Opinion
Civil No. 99-2067 (JRT/FLN)
May 9, 2001
David M. Gross, GROSS LAW OFFICE, 8323 Franklin Avenue West, St. Louis Park, MN, 55426-1914, for plaintiff.
Pierre N. Regnier and Joseph E. Flynn, JARDINE, LOGAN O'BRIEN, P.L.L.P., 2100 Piper Jaffray Plaza, 444 Cedar Street, St. Paul, MN, 55101-2179, for defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Jason Shade brings suit against defendants for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also asserts claims for violations of Art. I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, the Minnesota Fair Pupil Dismissal Act, the Minnesota Government Data Practices Act, and Minnesota Statute § 626.21. This matter is now before the Court on defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.
During the pendency of defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Court received notice, on May 8, 2001, that plaintiffs and the City of Apple Valley reached a settlement agreement. The City of Apple Valley has been dismissed and is therefore no longer a party to this action.
BACKGROUND
On December 2, 1999, plaintiff Jason Shade was a 17-year-old student at the Apple Valley Alternative Learning Center ("Apple Valley ALC"), which was run by Independent School District 196. Plaintiff was one of eight students who was being transported from Apple Valley ALC to Al's Autobody shop ("Al's Autobody" or "automotive shop"), near Farmington, Minnesota, for shop class. The automotive shop served as the classroom for the shop class. Allen Schmitz taught the shop class and also drove the school bus from Apple Valley ALC to the automotive shop.
On the way to Al's Autobody on the morning of December 2, 1999, Schmitz stopped at Burger King so the students could buy breakfast to eat on the way to Farmington. Plaintiff purchased a breakfast sandwich and a container of orange juice. After getting back on the bus with his food and drink, plaintiff was apparently unable to open his container of juice. Plaintiff then asked the students around him if anyone had something that he could use to open the orange juice container. Brandon Haugen, another student sitting near plaintiff on the bus, offered and handed plaintiff a folding knife with the blade closed. Plaintiff opened the blade, used the knife to open the orange juice container, and then closed the blade and returned it to Brandon Haugen.
Schmitz, while driving the bus, saw in the rearview mirror plaintiff holding the knife. Schmitz did not see where the knife came from or where it went after plaintiff used it. After seeing plaintiff with the knife, Schmitz contacted Shirley Gilmore, ALC Coordinator, to ask for her assistance with the situation. Schmitz told Gilmore that he had seen plaintiff with a knife and that he thought the situation should be addressed after shop class when the students returned to Apple Valley ALC. Schmitz conducted shop class without mentioning the incident to the students.
Upon receiving Schmitz's call, Gilmore contacted Dan Kaler, Director of Secondary Education in Apple Valley. Gilmore and Kaler decided that the matter should be addressed immediately and that the students who were on the bus should be searched so that the knife was located before the students came back to Apple Valley ALC. At that point, the students were still in shop class in Farmington. Gilmore and Kaler called the school liaison officer, Michael Eliason, who is also an Apple Valley police officer, to ask for his help in searching the students. Gilmore had decided to keep the students at the automotive shop in Farmington so that they could be searched before returning to Apple Valley ALC. Officer Eliason contacted Officer Ted Dau, a fellow school liaison officer in Farmington, to ask for his assistance in the search. Officer Dau then requested that Officer Wacker of the Farmington Police Department also be present for the search.
A school liaison officer is a local police officer who is assigned to a particular school to assist in any safety issues that arise in that school. During the school year, the officer's only assignment is the school to which he is assigned.
Officers Eliason, Dau and Wacker, as well as Gilmore and Kaler, then proceeded to the automotive shop to conduct the search of the students. By the time Gilmore, Kaler and the officers arrived at the automotive shop, the students had completed class and had boarded the bus for the trip back to Apple Valley ALC. Schmitz discussed with Officer Dau what he had witnessed and explained to him that while looking in the rearview mirror, he had seen plaintiff with a knife. Gilmore and the officers then boarded the bus and instructed the students to get off the bus. Once the students exited the bus Officers Dau and Eliason searched the empty bus. When the search did not turn up a knife, the officers exited the bus and approached the students.
Officer Dau informed the students that each of them would be searched in order to find the knife that Schmitz had seen. Officer Dau then asked the students if any of them had a knife. Brandon Haugen stepped forward and indicated that he had a knife. Officer Eliason took the knife from Haugen. At the time, the officers did not inquire of Schmitz whether the knife turned over by Haugen was the knife that he had seen plaintiff holding earlier that morning. Officer Dau then conducted an individualized search of each student.
The students were taken to the side of the bus and asked to place their hands on the bus and spread their legs. Officer Dau then conducted a pat-down search of each student. Plaintiff was the fourth student searched, and during the pat-down search Officer Dau removed an item from plaintiff's front pants pocket. The parties dispute the characterization of the item that was found in plaintiff's pocket. Plaintiff describes the item as a "pointer" that he intended to use in class and that he also used as a hand strengthener by doubling over the shaft. The "pointer" is approximately — 9 1/2 inches long, and expands to more than 22 inches when fully extended. Defendants describe the item as an expandable baton or asp baton and argue that it can be used as a weapon.
The two female students in the group were searched separately by Ms. Gilmore.
Plaintiff was later charged with possession of a dangerous weapon on school property (for possession of the knife), a felony-level offense pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.66, subd. 1d. Plaintiff admitted the charge on February 15, 2000. The school proceeded with disciplinary action against plaintiff based on the two incidents of weapon possession (possession of the knife and the baton). The parties eventually reached an agreement concerning plaintiff's discipline.
Plaintiff was suspended from school for a period of time during which he was tutored at home.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of ReviewRule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The moving party bears the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Vette Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1980). However, the nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings, but it must set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Burst v. Adolph Coors Co., 650 F.2d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 1981).
II. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff's primary claim in this matter is for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Dau conducted an unlawful warrantless search of him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendants' argue that the search was reasonable and therefore constitutional based on the standard applicable to searches in a school setting. While the Court finds the conduct of the school officials and police officers problematic in this case, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted based on the doctrine of qualified immunity.
Plaintiff's parents, Susan and Gary Shade, also assert a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, they have not articulated an independent constitutional violation that can serve as the basis for a § 1983 claim. Harpole v. Arkansas Department of Human Serv., 820 F.2d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 1987) (family members may not sue under § 1983 based on a constitutional deprivation suffered by another family member). Defendants' motion is therefore granted with respect to the claims of Gary and Susan Shade.
Although the parties have focused primarily on the issue of whether the police officers committed a violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights during their search, it is not necessary for the Court to reach the merits of that issue to resolve plaintiff's § 1983 claim. The Court holds that plaintiff's claim should be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity.
The issue of qualified immunity is separate from the merits. Myers, 833 F. Supp. at 1431. "The issue on the merits is whether the officer violated the law when the arrest was made, whereas the immunity in question is whether the officer violated clearly established law" when the search was conducted. Gainor v. Rogers, 973 F.2d 1379, 1383 (8th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original).
"Under federal law, police officers have immunity against civil actions unless their conduct violates `clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Myers v. Becker County, 833 F. Supp. 1424, 1431 (D.Minn. 1993) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The Court is therefore to consider the "specific constitutional rights the defendants allegedly violated, whether the rights were clearly established in law at the time of the alleged violation, and whether a reasonable person in the official's position would have known that his conduct would violate such rights." Waddell v. Forney, 108 F.3d 889, 891 (8th Cir. 1997). The Court cannot find that the Officer Dau violated plaintiff's clearly established rights. As such, he is entitled to qualified immunity.
The standard for qualified immunity is one of objective reasonableness. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. In evaluating whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must examine the information possessed by the police officer. Myers, 833 F. Supp. at 1431. Qualified immunity is a question of law to be decided by the district court. Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991).
The Court must first determine whether plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional right. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991). If a constitutional right is not asserted, plaintiff's lawsuit must be dismissed. Cross v. City of Des Moines, 965 F.2d 629, 632 (8th Cir. 1992). The Court's inquiry then proceeds to the question of whether the constitutional right in question is "clearly established" at the time of the alleged violation. Id. "For a right to be clearly established, `the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). While the "`defendants bear the initial burden of coming forward with facts to suggest that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority,' plaintiff must show that the law allegedly violated was clearly established." Id. (quoting Rich v. City of Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092, 1095 (6th Cir. 1992)).
In this case, plaintiff has asserted a specific constitutional violation, claiming that Officer Dau violated his Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unlawful warrantless search. The allegation as pled is sufficient to advance the Court's analysis to the question of whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232-33. The Court will look to the established law as articulated by the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit to determine whether the contours of plaintiff's alleged right were sufficiently clear so that Officer Dau would understand that he was violating that right.
At the time of the search, the Supreme Court had decided two significant cases clarifying Fourth Amendment law in the area of school searches, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), and Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). In T.L.O., the Court addressed the issue of whether Fourth Amendment protections extended to searches conducted on students by public school officials. The Court also addressed the standard by which to judge the legality of those searches. The Court initially held that Fourth Amendment applied to searches conducted by school authorities. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333. The Court then went on to hold that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student in a school setting. Id. at 340. In addition to relaxing the warrant requirement, the Court explained that the "school setting . . . requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search. Id. Rather than requiring probable cause before initiating a search, the Court determined that the legality of a search depends "simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search." Id. at 341. The standard articulated by the Court was whether the search was "justified at its inception, whether its scope was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying a search, and the extent of the privacy intrusion." Id.
In Vernonia, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of the scope of the Fourth Amendment in the school setting. There, the Court was faced with the issue of whether a school policy authorizing random urinalysis of student athletes violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In upholding the school policy, the Court noted that individualized suspicion is not always required to justify a search in the school setting. Accordingly, the clearly established law on the scope of school searches, as articulated by the Supreme Court, is that warrantless searches may be conducted in the absence of probable cause, and in some cases in the absence of individualized suspicion if they are "reasonable under the circumstances."
The Eighth Circuit has twice confirmed the more lenient reasonableness standard applicable to school searches. First, in Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987), the Eighth Circuit applied the "reasonableness standard" set forth in T.L.O. Notably, Cason also addressed an issue that was explicitly left open by the Supreme Court in T.L.O. — the standard to be applied when a search is conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies. Id. at 191. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the reasonableness standard is also the appropriate standard to be applied to a search that is conducted by police officers in conjunction with school officials. Id. at 191-92. Thus, the well settled law in the Eighth Circuit allows police officers to conduct searches in the school setting at the behest of school officials under the same lenient reasonableness standard articulated by the Supreme Court in T.L.O.
The Eighth Circuit also dealt with the issue of school searches in the context of a § 1983 claim in Thompson v. Carthage School Dist., 87 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 1996). In that case, a school bus driver informed the high school principal that there were fresh cuts on the seats of her bus, apparently from a knife. 87 F.3d at 980. Afraid that there was a weapon on school grounds, the principal decided that all male students in grades six through twelve should be searched. Id. Plaintiff, a male student, was searched and the search revealed matches and a cigarette package that were turned over to the principal because they were considered contraband. Id. Upon further inspection, the principal discovered a white substance in the match box that turned out to be crack cocaine. Id. The student was expelled for the remainder of the year and the student and his guardian brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that the initial decision to search all male students violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The Eighth Circuit held that the school officials were entitled to qualified immunity. Noting that individualized suspicion is not required for school searches, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the school officials did not violate clearly established law when deciding to search all older male students for the weapon. Id. at 982. Although not vital to the holding, the Eighth Circuit also concluded that the search was constitutionally reasonable and did not violate plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 983.
Given these decisions by the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit, the Court concludes that Officer Dau acted reasonably under the circumstances in conducting the individual searches and did not violate clearly established law. The officers in this case were faced with a situation in which Apple Valley school administrators requested their assistance in searching eight students, one of whom had been witnessed holding a knife on a school bus. It was reasonable for the officers to assume that the more lenient school standard would be applied to the search because it was conducted in conjunction with school officials and occurred during the school day, albeit between classroom locations. Cason, 810 F.2d at 191-92. It was also reasonable for the officers to assume, based on T.L.O., Vernonia, and Thompson, that a pat-down search of the students was justified considering that one student had been seen with a knife. In this case, as contrasted with Thompson, the school officials had eyewitness testimony that plaintiff had a knife, a sufficient basis for individualized suspicion and possibly even probable cause. The conduct therefore did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law. The Court finds that Officer Dau acted reasonably and is entitled to qualified immunity. Summary judgment is therefore granted in favor of defendants on plaintiff's § 1983 claim.
The Court is not entirely clear, based on the pleadings, whether the § 1983 claim is asserted only against Officer Dau or if the claim is intended to be asserted against the municipality of Farmington as well. Because § 1983 does not give rise to vicarious liability against a government entity, any claim against Farmington based on the conduct of Officer Dau must fail. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978); Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, any independent claim against the City of Farmington under § 1983 also fails because plaintiff has pointed to no official government policy or practice that constitutes a "custom or usage" of unconstitutional conduct. Mettler, 165 F.3d at 1204.
Despite this holding, the Court is troubled by the conduct of the school officials and the police officers in this case. While the plan to search each student on the bus was certainly justified when the school administrators learned of the existence of a knife, the decision to continue with the searches after the knife was turned over to the police is troublesome. The more reasoned approach would have been for the officers, once in possession of a knife, to simply ask the bus driver whether or not the knife that was turned over was the knife that he had seen plaintiff use. Police officers and school officials must keep in mind that students do not check their Fourth Amendment rights at the door to the school. The Court also cautions that police officers and school officials will not be permitted to rationalize overbroad searches by simply pointing to the more lenient reasonableness standard applicable to the school setting. While the officers did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment law in assuming that the school standard would be applied in this case, the Court is not convinced that the more lenient standard is necessarily applicable where, as here, the students were off school grounds and the search was conducted by police officers rather than school officials.
B. Minnesota State Law Claims
Plaintiff has also asserted four state law claims: violation of the Pupil Fair Dismissal Act; violation of Minn. Stat. § 626.21; violation of the Government Data Practices Act; and violation of the Minnesota Constitution, Article 1, § 10. Plaintiff did not dispute defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the state constitutional claim, the Pupil Fair Dismissal Act, and Minn. Stat. § 626.21. Summary judgment is therefore granted in favor of defendants on those claims.
Plaintiff's only remaining claim is one for violation of the Government Data Practices Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 13.01 et seq. Before the case was removed to this Court, the Dakota County District Court issued an order resolving the merits of this claim. That order required defendants to disclose all police reports sought by plaintiffs related to the claim. Defendants complied with the order and produced the requested information. Plaintiff's claim is therefore moot as he has received the information sought in the requests.
Plaintiff, however, has asserted that he is entitled to attorney's fees, costs and disbursements for bringing the initial motion in Dakota County. While plaintiff cites no authority for this claim, the Court assumes that it is based on Minn. Stat. § 13.08, which provides that "any aggrieved person may bring an action in district court to compel compliance with this chapter and may recover costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorney's fees, as determined by the court." In this case, the Court cannot find that plaintiff was an "aggrieved person" for purposes of the statute or that defendants clearly violated the Government Data Practices Act.
Plaintiff's father, Gary Shade, requested police information from both the Farmington and Apple Valley police departments following the incident on December 2, 1999. Minn. Stat. § 13.82 governs the disclosure of the police records sought in this case. Minn. Stat. § 13.82(6) provides that certain data "created or collected by law enforcement agencies which documents the agency's response to a request for service . . . shall be public government data." The statute also explains that "[e]xcept for data defined in subdivisions 2, 3, and 6, investigative data collected or created by a law enforcement agency in order to prepare a case . . . is confidential or protected nonpublic while the investigation is active." Minn. Stat. § 13.82(7). With regard to nonpublic investigative data, "during the time when an investigation is active, any person may bring an action in the district court . . . to authorize disclosure of investigative data." Id. It is not clear from the record before the Court whether Gary Shade was requesting information that was considered "public" by § 13.82(6) or "confidential" by § 13.82(7). If the motion before the Dakota County court sought to authorize disclosure of otherwise nonpublic data pursuant to § 13.82(7), the Court would conclude that plaintiff is not an "aggrieved person" for purposes of § 13.08. Washington v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 625, 610 N.W.2d 347, 349-50 (Minn.Ct.App. 2000) (finding that because school district withheld non-accessible data from plaintiff and did not wrongfully withhold public data, plaintiff was not an "aggrieved person" for purposes of statute). Based on the scant record before the Court on this issue, it cannot find a violation of the Government Data Practices Act. However, even if there was a violation in this case, the Court does not believe that it warrants an award of attorney's fees and costs. Kuczynski v. City of Dassel, No. CO-98-1278, 1999 WL 43348, at *3 (Minn.Ct.App. 1999) (explaining that § 13.08 does not require an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party). The Court therefore declines to award attorney's fees, costs, or disbursements to plaintiff in this case.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that plaintiff was a minor at the time of the incident and the Farmington city clerk indicated that the records were being withheld because juvenile records were involved. Minn. Stat. § 260B.171(5) prohibits disclosure of peace officer records of juveniles, except to the child or child's parents or guardian.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Docket No. 14] is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiffs' amended complaint [Docket No. 12] is DISMISSED with prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.