The rules governing other businesses and trades are not relevant to either the legal or medical profession, as both often require the disclosure of private and confidential information such as, in the context of physician and patient, personal medical or family history. We agree with the dissent of Justice Smith in Shankman v. Coastal Psychiatric Assocs., 258 Ga. 294, 368 S.E.2d 753 (1988) in which he stated: The medical profession, like the legal profession, is one that of necessity must have the faith and confidence of its patients (clients) in order to give effective treatment.

SMITH, Justice, dissenting. I think the agreement in this case is not valid. For other reasons see Smith, J., dissenting in Shankman v. Coastal Psychiatric Assoc., 258 Ga. 294 ( 368 S.E.2d 753) (1988).

See Rash, supra at 326 (restrictive covenant not void as against public policy because it limited patients' choice of physician within geographical area). See also Shankman v. Coastal Psychiatric Assoc., 258 Ga. 294 ( 368 S.E.2d 753) (1988); Karlin v. Weinberg, 390 A.2d 1161, 1168, n. 6 (N.J. 1978). 4.

Troup County Electric Membership Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 229 Ga. 348, 351, 191 S.E.2d 33 (1972).Shankman v. Coastal Psychiatric Assoc., 258 Ga. 294, 296 n. 2 (1988) (dissent); see also 1983 Ga. Const. Art. 3 § 6 ¶ V(c) ("The General Assembly shall not have the power to authorize any contract or agreement which may have the effect of or which is intended to have the effect of defeating or lessening competition, or encouraging a monopoly, which are hereby declared to be unlawful and void"). Nordson, which applied Ohio law to uphold an NCA otherwise unenforceable under Georgia law, 674 F.2d at 1374, 1377, is factually distinguishable.