Opinion
04-24-00602-CV
11-08-2024
Michael Lawrence SHALIT, Appellant v. Robin Lynn SHALIT, Appellee
From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas Trial Court No. 11-177 Honorable Kirsten Cohoon, Judge Presiding.
ORDER
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice.
This case concerns the dissolution of the parties' marriage. This appeal arises from post-decree proceedings. Pending before the court is appellant's "Unopposed Motion to Dismiss or Consolidate Appeal." Appellant filed his motion in this cause number and in Cause Number 04-24-00605-CV. By his motion, appellant seeks dismissal of the appeal in Cause Number 04-24-00605-CV or, alternatively, consolidation of the two appeals. On October 30, 2024, this court granted appellant's motion in Cause Number 04-24-00605-CV and dismissed that appeal. Consequently, we DENY AS MOOT appellant's motion pending in this cause number.
The chief deputy clerk of this court has transferred the record filed in Cause Number 04-24-00605-CV to Cause Number 04-24-00602-CV. The record appears complete; therefore, the next appellate deadline is the deadline for appellant to file his brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(a). We ORDER appellant to file his brief on or before December 9, 2024. We ORDER that appellee's brief must be filed within thirty days after the date appellant's brief is filed. See id. R. 38.6(b).
The order which appellant appeals from is an "Order on Motion for Emergency Funds," signed by the trial court on August 13, 2024. Appellant states in his notice of appeal:
Appellant believes the Order is a final, appealable order subject to regular appellate process. However, to the extent it could be viewed as a temporary injunction under Harley Channelview Properties, LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LL[C], 690 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2024), the appeal should be handled on an accelerated basis.
"Appellate review is ordinarily limited to final judgments." Harley Channelview Props., 690 S.W.3d at 37. "An appellate court has no jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order unless review is conferred by statute." Id. "Further, in cases brought under the Family Code, the Legislature expressly has prohibited review of temporary orders, which often include temporary injunctive relief." Id. at 41 (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.507). As to the finality of judgments, "when there has been no traditional trial on the merits, no presumption arises regarding the finality of a judgment." Crites v. Collins, 284 S.W.3d 839, 840 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). Additionally, without a conventional trial on the merits, a judgment that does not dispose of a claim for attorney's fees is not a final judgment, unless it "states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties." Farm Bureau Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 455 S.W.3d 161, 163-64 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 192-93 (Tex. 2001)).
We ORDER the parties to address in their briefs whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. The parties should make their contentions as to the nature of the trial court's August 13, 2024 Order on Motion for Emergency Funds (e.g., final order, temporary injunction, temporary order, etc.) and address whether we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal. The parties should support their contentions with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i), 38.2(a)(1).