Opinion
2012-11-14
Sunil SHAH, appellant, v. Sarita SHAH, respondent.
Harris Law Firm, P.C., Rockville Centre, N.Y. (Sondra I. Harris of counsel), for appellant. Michael Catalanotto, P.C., St. James, N.Y., for respondent.
Harris Law Firm, P.C., Rockville Centre, N.Y. (Sondra I. Harris of counsel), for appellant. Michael Catalanotto, P.C., St. James, N.Y., for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P. RUTH C. BALKIN, SHERI S. ROMAN, and SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.
In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from stated portions of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Cohen, J.), dated May 28, 2010, which, after a nonjury trial, inter alia, awarded the defendant 30% of his interest in Hi–Tech Trading (USA), Inc., and spousal maintenance in the sum of $4,000 per month for a period of four years.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
In determining the equitable distribution of marital property, the court may consider “any transfer or encumbrance made in contemplation of a matrimonial action without fair consideration” (Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B][5][d][13]; see Buchsbaum v. Buchsbaum, 292 A.D.2d 553, 554, 740 N.Y.S.2d 359). Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, in equitably distributing the parties' assets, the Supreme Court properly considered his interest in a business, known as Hi–Tech Trading (USA), Inc. (hereinafterHi–Tech), which was started by the plaintiff and a partner during the marriage, and was purportedly transferred by the plaintiff to his partner shortly before commencement of this action for no consideration ( see DeGroat v. DeGroat, 84 A.D.3d 1012, 1014, 924 N.Y.S.2d 425;Xikis v. Xikis, 43 A.D.3d 1040, 1042, 841 N.Y.S.2d 692;Buchsbaum v. Buchsbaum, 292 A.D.2d at 554, 740 N.Y.S.2d 359).
“ ‘Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital property and the party seeking to overcome such presumption has the burden of proving that the property in dispute is separate property’ ” ( Steinberg v. Steinberg, 59 A.D.3d 702, 704, 874 N.Y.S.2d 230, quoting Judson v. Judson, 255 A.D.2d 656, 657, 679 N.Y.S.2d 465;see D'Angelo v. D'Angelo, 14 A.D.3d 476, 477, 788 N.Y.S.2d 154;Farag v. Farag, 4 A.D.3d 502, 503, 772 N.Y.S.2d 368). Here, contrary to the plaintiff's contention, there was no showing or finding that funds he allegedly invested in High Tech were his separate property, and, thus, his interest in Hi–Tech was properly equitably distributed.
Under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff's contention that the Supreme Court engaged in “double counting” with respect to the award of maintenance is without merit, as the plaintiff's businesses constituted tangible, income-producing assets, rather than intangible assets ( see Keane v. Keane, 8 N.Y.3d 115, 119, 828 N.Y.S.2d 283, 861 N.E.2d 98;Weintraub v. Weintraub, 79 A.D.3d 856, 857, 912 N.Y.S.2d 674;Kerrigan v. Kerrigan, 71 A.D.3d 737, 738, 896 N.Y.S.2d 443).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.