The law with respect to damages caused to persons walking into glass doors seems to turn on a close analysis of the facts in each individual case. In Shannon v. Broadway 41st St. Corp. ( 272 App. Div. 1029, affd. 298 N.Y. 589) the plaintiff walked against a plate glass window in defendant's restaurant at Broadway and 41st Street in New York City. The windows could be lowered into the basement, and during the summer when it was lowered the window space was used as a means of ingress and egress. Plaintiff, accustomed to this use and believing the passage unobstructed, was injured when the glass window panel was raised into place without warning of its presence.

Of course, whether the proprietor is responsible to a patron who comes in contact with a glass door or wall and sustains injuries, depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident judged in light of the controlling legal standards. Apparently, the Kansas Supreme Court has not had occasion to deal with a plate glass case, but other jurisdictions have. Cases where plaintiff recovered for injuries resulting from contact with plate glass walls or doors are: Kanner v. Best Markets, Inc., 188 Pa. Super. 366, 147 A.2d 172 (1958); Fisher Construction Co. v. Riggs, 320 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.Civ.App. 1959); Grabel v. Handro Co., 161 N.Y.S.2d 998 (N.Y.City Ct. 1955); Harold Corporation v. Herzberg, 110 So.2d 683 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1959); Shannon v. Broadway 41st St. Corp., 298 N.Y. 589, 81 N.E.2d 324 (1948); Shannon v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Company, 96 Ga. App. 458, 100 S.E.2d 478 (1957). On the other hand, recovery was denied in Brown v. Alabama Foods, Inc., 190 A.2d 257 (D.C.Ct.App. 1963); Acme Laundry Company v. Ford, 284 S.W.2d 745 (Tex.Civ.App. 1955); A.C. Burton Co. v. Stasny, 233 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.Civ.App. 1949); Rosenberg v. Hartman, 313 Mass. 54, 46 N.E.2d 406 (Sup.Jud.Ct. 1943); Dukek v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk Co., 248 Minn. 374, 80 N.W.2d 53 (1956).

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered March 12, 1968 in favor of defendant upon the trial court's dismissal of the complaint at the end of plaintiff's case upon a jury trial. Judgment affirmed, with costs. "While under some circumstances a glass door exit may be constructed or maintained in a manner so as to constitute negligence (see Shannon v. Broadway 41st St. Corp., 272 App. Div. 1029, affd. 298 N.Y. 589), in the instant case there was a complete absence of proof of negligence on the part of defendant. There was no evidence offered to show faulty construction or improper maintenance" ( Luciano v. Mapart, Inc., 14 A.D.2d 843, mot. for lv. to app.

Judgment affirmed, with costs. In our opinion, the defendant's liability was properly determined as a question of fact, since the glass was not made apparent by any warning device to one using the passageway ( Shannon v. Broadway 41st St. Corp., 272 App. Div. 1029, affd. 298 N.Y. 589). The infant plaintiff "having `the status of a licensee', the defendant [landowner] owed him `the duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose * * * dangerous defects known to defendant and not likely to be discovered by plaintiff'" ( Brzostowski v. Coca-Cola Co., 16 A.D.2d 196, 199). Under the circumstances here, whether the defendant owner properly discharged his duty was an issue of fact (cf. Brzostowski v. Coca-Cola Co., supra). Beldock, P.J., Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur; Ughetta and Christ, JJ., dissent and vote to reverse the judgment and to dismiss the complaint on the ground that under the circumstances here the glass door did not constitute a trap or hidden danger of which the infant plaintiff, a social visitor, was unaware; and hence the defendant owner did not have any duty to give said plaintiff special notice or warning with respect to such door.

Appeal by plaintiff in a personal injury negligence action from a judgment of the Schenectady County Court in favor of defendant dismissing the complaint upon the ground of plaintiff's failure to prove a cause of action. About midafternoon on May 14, 1960 plaintiff sustained injuries to his nose when in an attempt to leave defendant's department store in Schenectady, New York, by its easterly exit to the public street, he walked against a stationary glass panel 18 1/4 inches in width located adjacent to two glass doors of the same height each of which was 30 inches wide and the nearer of which at the time was fixed in an open position. As was said in a recent case: "While under some circumstances a glass door exit may be constructed or maintained in a manner so as to constitute negligence (see Shannon v. Broadway 41st St. Corp., 272 App. Div. 1029, affd. 298 N.Y. 589), in the instant case there was a complete absence of proof of negligence on the part of the defendant. There was no evidence offered to show faulty construction or improper maintenance.

Judgment upon a directed verdict for defendant dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs to respondent. While under some circumstances a glass door exit may be constructed or maintained in a manner so as to constitute negligence (see Shannon v. Broadway 41st St. Corp., 272 App. Div. 1029, affd. 298 N.Y. 589), in the instant case there was a complete absence of proof of negligence on the part of the defendant. There was no evidence offered to show faulty construction or improper maintenance.

The two New York cases upon which plaintiff relies are clearly distinguishable from the case at bar and present fact questions which were properly left to the jury. In Shannon v. Broadway 41st St. Corp. ( 272 App. Div. 1029, affd. 298 N.Y. 589) a jury verdict for plaintiff was sustained where plaintiff walked into a glass panel separating the restaurant interior from a sidewalk cafe. When the sidewalk cafe was in operation the glass panel was removed to allow free passage to the sidewalk.

The court held that the entire arrangement gave an illusion of space and "when the illusion is so successful that some hapless person is injured in mistaking the illusion for reality he can hardly be charged with contributory negligence as a matter of law." Shannon v. Broadway 41st Street Corporation, 298 N.Y. 589, 81 N.E.2d 324, likewise departs from the majority rule applicable to glass door or window accidents. However this case appears to be an exception to the majority rule because of its factual background.

Accord: Shannon v. Broadway 41st. Street Corp., 298 N.Y. 589, 81 N.E.2d 324; Grabel v. Handro Co., City Ct., 161 N.Y.S.2d 998. This reasoning of the able trial judge correctly distinguishes this case from decisions relied on by appellant and, together with the general rule with respect to jury determination of disputes in testimony as to whether a situation is such as to alert an ordinary observer of a hazard resulting from another's conceded negligence, requires that the judgment in this cause be affirmed.

There is no dispute that pipe which had been taken from the bathroom was on the roof on the night in question or where it was located, there being several different pieces of varying length. There was also testimony, which was seriously disputed, that on the night in question there was still some debris in the form of loose laths and plaster which had been left by the truckmen when the major part of the debris was taken away. From a review of the testimony of all the witnesses, the court was justified in submitting the question of contributory negligence to the jury as a question of fact and we cannot say that the matter is one of law. ( Shannon v. Broadway 41st St. Corp., 298 N.Y. 589-590.) This case is distinguishable from Hudson v. Church of Holy Trinity ( 250 N.Y. 513) relied upon by the defendant-appellant as in that case there was not a relationship of landlord and tenant, the plaintiff was not familiar with the premises and there was no evidence that the defendant or its employees or agents invited the plaintiff to walk into the darkness which caused her fall and injury. The defendant raises a further question concerning testimony that the defendant was insured.