Opinion
C.A. No. 17-260 Erie
07-13-2018
ROBERT SHANER, Plaintiff v. LORI BROWN, Defendant
District Judge Hornak
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss [ECF No. 12] be granted and that this cased be dismissed. II. REPORT
A . Relevant Procedural History
On October 2, 2017, Plaintiff Robert Shaner, an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Albion"), filed this pro se civil rights action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant Lori Brown, a phlebotomist under contract to provide medical services to inmates in the optometry department at SCI-Albion. Plaintiff claims that Defendant failed to provide him with new prescription eyeglasses in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In addition, Plaintiff claims that Defendant made false statements in his medical chart and grievance paperwork in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. As relief for his claims, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages.
On December 15, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint [ECF No. 12], arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has since filed a response and brief in opposition to Defendant's motion [ECF Nos. 16, 17]. This matter is now ripe for consideration.
The factual history has been gleaned from the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint, as supplemented by the exhibits attached thereto, which are deemed part of the complaint.
On May 28, 2017, Plaintiff wrote a sick call request asking for a new pair of eyeglasses because his old eyeglasses were broken and had been confiscated. (ECF No. 4-3, at p. 2). On June 6, 2017, Defendant responded to Plaintiff's sick call request stating that Plaintiff was on the list to be seen by the optometry department; however, on July 5, 2017, Plaintiff filed a grievance complaining that he hadn't yet been seen by the optometry staff. (ECF No. 4-2, at p. 2). In her initial review response to Plaintiff's grievance, Jeri Smock, CHCA, stated that Plaintiff was examined by the optometrist on June 14, 2017 and was written a prescription for new eyeglasses. (Id. at p. 3). In addition, Ms. Smock stated that Defendant loaned him a temporary pair of frames to replace his old ones until his new eyeglasses were received. (Id.). Ms. Smock indicated further that the "optometry system ha[d] been down" and, thus, Defendant was unable to place the new order, but that she would do so as soon as the system was "back up and running." (Id.).
On July 26, 2017, Plaintiff was seen by the optometry department and was told that his eyeglasses were being ordered "for the second time." (ECF No. 4, Complaint, at p. 4). On August 9, 2017, Plaintiff submitted an inmate request to SCI-Albion's business office asking if the money for the new eyeglasses had been deducted from his inmate account yet. (ECF No. 4-1, at p. 2). The business office staff responded that no deduction for the glasses had been made. (Id.). On September 1, 2017, Plaintiff submitted another inmate request to the business office asking if the money for the glasses had been deducted from his account. (Id., at p. 3). In response, the business office replied that no deduction had been made because he did not have enough funds in his account. (Id.). The present action ensued.
C. Standards of Review
1. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007). A complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (May 18, 2009) (specifically applying Twombly analysis beyond the context of the Sherman Act).
The Court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) citing Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Nor must the court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions"). A Plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, citing 5 C.Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (3d ed. 2004). Although the United States Supreme Court does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D.Del. February 19, 2008) quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
The Third Circuit subsequently expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases:
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, we must take the following three steps:Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'
2. Pro Se Pleadings
Pro se pleadings, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the court can reasonably read pleadings to state a valid claim on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) ("petition prepared by a prisoner... may be inartfully drawn and should be read 'with a measure of tolerance'"); Freeman v. Department of Corrections, 949 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1991). Under our liberal pleading rules, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997) (overruled on other grounds). See, e.g., Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) standard); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Company, 906 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1990) (same). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, this Court will consider facts and make inferences where it is appropriate.
D. Discussion
1. Fourth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated his Fourth Amendment rights "by lying and false documenting information in [his] medical-chart and grievance paper-work by stating that [he] was examined on 6-14-17 and wrote out a prescription for [his] new eyeglasses ... and ... that [Defendant] loaned [him] a temporary pair [of eyeglasses]" when he was never examined or given a pair of loaner eyeglasses at that time. (ECF No. 4, Complaint, at p. 4).
In general, the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes unreasonable searches and seizures. Obviously, Plaintiff's allegations regarding Defendant's allegedly false statements in his medical chart and grievance paperwork do not, in any way, implicate an unreasonable search or seizure of his property. Thus, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim has no merit and should be dismissed.
2. Eighth Amendment Claim
In the medical context, a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment occurs only when prison officials are deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). "In order to establish a violation of [the] constitutional right to adequate medical care, evidence must show (i) a serious medical need, and (ii) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need." Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need involves the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Estelle, 429 U.S at 104. Such indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or "persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury" White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
A serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Monmouth County Correction Institute Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). --------
Mere misdiagnosis or negligent treatment is not actionable as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. "Indeed, prison authorities are accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners." Durmer, 991 F.2d at 67 (citations omitted). Any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment is disavowed by courts since such determinations remain a question of sound professional judgment. Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979), quoting Bowring v. Goodwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, deliberate indifference is generally not found when some level of medical care has been offered to the inmate. Clark v. Doe, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 13, 2000) ("courts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims where an inmate has received some level of medical care").
Here, Plaintiff's allegations make clear that Defendant is a phlebotomist, not an optometrist. Thus, she was not responsible for examining Plaintiff's eyes, or for writing the prescription for new eyeglasses. Instead, Plaintiff appears to be alleging that Defendant denied him a new pair of eyeglasses by failing to order them after a prescription was issued. However, the allegations fail to attribute this failure to any deliberate indifference on the part of Defendant. Initially, the documents attached to Plaintiff's complaint indicate that the immediate delay in ordering the eyeglasses was attributable to a fault in the ordering system, which required repair before the order could be processed. More importantly, it is apparent from Plaintiff's allegations that the primary reason the eyeglasses were not ordered was the business office's refusal to debit Plaintiff's inmate account for the cost of the eyeglasses due to the lack of sufficient funds in his account. Neither of these circumstances implicate Defendant's deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. Thus, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed.
3. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. "This is not a command that all persons be treated alike but, rather, 'a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.'" Artway v. Attorney General of State of N.J., 81 F.3d 1235, 1267 (3d Cir.1996), quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). See also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (Equal Protection Clause prohibits decision to prosecute based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification).
The level of scrutiny applied to ensure that classifications comply with this guarantee differs depending on the nature of the classification. Classifications involving suspect or quasi-suspect class, or impacting certain fundamental constitutional rights, are subject to heightened or "strict" scrutiny. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439. Other classifications are subject to the "rational basis" test, which requires that a classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest to survive an equal protection challenge. F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts); Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465 (1991).
Moreover, to demonstrate an equal protection violation, an inmate has the burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987). Official action does not violate the Equal Protection Clause solely because it results in a disproportionate impact; proof of discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1977); Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 938 (3d Cir.1996). Discriminatory purpose implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker selected a particular course of action at least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. An inmate must offer evidence specific to his own case that would support an inference that unlawful considerations played a part in the adverse decision. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293.
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that he is a member of a suspect class, as it is well settled that prison inmates are not a suspect class. Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001); See also Nicholas v. Tucker, 114 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1997) (inmates are not suspect class so as to require more exacting scrutiny), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1126 (1998); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997); Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, Plaintiff is essentially invoking the "class of one" theory announced by the Supreme Court in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).
According to the "class of one" theory, "a plaintiff must allege that (i) the defendant treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment." Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006). citing Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege the existence of similarly situated inmates who were, in fact, treated differently than him. Instead, he alleges that, as an indigent inmate, he is not being treated equally "like any other inmate that can pay for eye glasses...." (ECF No. 4, Complaint, at p. 6). In other words, Plaintiff is comparing his treatment as an indigent inmate to other inmates who are not indigent and, thus, are dissimilarly situated. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to make any factual allegations that would establish purposeful discrimination. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of equal protection upon which relief may be granted and the same should be dismissed. II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss [ECF No. 12] be granted and that this cased be dismissed.
In accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2), the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service to file written objections to this report and recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F. 3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011).
/s/ Susan Paradise Baxter
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER
United States Magistrate Judge Date: July 13, 2018 cc: The Honorable Mark R. Hornak
United States District Judge