Opinion
No. 4:CV-00-0541
March 11, 2003
Donna S. Weldon, Harrisburg, PA, Patricia Carey Zucker, ELLIOTT REIHNER SIEDZIKOWSKI EGAN AND BALABAN, Harrisburg, PA, for Plaintiff.
David R. Fine, John P. Krill, Jr., KIRKPATRICK LOCKHART LLP, Harrisburg, PA, Kevin C. McNamara, THOMAS, THOMAS HAFER Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Edward N. Shadle commenced this action on March 24, 2000, by filing a complaint against Central Dauphin School District (Central Dauphin), its Board of School Directors (Board), several members of the Board, and the Central Dauphin superintendent. In the complaint, Shadle alleged that defendants violated several statutes when they discriminated against him on the basis of his disability (depression and anxiety).
Shadle filed an amended complaint on July 5, 2000 limiting the complaint to two counts, namely, violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Count I) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. C.S.A. § 951 et seq. (Count II). Specifically, Shadle alleges that Central Dauphin refused to provide him with a reasonable accommodation for his disability and refused to engage in an interactive process to determine an appropriate reasonable accommodation. Shadle claims that he was constructively discharged, lost wages and benefits, and suffered extreme mental distress.
By order dated October 26, 2000, we granted defendants' motion to dismiss from the lawsuit each individual named as a defendant. Remaining as defendants are Central Dauphin and the Board. Before the court is defendants' motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b). For the reasons that follow, we will grant the motion.
DISCUSSION I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of stating the basis for its motions and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "It can discharge that burden by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325.
Once the moving party points to evidence demonstrating that no issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party has the duty to set forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists and that a reasonable factfinder could rule in its favor. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). "Speculation and conclusory allegations do not satisfy this duty." Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 252 (citing Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995)).
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Viewed in the light most favorable to Shadle, the relevant facts are as follows.
At the time of the events relevant to this action, Shadle had been principal at South Side Elementary School (South Side Elementary) in the Central Dauphin School District for approximately seventeen years. Throughout his tenure at South Side Elementary, Shadle was subject to numerous written reprimands from his superiors. The reprimands from a previous superintendent and director of elementary education addressed varied behavior by Shadle, including speaking rudely to parents, failing to follow school district guidelines on dress and smoking, and failing to act as a team player.
In 1996, Central Dauphin hired a new superintendent, Barbara Hasson, and a new supervisor of elementary education, Barry Tomasetti. Shortly after Tomasetti assumed the position of supervisor of elementary education, a letter addressed to Hasson arrived at Shadle's school. Shadle opened and read the letter; he forwarded it to Hasson three weeks later. As a result, Hasson wrote Shadle a memorandum of reprimand for the underlying conduct regarding the mail as well as for inappropriate comments to Tomasetti regarding the incident. Upon receiving the memo, Shadle framed it and put it on his desk. When Tomasetti later saw the framed memo on Shadle's desk, he ordered Shadle to remove it; Shadle refused to do so.
On another occasion, Shadle referred to Tomasetti as a "prick" in a telephone conversation with Tomasetti's secretary. In addition, Shadle smoked in his school building on several occasions throughout the 1996-97 school year.
During a visit to South Side Elementary in May 1997, District Administrator Barbara Marinak witnessed Shadle yelling at a group of students. Shadle sent all of the children but one back to class. Shadle then escorted the remaining child to the copier room, continued to yell at him, and repeatedly hit the wall above the child's head with a ruler.
On May 29, 1997, Hasson and Tomasetti received an urgent call from the mother of a special-needs child. Hasson and Tomasetti traveled to South Side Elementary to discuss the situation with Shadle. When Hasson and Tomasetti arrived at the school, Shadle was not in the building and his staff did not know where he was. After the May 29 incident, Tomasetti and Shadle exchanged various memoranda. In one memorandum, Shadle told Tomasetti that he did not notify Tomasetti and Hasson of his absence from the building because he left the building quickly, and "frankly[,] it was not then, nor is it now any of your business as to the nature of my emergency." (Exs. Supp. Defs.' Mot. Summ. J., Rec. Doc. No. 45, Ex. G.)
On June 16, 1997, Central Dauphin served an official notice of disciplinary action on Shadle. The notice set forth a statement of charges and advised Shadle that a hearing was scheduled before the Board on June 30, 1997, to consider dismissing or suspending him for his misconduct.
On June 19, 1997, Shadle met with Thomas Shivetts, executive director of the Pennsylvania Associations of Elementary and Secondary School Principals (Association), the statewide advocacy group for public school principals. Shadle and Shivetts met with Donna Weldon, the Association's chief counsel, on June 23, 1997. Shadle, Shivetts, and Weldon decided that Shivetts would call Hasson to discuss a possible resolution of the charges against Shadle. Shivetts and Hasson agreed to a proposal designed to enhance Shadle's retirement; the proposal combined sick leave and sabbatical leave to allow Shadle to reach a 30-year threshold. Weldon memorialized the proposal in writing and sent it to the Board's counsel. Hasson agreed to present the proposal to the Board on June 30, 1997.
Due to Shadle's previously scheduled vacation over June 30, 1997, Weldon had sought and received a continuance of the dismissal/suspension hearing. Hasson presented the proposal at the Board meeting on June 30, 1997; the Board rejected the proposal, and rescheduled the dismissal/suspension hearing for July 8 and 10, 1997.
Because Weldon was unavailable to attend a hearing on July 10, the Association engaged Richard Snelbaker to represent Shadle at the dismissal/suspension hearing on July 8, 1997. On July 8, Snelbaker sent a letter to the Board's solicitor describing Shadle's depression as sufficiently severe to be a disability for purposes of the ADA, and requesting an indefinite continuance of the dismissal/suspension hearing to permit Shadle to complete diagnostic testing and obtain treatment. The letter stated that Shadle would use his accumulated sick leave, and that Shadle hoped to determine his length of absence after consultation with psychiatrist Ralph Picciotto, M.D.
Snelbaker and Shivetts attended the Board's July 8 meeting on behalf of Shadle. Snelbaker made an oral presentation to the Board, essentially outlining what he had stated in the letter to the Board's solicitor and asking the Board to postpone the dismissal/suspension hearing indefinitely. The Board caucused privately and decided to grant a continuance until July 17, 1997, in order to allow Shadle to see Picciotto as well as an independent expert selected by the District. Snelbaker and Shivetts agreed that Shadle would be examined by Abram Hostetter, M.D.
On July 9, 1997, Shivetts forwarded a second proposal to Hasson to be presented to the Board on behalf of Shadle. The proposal sought to permit Shadle to use his sick leave to enhance his retirement, thereby avoiding the need for a hearing. The Board rejected the second proposal at its July 14, 1997 meeting.
Shadle met with Hostetter on July 11, 1997. In his report of the session, Hostetter described Shadle's willingness to go forward with the hearing and offered his opinion that Shadle was able to consult with his lawyers with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.
Shadle met with Picciotto on July 15, 1997. Shadle did not inform the District of Picciotto's findings with regard to his diagnosis or his availability for the July 17 hearing. In fact, neither Shadle nor his representatives appeared at the Board's July 17 meeting. Rather, on July 17, 1997, Shadle hand-delivered a resignation letter to the District's administration building.
III. DEFENDANTS' MOTION
The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a "qualified individual with a disability" on the basis of the disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). "Discrimination under the ADA encompasses not only adverse actions motivated by prejudice and fear of disabilities, but also includes failing to make reasonable accommodations for a plaintiff's disabilities." Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 306 (3d Cir. 1999). In their motion for summary judgment, defendants claim that Shadle has failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination because (1) none of defendants' actions before they had notice of Shadle's disability can be considered as evidence of discrimination; (2) Shadle was not a "qualified" individual under the ADA; and (3) defendants' actions were not "because of" Shadle's disability, but "because of" his admitted misconduct. Defendants also claim that Shadle caused the breakdown of the "interactive process" required under the ADA. Finally, defendants maintain that the provision of the ADA upon which Shadle relies is unconstitutional in that it exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.
We note at the outset that because "[t]he PHRA and ADA are interpreted in a co-extensive manner," with the exception of the challenge to the constitutionality of the ADA, our analysis of Shadle's claims under the ADA also applies to his claims under the PHRA. Imler v. Hollidaysburg Am. Legion Ambulance Serv., 731 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. Super 1999); see also Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). We address each of defendants' assertions below.
A. FAILURE TO MAKE OUT A PRIMA FACIE CASE
To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the statute; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that he has suffered an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination. Gaul v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998). Defendants do not challenge Shadle's claim that, at the time of his retirement, he suffered from a disability. However, defendants argue that Shadle fails to meet the other requirements to establish a prima facie case under the ADA; they maintain that Shadle was not otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, and that defendants' adverse employment action was a result of Shadle's misconduct, and not of discrimination. Defendants also argue that none of their actions before July 8, 1997 may be considered as evidence of discrimination. We will address each argument separately.
1. Notice
Defendants claim that because Shadle admitted that he did not advise the District of his alleged disability before July 8, 1997, the District's actions before that date may not be considered as evidence of discrimination. (See Shadle Dep., Rec. Doc. No. 45, Ex. A at 199.) We disagree.
In order for a defendant's conduct to be considered as part of a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant must have been on notice of the alleged disability when it acted. See Mitchell v. Washingtonville Central Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1999). Although it is true that Shadle admitted at his deposition that he did not inform the defendants of his disability before July 8, 1997, the evidence on record indicates that defendants were aware that Shadle suffered from depression as early as June 30, 1997. The Release and Settlement Agreement drafted by Weldon and presented to the Board on June 30, 1997 by Hasson specifically states that "Shadle is currently under the medical care of a physician and psychologist for depression and stress-related illness." (Release and Settlement Agreement, Rec. Doc. No. 45, Ex. J.) It follows, then, that defendants were on notice of Shadle's disability as of June 30. Therefore, we may consider defendants' actions on and after June 30, 1997 when determining whether Shadle has set forth a prima facie case of discrimination.
2. Otherwise Qualified
The two-part test used to determine whether a plaintiff is "otherwise qualified" to perform the essential functions of his job under the ADA requires a court to examine (1) "whether the individual satisfies the prerequisites for the position, such as possessing the appropriate educational background, employment experience, skills, licenses, etc."; and (2) "whether or not the individual can perform the essential functions of the position held or desired, with or without reasonable accommodation." Gaul, 134 F.3d at 580 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants concede, and we agree, that Shadle satisfies the first prong of the test, i.e, he possesses the appropriate educational background and employment experience for the position of elementary school principal. Defendants contend, however, that Shadle did not have the ability to perform the essential functions of his job in the summer of 1997.
Shadle has admitted that he was unable to perform the essential functions of a school principal in the summer of 1997. (See Shadle Dep., Rec. Doc. No. 45, Ex. A at 224.) The issue in dispute is whether Shadle would have been able to perform the essential functions of his job if provided with some reasonable accommodation. See Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 1998). Defendants argue that the accommodation Shadle proposed — an indefinite leave of absence — is per se unreasonable and that there was in fact no reasonable accommodation that would have rendered Shadle qualified in July 1997. We agree.
On the issue of reasonable accommodation, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that "an effective accommodation exists that would render [him] otherwise qualified." Walton v. Mental Health Assoc., 168 F.3d 661, 670 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). To avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff's proposal must not be "clearly ineffective" or "outlandishly costly." Id. (citation omitted). The Third Circuit has not considered a request for an indefinite leave of absence under this standard. Other circuits that have considered the issue have found that a request for an indefinite leave of absence is unreasonable. See, e.g.,Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999, 1004 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that the ADA "does not require an employer to accommodate an employee who suffers a prolonged illness by allowing him an indefinite leave of absence"); Watkins v. JS Oil Co., Inc., 164 F.3d 55, 62 (affirming district court finding that defendant "was not required, for ADA purposes, to provide accommodation to [plaintiff] for what amounted to an `indefinite leave'"); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that "[n]othing in the text of the reasonable accommodation provision requires an employer to wait for an indefinite period to achieve its intended effect").
Shadle attempts to distinguish the instant case from those decided by other circuits by pointing out that the plaintiffs in those cases had taken extensive leave and were requesting more time, whereas Shadle was refused the chance to use any leave. (See Pl.'s Br. Opp'n, Rec. Doc. No. 52, at 24.) Defendants assert, and we agree, that the differences to which Shadle points are immaterial. In Myers, for example, the Fourth Circuit based its reasoning on the fact that the reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA is "formulated entirely in the present tense, framing the precise issue as whether an individual `can' (not `will be able to') perform the job with reasonable accommodation." Myers, 50 F.3d at 283. Based on this reasoning, we think it clear that a request for an indefinite leave of absence such as the one that Shadle made is unreasonable under the ADA.
Inasmuch as Shadle had no idea when he might be able to return to work at the time he requested a leave of absence, his proposed accommodation was not reasonable. (See Shadle Dep., Rec. Doc. No 45, Ex. A at 221-22.) Moreover, the evidence makes clear that there was no reasonable accommodation that would have rendered Shadle "qualified" at the time of his resignation. Shadle testified that not only was he unable to perform his job in July 1997, but he was also unable to perform his job for at least 10 months after July 1997. (See Shadle Dep., Rec. Doc. No. 45, Ex. A at 227.) Shadle has never suggested that there was some other accommodation that would have allowed him to perform the essential functions of his position. Thus, Shadle has failed to meet his burden of proving that "an effective accommodation exists that would render [him] otherwise qualified." Walton, 168 F.3d at 670 (citation omitted). It follows that no reasonable jury could find that Shadle was "otherwise qualified" to perform the essential functions of his job.
Shadle has failed to make out a prima facie case under the ADA, and defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment. Having found that, we need not address the remainder of defendants' arguments. We will nonetheless do so.
3. Adverse Employment Action as a Result of Discrimination
The third prong in a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that he was subject to an adverse employment action because of his disability. Gaul, 134 F.3d at 580.
Although he claims in the amended complaint that he was constructively discharged, Shadle has presented no evidence that defendants "knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign." Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1084 (3d Cir. 1996). Further, inasmuch as he has largely admitted that he committed the serious acts of misconduct that gave rise to the disciplinary charges against him, we believe that no reasonable jury could find that defendants brought the charges because of Shadle's disability; rather, defendants brought the charges because of the misconduct itself. (See Shadle Dep., Rec. Doc. No. 45, Ex. A at 217 (stating that "I admitted to smoking in the building. I admitted to most of those charges.").) In fact, at the time defendants brought the charges of misconduct against Shadle, they had no idea Shadle was suffering from depression. Shadle has thus failed to meet the third prong in attempting to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA.
B. INTERACTIVE PROCESS
The ADA's regulations provide that "[t]o determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the [employer] to initiate an informal, interactive process with the [employee] in need of accommodation." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). The Third Circuit has found that "an employer who acts in bad faith in the interactive process will be liable if the jury can reasonably conclude that the employee would have been able to perform the job with accommodations." Taylor, 184 F.3d at 317-18. Because we have found that no reasonable jury could conclude that Shadle would have been able to perform the essential functions of his job with accommodations, we need not address whether defendants acted in bad faith in the interactive process. We find, however, that it was Shadle, and not defendants, who acted in bad faith.
In response to Shadle's having revealed that he had what he believed to be a disability covered by the ADA, the Board agreed to postpone the dismissal/suspension hearing until July 17, 1997, in order to allow Shadle to be evaluated both by his psychiatrist and by a psychiatrist chosen by defendants. Shadle was examined by Dr. Hostetter, the psychiatrist chosen by defendants, on July 11, 1997. Hostetter relayed to the Board Shadle's statement that he wished to go forward with the hearing.
Shadle saw his own psychiatrist, Dr. Picciotto, on July 15, 1997. Although Shadle's counsel, in his July 8, 1997 letter to the Board's solicitor, expressed that he would provide more information as to the length of Shadle's leave of absence after consultation with his psychiatrist, neither Shadle nor his counsel provided defendants with any more information regarding Shadle's condition or his length of absence after his appointment with Picciotto. Thus, on July 17, 1997, the date of Shadle's resignation, defendants had no information other than that from Hostetter that Shadle wished to go forward with the hearing. It is clear that Shadle essentially kept defendants in the dark regarding his condition, and we find it curious that he now asserts that defendants failed to engaged in an "interactive process."
C. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
Defendants' final claim is that Title I of the ADA as applied to public schools exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8. Inasmuch as we have found that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the merits of the claim, we need not reach this issue and we therefore decline to address it.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted. An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying memorandum,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. No. 41) is granted.
2. Final judgment is entered in favor of Defendants Central Dauphin School District and the Board of School Directors of the Central Dauphin School District and against Plaintiff Edward N. Shadle.
3. The clerk is directed to close the case file.