Opinion
No. 3-531 / 02-1612
Filed October 29, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forLee (South) County, Mary Ann Brown, Judge.
Darlene Shankle appeals a trial judge's ruling in a products liability case admitting testimony concerning repair history of an allegedly defective product. AFFIRMED.
Christopher Cook of Wandro, Lyons Baer, P.C., Des Moines, and Glenn Norris and George Davison, Jr. of Hawkins Norris, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Richard Whitty and Kerrie Liedtke of O'Connor Thomas, P.C., Dubuque, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Darlene Shankle appeals a trial judge's ruling in a products liability case admitting testimony concerning repair history of an allegedly defective product. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On August 15, 1998, Shankle was injured when a fluid tube of a sprayer she was using broke loose from the sprayer at a solder joint spewing flammable liquids over her body. Shankle sued Armour, the manufacturer of the sprayer, under theories of products liability as well as negligent manufacture. She specifically claimed a solder connection on the sprayer was defectively manufactured.
Before trial, Shankle moved in limine to preclude Armour from submitting evidence concerning the positive safety records of its sprayers. Shankle argued the safety record of this or other sprayers was irrelevant to any of her theories of liability. The court granted Shankle's motion without final ruling on admissibility, stating:
The only purpose that the Court can envision offering into evidence the absence of prior accidents with this particular or other spray guns similar to it would be to show some type of knowledge on the part of the Defendant. In order for the Plaintiff to prove its strict liability claim, it is not even necessary for the Plaintiff to prove that the Defendant knew the product was defective. As a result, any evidence concerning the absence of accidents with the spray gun is not relevant to any issue in this proceeding. Reference thereto could be prejudicial to the Plaintiff. As a result, the Plaintiff's motion should be granted.
The court, however, warned Shankle that if she argued that Armour knew or should have known something before the incident, the court would likely allow Armour to present evidence that they had no knowledge of prior complaints.
At trial, Armour asked the trial judge to reconsider her earlier ruling because Shankle questioned Michael Mihna, the President of Armour, about his familiarity with the production process and repair history of the sprayer involved in this incident. The trial judge found Shankle's questions opened the door to this line of inquiry. The judge stated:
As a result, I think that we have a different issue here and I'm not basing my ruling on similar incidents or similar accidents. That's not what this is based upon. It's based upon the opportunity that needs to be given to the defendant to respond to evidence that's already been entered into the record concerning the typical types of things that need to be repaired on these tubes.
And, as a result, I'm going to-I don't even know that this relates to the motion in limine, to tell you the truth, because it's a different issue. I believe if the issue comes up, the defendant should be allowed to offer testimony . . .[as to] whether that has been something else that they've had to repair on guns when they've come in for repairs.
Mihna then testified that in the last fifteen to twenty years he has never seen or heard of a defect in the solder connection of the sprayer at issue in this case.
The jury subsequently returned a verdict for Armour and Shankle now appeals. On appeal Shankle raises the following issue:
The District Court abused its discretion when it allowed the admission of testimony concerning Defendant-Appellee's lack of knowledge of other incidence involving its spray guns.
II. Standard of Review
Our review in this law action is for errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4.
III. Preservation of Error
Armour argues that Shankle has not preserved error on this issue because she failed to timely object to the challenged testimony at trial. Shankle argues the trial court's ruling on Armour's request to reconsider its earlier ruling was dispositive and no further objection was necessary.
The primary purpose of a motion in limine is to preclude reference to potentially prejudicial evidence prior to the trial court's definitive ruling on its admissibility. State v. Davis, 240 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Iowa 1976). Generally, any error based on the trial court's disposition of a motion in limine is not preserved unless the record includes a timely objection when the challenged evidence is offered at trial. Id. The resolution of a preservation of error issue is "not controlled by the title of the motion or its prayer." State v. O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Iowa 1979). Our concern is "what the ruling of the trial court does or purports to do." Id. A ruling limited to protection from prejudicial references must be distinguished from a ruling on the admissibility of the challenged evidence. State v. Miller, 229 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Iowa 1975). If the trial court's ruling is dispositive on the issue of admissibility, it is considered final for purposes of appeal and no further objection is necessary. Id.
In this case the district court's ruling provided in part:
I think all of that testimony and all of that evidence has created a situation where the defendant ought to be able to respond . . . I think that the defendant should be able to offer testimony about whether that has been one of the typical items of repair . . . But I want to make it clear that repair issues, I think, have been talked about and it's appropriate to respond to those.
We find this language was sufficiently dispositive of Shankle's objection to obviate the need for further objection at trial. We affirm on this issue.
IV. Admissibility of Mihna's Testimony
Alleged errors regarding the admission of evidence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Dettmann v. Kruckenberg, 613 N.W.2d 238, 249 (Iowa 2000). Under the abuse of discretion standard, we will reverse when the ruling rests on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or unreasonable. Morris-Rosdail v. Schechinger, 576 N.W.2d 609, 611 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). A ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law. State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001) (citing Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Iowa 2000)).
At trial, Shankle questioned Mihna concerning his familiarity with the manufacture and repair of the sprayer at issue. "[O]ne who induces a trial court to let down the bars of a field of inquiry that is not competent or relevant to the issues cannot complain if his adversary was also allowed to avail himself of the opening." State v. Jones, 471 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Iowa 1991) (citation omitted). Moreover, the doctrine of curative admissibility provides that when "one party introduces inadmissible evidence, with or without objection, the trial court may allow the adverse party to offer otherwise inadmissible evidence on the same subject if it is responsive to the evidence in question." Lala v. Peoples Bank Trust Co. of Cedar Rapids, 420 N.W.2d 804, 807-08 (Iowa 1988) (citations omitted). The trial judge expressly and correctly warned Shankle's attorney concerning the consequences of inquiries concerning Mihna's familiarity with the sprayer's repair history. The trial judge did not abuse her discretion by concluding Shankle opened the door to Mihna's testimony and allowing Armour to respond accordingly The district court's judgment is therefore affirmed.