Opinion
Civil Action 24-03041 (UNA)
12-19-2024
RIFAT SHAFIQUE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JAMES E. BOASBERG, Chief Judge
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, submitted to the Clerk a Complaint and Request for Injunction purporting to be a “Removal Action,” ECF No. 1 at 1, and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), ECF No. 2. The initiating document does not comply with the “Procedure for removal of civil actions,” 28 U.S.C. § 1446, and therefore is docketed as a civil complaint originating in this district court. For the following reasons, the Court grants the IFP application and dismisses the complaint.
Plaintiff sues the U.S. Marshals Service for allegedly “execut[ing] an eviction without a writ” on March 8, 2023. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2, 4-5. He seeks “declaratory relief, replevin, and general actual and statutory damages of not less than $17,432,000” for the “wrongful taking of [his] property.” Id. at 5. It is reasonably safe to conclude that this action is yet another iteration of Plaintiff's wrongful eviction claim arising from his landlord-tenant matter in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia that has “been litigated, more than once, across five different local and federal courts,” Shafique v. Equity Residential Real Estate Investment Trust, 2024 WL 1989113, at *1 (D.D.C. May 1, 2024), and which undermines Plaintiff's premise. See id. (recounting the Superior Court's entry on June 27, 2022, of “a judgment of possession and redeemable writ of restitution on behalf of Equity Residential” and execution of the writ on March 8, 2023, upon remand of Plaintiff's “attempted” removal of “Shafique 1 to this District”) (citing Equity Residential Management, LLC TA 1500 Mass. A v. Shafique, Rifat, No. 2022-LTB-000462 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed 2/4/2022)).
Nevertheless, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). It is “presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id.; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (requiring a party seeking relief in the district court to plead facts that bring the suit within the court's jurisdiction). Agencies of the United States are immune from suit save “clear congressional consent[.]” United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). A waiver of immunity “must be unequivocally expressed in statutory text, and [it cannot] be implied.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff invokes the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1982, Compl. at 3, but Congress has not waived the United States' immunity from personal injury lawsuits arising under the Constitution. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994). The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), waives the United States' immunity, subject to enumerated limitations, id. § 2680. Before filing a lawsuit, an FTCA claimant must exhaust administrative remedies by presenting the claim to the appropriate federal agency and obtaining a final written denial of the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). If an agency fails to render a decision within six months after the claim is submitted, the claimant may proceed to court “any time thereafter” on what is “deemed” to be “a final denial.” Id.
Nothing in the complaint suggests that Plaintiff has pursued, much less exhausted, his administrative remedies under the FTCA, and in this circuit, the FTCA's presentment requirement is “jurisdictional.” Simpkins v. D.C. Gov't, 108 F.3d 366, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)); Norton v. United States, 530 F.Supp.3d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 2021) (collecting cases). Consequently, this case will be dismissed by separate order.