred by statute of limitations) and Ken-Lu Enterprises, Inc. v. Neal, 29 N.C. App. 78, 223 S.E.2d 831 (1976). Section 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1976) provided: "Any action under this section may be brought in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the violation."

eficial Fin. Co., 370 So.2d 1001 (Civ.App. 1979), cert. den., 370 So.2d 1005 (Sup.Ct. 1979) (under Alabama law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for set-off, not recoupment); Hodges v. Community Loan Investment Corp., 133 Ga. App. 336, 210 S.E.2d 826 (Ga.App. 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 234 Ga. 427, 216 S.E.2d 274 (Sup.Ct. 1975) (under Georgia law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is barred after one year); Empire Fin. Co. of Louisville v. Ewing, Ky., 558 S.W.2d 619 (Sup.Ct. 1977) (under Kentucky law a counterclaim for a TILA violation is for recoupment, not setoff); Public Loan Co. v. Hyde, 47 N.Y.2d 182, 417 N.Y.S.2d 238, 390 N.E.2d 1162 (Ct.App. 1979) (under New York law a counterclaim is not barred by the statute of limitations if it arises from the underlying transactions sued upon); Stephens v.Household Fin. Corp., 566 P.2d 1163 (Okla. 1977) (under Oklahoma law a counterclaim is not barred by the statute of limitations until the principal claim is so barred). But compareShannon v. Carter, 282 Or. 449, 579 P.2d 1288 (Sup.Ct. 1978), cert. den., 439 U.S. 1090, 99 S.Ct. 873,59 L.Ed.2d 57 (1979) (applying federal law and denying recoupment) with Household Consumer Discount v. Vespaziani, 490 Pa. 209, 415 A.2d 689 (Sup.Ct. 1980) (applying federal law and permitting recoupment). The supremacy clause of the United States Constitution dictates, however, that federal law is paramount and contrary state law must yield. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

See also Household Finance Corporation v. Hobbs, 387 A.2d 198 (1978); Garza v. Allied Finance Co., 566 S.W.2d 57 (1978); Akron National Bank Trust Co. v. Roundtree, 60 Ohio App.2d 13, 395 N.E.2d 525 (1978); Empire Finance Co. of Louisville Inc. v. Ewing, Ky. App., 558 S.W.2d 619 (1977). But see Public Loan Company,Inc. v. Hyde, 89 Misc.2d 226, 390 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1977); Shannon v. Carter, 282 Or. 449, 579 P.2d 1288 (1978). We adopt the latter line of cases finding that appellant's claims were indeed in the nature of a recoupment defense.

Also, the author of a thorough discussion of the instant issue has concluded that recoupment should be permitted. Comment, Truth in Lending and the Statute of Limitations, 21 Villanova L.Rev. 904 (1976). Decisions reaching a contrary result include, but are not limited to, the following: Basham v. Finance Corp., 583 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, sub nom. De Jaynes v. General Finance Corp., 439 U.S. 1128, 99 S.Ct. 1046, 59 L.Ed.2d 89 (1979); Shannon v. Carter, 282 Or. 449, 579 P.2d 1288 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090, 99 S.Ct. 873, 59 L.Ed.2d 57 (1979); Hodges v. Community Loan Investment Corp., 133 Ga. App. 336, 210 S.E.2d 826 (1974), rev'd in part on other grounds, 234 Ga. 427, 216 S.E.2d 274 (1975); and Household Consumer Discount Company v. Vespaziani, 255 Pa. Super. 367, 387 A.2d 93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978). 1. A claim for recoupment has its own unique characteristics, separate and distinct from other defenses which may be asserted: it must arise out of the same transaction that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's action and it can only be utilized to reduce or avoid the plaintiff's recovery.

" Stephens v. Household Finance Corp. (Okla. 1977), 566 P.2d 1163, 1166. • 3 While we realize that there have been decisions to the contrary (see, e.g., Shannon v. Carter (1978), 282 Or. 449, 579 P.2d 1288; Ken-Lu Enterprises, Inc. v. Neal (1976), 29 N.C. App. 78, 223 S.E.2d 831), we believe that permitting the Riddles' counterclaim is most consonant with Congress' intent in passing TILA and Illinois precedent. As the court stated in Wood, barring a defense or counterclaim under section 1640(e) in the same manner as a separate action would reward the unscrupulous lender by giving him a reason to delay a suit on a note for one year so that violation of the Act could not be used against him. Having decided that the Riddles are entitled to bring a counterclaim, we must next address the problem of damages. Under TILA, the measure of damages is fixed as twice the finance charge, but not less than $100 nor more than $1,000.