Opinion
J-A20004-15 No. 342 EDA 2015
08-05-2015
SAFIA SHAIKH, Appellee v. BALIGH U. SYED, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
Appeal from the Order December 22, 2014, Court of Common Pleas, Northampton County, Domestic Relations at No. DR-0079714 - PACSES No. 311114714 BEFORE: DONOHUE, SHOGAN and WECHT, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.:
Baligh U. Syed ("Father") appeals from the December 22, 2014 order entered by the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas granting the petition for child support filed by Safia Shaikh ("Mother"). Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts and procedural history of this case as follows:
On June 13, 2014, [Mother] filed a Uniform Support Petition seeking child support for one child ... who was born in the United States [in] April [] 2008. [Mother] and [Father] were married in Pakistan on July 6, 2007, separated on November 20, 2011, and divorced in Pakistan on May 4, 2012.Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/15, at 1-7 (record citations and footnote omitted; emphasis in the original).
[Mother] resides in Texas and filed the [p]etition for [s]upport with the Child Support Division of the Attorney General's Office ("Texas Support Office") in Arlington, Texas. [Father] resides in Easton, Northampton County, Pennsylvania. The Texas
Support Office sent a [c]hild [s]upport [e]nforcement [t]ransmittal to the Northampton County Domestic Relations Section on June 23, 2014. The parties were ordered to appear for a support conference on July 29, 2014.
On July 21, 2014, [Father] filed [p]reliminary [o]bjections to [Mother]'s [s]upport [p]etition. The parties appeared for a hearing on the [p]reliminary [o]bjections on August 25, 2014. At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties were directed to file briefs in support of their respective legal positions regarding [Father]'s [p]reliminary [o]bjections. On September 12, 2014, the court, by the Honorable Paula A. Roscioli ..., overruled [Father]'s [p]reliminary [o]bjections to the [s]upport [p]etition and scheduled a support conference for October 15, 2014.
[Father] appeared at the support conference before Conference Officer Marta E. Husovsky ("Husovsky"). [Mother] was not required to appear. Husovsky determined that [Mother] was unemployed but currently volunteered in a hospital in Texas. It was noted that [Mother] was only temporarily in the United States. Husovsky concluded that [Mother] could not obtain a physician's salary in the United States because she was only temporarily in the United States, but was not medically unable to work. Therefore, Husovsky recommended that [Mother] be assessed a fulltime income as a home health aide at $9.98 per hour as per the Pennsylvania Occupational Wage Survey. On October 17, 2014, Judge Roscioli entered an [o]rder of [s]upport directing [Father] to pay child support in the amount of $1,030.00 per month, allocated as $858.00 for basic support of the one child and $172.00 for arrears. The [o]rder was based on an assessed income for [Mother] in accordance with Husovsky's recommendations and [Father]'s income as determined from paystubs submitted to the Domestic Relations Section.
On October 27, 2014, [Father] filed a written demand for a de novo hearing. On December 10, 2014, [Father] and his counsel appeared, as did [Mother] (via telephone) and the Title IV-D advocate, Attorney Stephen Mowrey.
At the hearing, Attorney Mowrey stated on the record that "there's a history here of family violence, so there may be certain questions that would be inappropriate based on that history." [Mother] testified she had been in the United States since January 2014 but was not currently employed because she did not have permission to work in the United States. While living in Pakistan, [Mother] was employed at the Liaquat National Hospital as a physician.
[Mother] stated that her sole intention in coming to the United States was to bring her daughter to safety as there had been threats made against her life. [Mother] described the circumstances that led to her entry to the United States in January 2014, indicating that she had received threatening calls while in Pakistan and[] subsequently[] contacted the United States Consulate. She testified that the United States Consulate instructed her to bring her daughter, a United States citizen, to the United States and granted [Mother] an emergency [v]isitor's [v]isa to do so. [Mother] testified that her visa was stamped with an expiration date of July 18, 2014, but she applied for[] and received a stay until December 2014. [Mother] testified that she was in the process of filing for political asylum in the United States. ... While [Mother] did not present documentation to support this testimony at the time of the hearing, [the trial court] found [Mother]'s testimony credible.
[Mother] testified that she fears [Father]. She stated that she had last seen [Father] in October 2014, when she met him in court in Texas. [Mother] provided a detailed description of an incident of abuse in which [Father] had her pinned on the
ground, was sitting on [Mother]'s chest with his knees on her hands and was strangling her while [their] daughter witnessed this incident. She indicated that part of the reason she came to the United States was because of issues with violence she had with her husband. While [Father] testified that there was no domestic violence in his relationship with [Mother], [the trial court] did not find this testimony credible.
At the December 10, 2014 hearing, the entire Northampton County Domestic Relations file was made part of the record. Included in the file is an April 21, 2014 letter from Safe Haven of Tarrant County in Arlington, Texas[,] indicating that in February 2014, [Mother] initiated services with Safe Haven to seek counseling for emotional distress and domestic violence. The correspondence notes emotional, verbal, physical and sexual abuse. Also included in the file is a Texas Department of Family and Protective Services report confirmation that a representative of Safe Haven had reported the specific incident of abuse [to] which [Mother] testified.
On December 22, 2014, the [trial court] entered the [o]rder currently before the Superior Court. The [o]rder modified the October 17, 2014 [s]upport [o]rder and required [Father] to make monthly support payments of $1,156.00 per month, allocated as $963.00 for basic support of one child and $193.00 in arrears, effective June 13, 2014. [Father]'s liability for uncovered medical expenses was raised from 77% to 100%. The [o]rder indicates that the support amount was based upon [Mother] having $0.00 income due to her ineligibility to work legally in the United States. All other aspects of the October 17, 2014 [o]rder remained in effect.
On January 20, 2015, Father filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a court-ordered concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court issued a responsive written opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on March 23, 2015.
On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review, which we have reordered for ease of disposition:
I. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it overruled [Father]'s [p]reliminary [o]bjections to [Mother]'s Interstate Uniform Support [p]etition, when [Mother] failed to file an [a]nswer to the [p]reliminary [o]bjections, and where the [trial c]ourt failed to consider the Texas statute governing [Mother]'s basis for [j]urisdiction. (Tex. FA Code ann. § 159.201), which violated [Father]'s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and [d]enied [Father]'s [c]ontest of [r]egistration or [e]nforcement pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 7607?Father's Brief at 6-7.
II. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it permitted the [s]upport [c]omplaint [filed] in Texas to be heard through the Interstate Support system, where Mother is not a United States citizen, does not have legal status to remain in the United States, and has become a financial burden to the [c]ourts in Texas and Pennsylvania to hear a matter when Mother has essentially used the court system to obtain support when she has no authority to remain in the United States?
III. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in its [o]rder of [c]ourt entered on December 22, 2014 in determining that Mother has no income or an earning capacity, for purposes of calculating Father's child support obligation, due to Mother's ineligibility to work in the
United States when she voluntarily entered the United States on a visitor's visa?
IV. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in its [o]rder of [c]ourt entered on December 22, 2014 in failing to assess [] Mother with an earning capacity commensurate with that of a physician in the United States, as Mother received medical training and a medical degree, she worked as a physician, and Mother continues to be employable as a physician, and [] Mother voluntarily came to the United States on a visitor's visa, with full knowledge that she would not be able to legally work in the United States?
V. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it relied on Mother's alleged immigration status in the United States without requiring proof thereof and disclosure to Father, as a reason for not assigning her an earning capacity, as Mother clearly has an earning capacity when she voluntarily left her physician position in Pakistan to enter the United States without the ability to legally work here?
VI. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it failed to consider that Mother voluntarily left her employment in Pakistan and did not mitigate her losses by moving to a location in the world where she could not legally work, which is tantamount to voluntarily leaving her employment without cause?
VII. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in precluding Father from having access to information regarding [] Mother and the child, including their whereabouts, without more than a mere assertion on the part of Mother that there was prior domestic abuse, and therefore violated the requirements of the Interstate Uniform Support Petition (23 Pa.C.S.A. § 7311)[?] Such an error and abuse of discretion precluded Father from properly inquiring as to the circumstances,
documentation, and factual allegations in this matter, which were pertinent to the petition for support[.]
Father's first and second issues on appeal address the trial court's denial of his preliminary objections to Mother's support complaint. Specifically, the preliminary objections raised challenged the trial court's in personam jurisdiction and the legal sufficiency of the complaint. We review these issues according to the following standard:
[O]ur standard of review of an order of the trial court overruling or granting preliminary objections is to determine whether the trial court committed an error of law. When considering the appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary objections, the appellate court must apply the same standard as the trial court.HRANEC Sheet Metal , Inc. v. Metalico Pittsburgh , Inc., 107 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). "[W]hen deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Gaboury v. Gaboury , 988 A.2d 672, 675 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering preliminary objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Preliminary objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free from doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove facts legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If any doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary objections.
At the outset, we disagree with the trial court's contention that Father waived review of these issues based upon his failure to appeal the denial of his preliminary objections within thirty days of the trial court's order. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/15, at 25-26. To the contrary, it is well-settled law that "[g]enerally, an order denying preliminary objections is interlocutory and not appealable as of right." Pisano v. Extendicare Homes , Inc., 77 A.3d 651, 654 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 86 A.3d 233 (Pa. 2014), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2890 (U.S. 2014). "Once an appeal is filed from a final order, all prior interlocutory orders become reviewable." In re Bridgeport Fire Litig., 51 A.3d 224, 229 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). The final, appealable order in this case was not entered until December 22, 2014, and Father filed his timely notice of appeal from this order. As such, the propriety of the trial court's denial of Father's preliminary objections is now properly before us for consideration.
We now turn to the arguments raised by Father. First, Father asserts that the trial court denied his due process rights by failing to consider the Texas statute regarding jurisdiction over a non-resident. Father's Brief at 27-28; see Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 159.201(a). In so arguing, Father acknowledges that this case falls under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA"). Father's Brief at 27. We have previously summarized the history and purpose of the UIFSA as follows:
In 1992, the National Conference on Uniform State Laws ("Conference") approved UIFSA as a replacement for the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) and its revised version, RURESA. Congress then mandated enactment of a 1996 revised version by tying such enactment to eligibility for federal funding for child support enforcement. One of the primary purposes of UIFSA was to create a "one-order" system to replace the prior system under URESA and RURESA, which allowed for the same parties and child to be subject to multiple child support orders at any one time. UIFSA establishes a procedure to determine which order should control and which court should have "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction." UIFSA also establishes strict procedures governing the enforcement and modification of an order should circumstances exist requiring a new state to assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.Sheetz v. Sheetz , 840 A.2d 1000, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
In the case at bar, there was no existing support order entered in another state prior to the order entered in Pennsylvania that is currently on appeal. Mother filed her petition for child support in Texas. Texas then forwarded the petition to Pennsylvania, which accepted jurisdiction over the petition. This procedure is proper under the UIFSA. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7101(b) (defining "initiating state" and "responding state" under the UIFSA), 7203 (stating that "a tribunal of this State may serve as an initiating tribunal to forward proceedings to another state and as a responding tribunal for proceedings initiated in another state"). Texas did not attempt to exercise jurisdiction over Father or over the petition for child support. Father acknowledges this in his brief on appeal. See Father's Brief at 29. Although Father is correct that he is entitled to contest the jurisdiction of the tribunal that issues a child support order, see 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 7607(a)(1), the issuing tribunal in this case was the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, not a tribunal in the State of Texas. It is uncontested that Father is a resident of Northampton County. The trial court therefore had no cause to evaluate Texas' jurisdiction over Father pursuant to section 159.201(a) of Texas' UIFSA.
Pursuant to the UIFSA, Texas is the "initiating state," which section 7101(b) defines as "[a] state from which a proceeding is forwarded or in which a proceeding is filed for forwarding to a responding state under this part or a law or procedure substantially similar to this part, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 7101(b). Pennsylvania is the "responding state," which is "[a] state in which a proceeding is filed or to which a proceeding is forwarded for filing from an initiating state under this part or a law or procedure substantially similar to this part, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act." Id.
Father also contends that Mother was required to prove that Texas was the child's "home state" in order to file for child support in Texas. He provides no citation to any authority in support of this contention. See Father's Brief at 29. Our review of the jurisdictional requirements of the UIFSA does not find support for this claim. To the contrary, the UIFSA permits a state to assume jurisdiction over a non-resident of that state if:
The UIFSA defines "home state" as "[t]he state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as parent for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the time of filing of a petition or comparable pleading for support and, if a child is less than six months old, the state in which the child lived from birth with any of them." Id. This definition is identical to the definition of "home state" under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, which, unlike the UIFSA, uses the child's "home state" as a basis for determining jurisdiction for an initial custody determination. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5421(a).
(1) the individual is personally served with citation in this state;Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 159.201(a); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 7201.
(2) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction;
(3) the individual resided with the child in this state;
(4) the individual resided in this state and provided prenatal expenses or support for the child;
(5) the child resides in this state as a result of the acts or directives of the individual;
(6) the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse;
(7) the individual asserted parentage in the paternity registry maintained in this state by the vital statistics unit; or
(8) there is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Because the UIFSA is a "uniform" law, the Texas provision concerning jurisdiction over a non-resident is identical to that of Pennsylvania. Compare Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 159.201(a) with 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 7201.
Mother never contested that either Texas or Pennsylvania had jurisdiction over the matter and clearly consented thereto by filing her request for child support in Texas and entering her appearance in Pennsylvania. See id .; cf. Pfeifer v. Cutshall , 851 A.2d 983, 986 (Pa. Super. 2004) (finding that by "exercising her right to enforce [the child support order entered in Pennsylvania] via her contempt petition" resulted in the mother acquiescing to Pennsylvania's jurisdiction over her as a non-resident). Furthermore, the record reflects that the child was born in Pennsylvania while Mother and Father were married to each other, indicating that Mother lived here with the child (and presumably with Father) for some period of time. See Child Support Petition, 6/23/14.
Father additionally contends that Mother's failure to include certain required identifying information, i.e., her residential address, rendered the petition for child support deficient and Pennsylvania should not have accepted it for disposition. Father's Brief at 29-30. This contention is completely meritless. Although Father is correct that section 7311 of the UFSA generally requires a petitioner to include in the filing, inter alia, the petitioner's residential address, it permits the exclusion of this information under section 7312 if a court finds, in relevant part, "that the health, safety or liberty of a party or child would be unreasonably put at risk by the disclosure of identifying information." 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7311(a), 7312.
The record reflects that Mother appended to her petition for child support documentation relating to physical, sexual and emotional abuse perpetrated against her by Father. Child Support Petition, 6/23/14. At the hearing on Mother's child support petition, Mother testified that she feared Father, recounting one particular incident of physical abuse that was documented in the records included with the child support petition. See N.T., 12/10/14, at 27-28. The trial court found credible the testimony and evidence of abuse by Father and that Mother and the child "would be unreasonably put at risk by the disclosure of the identifying information at issue pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 7312." Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/15, at 19.
Father additionally baldly claims that he believed that Mother and child were living in Pakistan, not Texas, when she filed the petition for child support, which would have deprived either Pennsylvania or Texas of jurisdiction over the matter. Father's Brief at 30-31. Our review of the record finds no support for this contention. A representative from the Texas Attorney General's Office filed Mother's child support petition. See Child Support Petition, 6/23/14. Mother testified that at the time of the hearing she was living in Texas with the child and was in the process of filing for political asylum so that she could remain in the United States indefinitely. N.T., 12/10/14, at 9-10. There is nothing in the record to support a finding that Mother was not living in the United States when she filed for child support.
In his second issue raised, Father asserts that the trial court erred by entertaining Mother's request for child support when Mother is not a United States citizen. Father's Brief at 31-32. Father's argument in support of this claim consists of a single paragraph with no citation either to the record or to any legal authority. See id. As such, it is waived. See Hayward v. Hayward , 868 A.2d 554, 558 (Pa. Super. 2005); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
Even if not waived, we note that United States citizenship of the parent is not a requirement for filing a petition for child support. See , e.g., Love v. Love , 33 A.3d 1268, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2011) (case involving a petition for child support filed by the mother who was not a citizen of the United States). Furthermore, as the trial court observed, child support is the right of the child, not the parent. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/15, at 20 (citing Kelser v. Weniger , 744 A.2d 197, 796 (Pa. Super. 2000)). It is uncontested that the child in this case is a United States citizen. See Child Support Petition, 6/23/14; Father's Brief at 8.
The claims Father raises regarding the trial court's denial of his preliminary objections are meritless. As such, we find that the trial court did not err by denying his preliminary objections.
The next four issues raised by Father contest the trial court's decision not to assign Mother an earning capacity. The trial court found that Mother was forced to leave her employment in Pakistan based upon her testimony that she and the child were receiving death threats, and because Mother is not legally permitted to work in the United States, the court did not assign her an earning capacity. Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/15, at 10-17.
We review a trial court's child support order according to the following scope and standard:
When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse the trial court's determination where the order cannot be sustained on any valid ground. We will not interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the support order. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has been abused. In addition, we note that the duty to support one's child is absolute, and the purpose of child support is to promote the child's best interests.Morgan v. Morgan , 99 A.3d 554, 556-57 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 113 A.3d 280 (Pa. 2015).
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1910.16-2(d) governs reduced or fluctuating income in the context of child support. It states:
(1) Voluntary Reduction of Income. When either party voluntarily assumes a lower paying job, quits a job, leaves employment, changes occupations or changes employment status to pursue an education, or is fired for cause, there generally will be no effect on the support obligation.Pa.R.C.P. No. 1910.16-2(d).
(2) Involuntary Reduction of, and Fluctuations in, Income. No adjustments in support payments will be made for normal fluctuations in earnings. However, appropriate adjustments will be made for substantial continuing involuntary decreases in income, including but not limited to the result of illness, lay-off, termination, job elimination or some other employment situation over which the party has no control unless the trier of fact finds that such a reduction in income was willfully undertaken in an attempt to avoid or reduce the support obligation.
(3) Seasonal Employees. Support orders for seasonal employees, such as construction workers, shall ordinarily be based upon a yearly average.
(4) Earning Capacity. If the trier of fact determines that a party to a support action has willfully failed to obtain or maintain appropriate employment, the trier of fact may impute to that party an income equal to the party's earning capacity. Age, education, training, health, work experience, earnings history and child care responsibilities are factors which shall be considered in determining earning capacity. In order for an earning capacity to be assessed, the trier of fact must state the reasons for the assessment in writing or on the record. Generally, the trier of fact should not impute an earning capacity that is greater than the amount the party would earn from one full-time position. Determination of what constitutes a reasonable work regimen depends upon all relevant circumstances including the choice of jobs available within a particular occupation, working hours, working conditions and whether a party has exerted substantial good faith efforts to find employment.
Father asserts that Mother failed to present sufficient evidence of her immigration status - that she is present on a visitor's visa, not permitted to work, and was in the process of finalizing paperwork seeking political asylum in the United States. Father's Brief at 24-25. Father further contends that Mother "voluntarily" terminated her employment in Pakistan and came to the United States, knowing that she would not be permitted to work, and the trial court therefore erred by failing to assign her an earning capacity as an internist in the United States. Id. at 17-22, 25-26.
All of Father's arguments on these issues are plagued by the same deficiency - he ignores the trial court's credibility determinations. The record reflects that Mother testified that she fled Pakistan to "bring her daughter to safety" because of "threat calls" she received. N.T., 12/10/14, at 20-21. Mother stated she fled Pakistan pursuant to the advice of the United States Consulate and was issued an emergency passport. Id. Mother testified that she is here on a visitor's visa, which does not permit her to work in the United States. Id. at 6-7. She testified that she has no income, but receives $700 per month from her brother, who lives in Australia, to cover her living expenses, and varying amounts of money every month from "charities." Id. at 17-18, 25-26.
Whether a party testifies truthfully is a credibility determination made by the trial court. S.K.C. v. J.L.C., 94 A.3d 402, 414 (Pa. Super. 2014). The failure of a party to provide documentary evidence in support of testimony is relevant to the determination of whether that party is testifying truthfully, but it does not preclude the trial court from concluding that the testimony provided by the party is in fact truthful. Id.
When the trial court sits as fact finder, the weight to be assigned the testimony of the witnesses is within its exclusive province, as are credibility determinations, and the court is free to choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. This Court is not free to usurp the trial court's duty as the finder of fact.Mackay v. Mackay , 984 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2009) (internal citations, quotations and formatting omitted), appeal denied, 995 A.2d 354 (Pa. 2010).
Although Mother did not present documentation to support this testimony, there is no requirement that she do so - her testimony on these issues, which the trial court found credible, was itself sufficient evidence. Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/15, at 5. Based upon Mother's testimony, the trial court found that Mother involuntarily left her employment; she did not leave employment for purposes of avoiding her obligation to support her child; and she has not willfully failed to maintain appropriate employment, as she is currently not permitted to work in the United States. Id. at 16; Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-2(d)(2), (4). On these bases, the trial court declined to assign her an earning capacity. Id.
Mother's testimony supports the trial court's determination that Mother did not voluntarily or willfully fail to obtain appropriate employment and thus, its decision not to assign Mother an earning capacity. As such, no relief is due.
As his final issue on appeal, Father asserts that the trial court erred by not requiring Mother to disclose her residential address, as her "mere assertion" of domestic violence was insufficient to overcome the requirements of section 7311. Father's Brief at 22. Once again, Father does not cite to any authority in support of his claim, including any discussion of section 7311 of the UIFSA. See id. at 22-24. Nonetheless, as we stated above in response to his argument that the trial court erred by denying his preliminary objections based upon Mother's failure to include her residential address in her petition for child support, we find no error in the trial court's determination. The trial court found credible Mother's testimony that she was the victim of physical abuse at Father's hands and therefore concluded that Mother and the child "would be unreasonably put at risk by the disclosure of the identifying information at issue pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 7312." Trial Court Opinion, 3/23/15, at 19. As the record supports the trial court's determination, we find no error in the trial court's decision not to require Mother to disclose her residential address. See Mackay , 984 A.2d at 533; S.K.C., 94 A.3d at 414.
Father further avers that he was denied access to reports documenting the domestic violence that Mother appended to her request for child support. Father's Brief at 23. Our review of the record reveals that he did not raise this contention at the hearing on the petition for child support. The only objection regarding access to information made by Father at the hearing was in relation to Mother's testimony that she was in the process of seeking political asylum. N.T., 12/10/14, at 16. In response to the trial court recounting this testimony, counsel for Father stated:
This is the first I've heard about that. And, Your Honor, this is the other problem with this case. We have not been allowed to have access to any of her documentation so we could address it and I think that's a really serious issue here. How do we protect my client's claims when she just wants to hold up her hands and say I don't want to tell him anything?Id.
To the extent Father intended this to be an objection to the denial of access to documentation of domestic violence between the parties, this objection did not serve to preserve that issue for our review. "[I]n order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a timely and specific objection at the appropriate stage of the proceedings before the trial court." Thompson v. Thompson , 963 A.2d 474, 475 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). The record reflects that at the inception of the hearing, the trial court incorporated the entire file of the case into the record, including the documentation of domestic violence appended to Mother's petition for child support. N.T., 12/10/14, at 4. Father did not object at that time. See id. In belatedly making the above objection during Mother's testimony, Father failed to state with any specificity what information he was allegedly denied access. As his objection was neither timely nor specific, his argument is waived on appeal. Thompson , 963 A.2d at 475.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/5/2015