Opinion
1:21-CV-275-HAB
10-14-2021
DOUGLAS ROBERT SHAFFER, Plaintiff, v. THOMAS J. FELTS, et al., Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
HOLLY A. BRADY, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
This Court has no jurisdiction to set aside a state-court foreclosure judgment. It has told Plaintiff this twice. Undeterred, Plaintiff has asked this Court to reconsider its most recent admonition. (ECF No. 16).
The Court construes Plaintiff's motion as a motion to correct errors. Rule 59(e) motion “may be granted only if there has been a manifest error of fact or law, or if there is newly discovered evidence that was not previously available.” Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021). A motion to correct errors “does not allow a party to introduce new evidence or advance arguments that could and should have been presented to the district court prior to the judgment.” A&C Constr. & Installation, Co. WLL v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 963 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bordelon v. Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000)). This Court's “opinions are not intended as mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant's pleasure.” Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
The sole basis for Plaintiff's reconsideration request is his assertion that there is an “exception to the Rooker-Felman Doctrine [for] Fraud [sic].” (ECF No. 16 at 1) (original emphasis). In support of his position, Plaintiff relies upon Strasen v. Strasen, 897 F.Supp. 1179 (E.D. Wisc. 1995). There, the plaintiff brought a federal court action claiming that her ex-husband concealed assets, committed perjury, and misrepresented his financial dealing and holding during their divorce proceedings. The district court raised the Rooker-Feldman issue sua sponte. Id. at 1182. Judge Warren found Rooker-Feldman inapplicable, holding “[t]he plaintiff's claims relate to the process leading to the procurement of the state court judgment. Unlike a prototypical Rooker-Feldman case where the injury complained of was caused by the state court judgment, here the injury complained of was caused by the conduct of the defendants.” Id. at 1183 (original emphasis).
Ignoring, for a moment, that this argument could and should have been advanced in Plaintiff's prior filings, the Court does not find Strasen controlling.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is concerned not with why a state court's judgment might be mistaken (fraud is one such reason; there are many others) but with which federal court is authorized to intervene. The reason a litigant gives for contesting the state court's decision cannot endow a federal district court with authority; that's what it means to say that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional.Iqbal v. Patel, 780 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2015) (original emphasis). Iqbal teaches, then, that simply invoking the word “fraud” does not grant a district court jurisdiction to set aside a state-court order.
That said, Plaintiff is correct that Rooker-Feldman “does not bar a federal suit that seeks damages for a fraud that resulted in a judgment adverse to the plaintiff. Such a suit does not seek to disturb the judgment of the state court, but to obtain damages for the unlawful conduct that misled the court into issuing the judgment.” Johnson v. Pushpin Holdings, LLC, 748 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2014). The problem is, that's not what Plaintiff seeks. Plaintiff seeks “relief in [the] form of property being returned or to have the recorded lien satisfied.” (ECF No. 4 at 7). These are not requests for damages; these are requests to overturn the foreclosure judgment. As such, Plaintiff's claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman.
For these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and Request for Hearing (ECF No. 16) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.