Although plaintiff does not claim that she lost wages owed to her, she testified at her deposition that she lost future compensation and an opportunity for promotion as a direct result of her injuries. Defendants did not demonstrate that plaintiff will be unable to establish her claims with reasonable certainty at trial (see El Shammaa v Parent, 237 A.D.2d 684, 686 [3d Dept 1997]).

Although plaintiff does not claim that she lost wages owed to her, she testified at her deposition that she lost future compensation and an opportunity for promotion as a direct result of her injuries. Defendants did not demonstrate that plaintiff will be unable to establish her claims with reasonable certainty at trial (see El Shammaa v. Parent, 237 A.D.2d 684, 686, 654 N.Y.S.2d 437 [3d Dept. 1997] ).

In its moving papers, defendant failed to respond to plaintiffs assertion — detailed in the bill of particulars — that defendant created or exacerbated the allegedly dangerous condition by piling snow around a low, inadequately lighted area of the sidewalk, thereby allowing runoff to pool and freeze. Accordingly, defendant's motion was properly denied ( see Schissler v Athens Assoc., supra at 979-980; Amidon v Yankee Trails, Inc., supra at 837; El Shammaa v Parent, 237 AD2d 684, 685). Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Supreme Court properly denied that part of defendant's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the common-law negligence cause of action. The "presence of ice below the gutterless roof raises a question of fact as to causation and [the owner's] responsibility * * * for defects on the premises over which he retains control" ( El Shammaa v. Parent, 237 A.D.2d 684, 685; see also, Loguidice v. Fiorito, 254 A.D.2d 714; Migli v. Davenport, 249 A.D.2d 932). The court properly granted that part of defendant's motion seeking summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241 Lab. (6) claim and third-party defendant's cross motion for the same relief. The Labor Law § 241 Lab. (6) claim is premised upon an alleged violation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.7 (d) and (e). Because the accident occurred in an open area and not on a defined walkway, passageway or path, section 23-1.7 (d) does not apply ( see, Hill v. Corning Inc., 237 A.D.2d 881, 882, lv dismissed in part and denied in part 90 N.Y.2d 884; McGrath v. Lake Tree Vil. Assocs., 216 A.D.2d 877, 878).

that "[s]ummary judgment is a drastic remedy and `should not be granted where there is any doubt as to the existence of a triable issue'" ( Napierski v. Finn, 229 A.D.2d 869, 870, quoting Moskowitz v. Garlock, 23 A.D.2d 943, 944); it must clearly appear that no material and triable issue of fact is presented ( see, Lustyik v. Manaher, 226 A.D.2d 852; Bulger v. Tri-Town Agency, 148 A.D.2d 44, lv dismissed 75 N.Y.2d 808) and the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ( see, Stata v. Village of Waterford, 225 A.D.2d 163, 167; Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate v. Berner, 202 A.D.2d 949, 950; Weiss v. Garfield, 21 A.D.2d 156). Liability for a slip and fall injury is based in part on the party responsible for controlling and maintaining the subject property ( see, Russell v. Hepburn Hosp., 154 A.D.2d 796, 797). If the controlling party is a lessee, it must be shown that the lessee knew or should have known that the icy condition existed ( see, El Shammaa v. Parent, 237 A.D.2d 684). A lessor will be held responsible only if the lessor maintained sufficient control over the property as to impute liability due to a lack of corrective action in removing a dangerous condition ( see, Lynch v. Lom-Sur Co., 161 A.D.2d 885). However, if the dangerous condition was the result of a snow storm, the controlling party must be given a reasonable amount of time after the storm ceases to remedy the dangerous condition ( see, Zima v. North Colonie Cent. School Dist., 225 A.D.2d 993, 994; Downes v. Equitable Life Assur. Socy., 209 A.D.2d 769; Croff v. Grand Union Co., 205 A.D.2d 856).

Both defendants and Donohue-Halverson successfully moved for summary judgment before Supreme Court, thus prompting these appeals. While an "out-of-possession landlord is not liable for conditions upon the land after transfer of possession and control" ( Kinner v. Corning, Inc., 190 A.D.2d 977; see, Seigel v. Congregation Zichron Shmuel, 226 A.D.2d 913), where one "contracts to repair or maintain the property, [such out-of-possession landlord] may be liable for defects thereon" ( Webb v. Audi, 208 A.D.2d 1122; see, El Shammaa v. Parent, 237 A.D.2d 684). Defendants, as the proponent of this motion, contend that they transferred full possession and control, along with the responsibility to remove snow and ice on the sidewalk, to their tenants by the lease agreement. Yet, our review of such agreement reveals no provisions addressing these issues.

Although plaintiff does not claim that she lost wages owed to her, she testified at her deposition that she lost future compensation and an opportunity for promotion as a direct result of her injuries. Defendants did not demonstrate that plaintiff will be unable to establish her claims with reasonable certainty at trial (see El Shammaa v Parent, 237 A.D.2d 684, 686 [3d Dept 1997]).