Opinion
Civil Action GLR-23-1167
11-01-2023
Rahman Shakil v. Kofi Boateng
MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL RE:
GEORGE L. RUSSELL, III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dear Counsel:
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Shakil Rahman's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8). The Motion is ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D.Md. 2023). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the Motion.
The Clerk of Court is directed to correct the docket to reflect Rahman's correct name.
Background
On October 25, 2019, Defendant Kofi Boateng's title and interest in real property located at 12600 Nichols Promise Drive, Bowie, Maryland 20720 (“the Property”) was extinguished in a ratified foreclosure sale. See Boateng v. Brown, No. CAEF16-04391 (Prince George's Cty. Cir. Ct.). On March 23, 2023, Plaintiff Shakil Rahman filed a Complaint for Wrongful Detainer against all occupants of 12600 Nichols Promise Drive, Bowie, Maryland 20720 in Maryland State Court pursuant to § 14-132 of Maryland's Real Property Code. (ECF No. 2). On May 3, 2023, Defendant Kofi Boateng removed the action to this Court. (ECF No. 1). On May 18, 2023, Rahman filed a Motion to Remand. (ECF No. 8). Boateng filed an Opposition on May 24, 2023 and purported to file counterclaims, (Resp. Opp. at 1-3, ECF No. 9), which are prohibited in wrongful detainer actions, see Md. Code. Ann., Real Prop. § 14-132.
Standard of Review
A defendant may remove a state court action to federal court if the federal court would have original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions that arise under federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or have an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and complete diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
A party seeking removal carries the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). The Court must “strictly construe the removal statute and resolve all doubts in favor of remanding the case to state court.” Goucher Coll. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 541 F.Supp.3d 642, 647 (D.Md. 2021) (quoting Richardson v. Phillip Morris Inc., 950 F.Supp. 700, 702 (D.Md. 1997)). Accordingly, if federal jurisdiction is doubtful, the Court should grant a motion to remand. Mulcahey, 29 F.3d at 151.
Analysis
In the Motion to Remand, Shakil argues that Boateng's removal of this action was improper because there is no basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. (Mot. Remand at 1, ECF No. 8). The Court agrees with Shakil and will remand the case to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a district court must remand any case in which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 584 (4th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a party seeking adjudication in federal court must “demonstrate the federal court's jurisdiction over the matter.” Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 2008). “Where a defendant seeks to remove a case to federal court, the defendant must simply allege subject matter jurisdiction in his notice of removal.” Cunningham v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 669 F.Supp.2d 624, 627 (D.Md. 2009). “But if the plaintiff challenges removal in a motion to remand, then the burden is on the defendant to ‘demonstrate] that removal jurisdiction is proper.'” Id. (quoting Strawn, 530 F.3d at 297). Here, Boateng has not demonstrated that removal jurisdiction is proper because the Court lacks both federal question and diversity jurisdiction.
Federal question jurisdiction arises only from “those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd. of the State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983). This case involves no such causes of action; rather, this case is an in rem wrongful detainer action arising under Maryland state law, involving property located in Maryland. Moreover, even if, as Boateng raises in his response to the Motion to Remained, Defendant has federal defenses or counterclaims to Plaintiffs' wrongful detainer action, these are not sufficient to support removal based on federal question jurisdiction. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002) (stating that a counterclaim “cannot serve as the basis for [federal question] jurisdiction”); Cook v. Georgetown Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 1272, 1275 (4th Cir. 1985) (“A federal defense to a state cause of action is not sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction . . .”). The Court therefore lacks federal question jurisdiction, and removal on this ground was improper.
Any attempt to remove this action based on diversity jurisdiction is also improper. District courts have jurisdiction over civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). In matters where a federal court has diversity jurisdiction, the case “may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). In this case, Boateng's notice of removal indicates that he is a Maryland citizen seeking to invoke diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. His request for removal is therefore barred by the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), since he is a nominal defendant-citizen of the state where this action was instituted. See LPP Mortg., LTD v. Fuller, No. 4:11-CV-24-BO, 2011 WL 13233531, at *1 (E.D. N.C. July 21, 2011). The Court therefore lacks diversity jurisdiction, and removal on this ground was improper.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 8) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion to Expedite the Court's Ruling on the Motion to Remand and its Opposition (ECF No. 10) is DENIED as moot. This case shall be REMANDED to the District Court for Prince George's County. Despite the informal nature of this memorandum, it shall constitute an Order of the Court, and the Clerk is directed to docket it accordingly.