Opinion
No. CA 07 00987.
January 30, 2008.
APPEAL FROM THE ALEXANDRIA CITY COURT PARISH OF ALEXANDRIA CITY COURT, NO. 99,674, HONORABLE RICHARD ERIC STARLING, JR., CITY COURT JUDGE.
AFFIRMED.
Sam Charles Giordano Attorney at Law, Alexandria, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee: Adline Shackleford.
Dana C. Graham Borne Wilkes, Lafayette, LA, Counsel for Defendants/Appellants: Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana Reshunda Matthews.
Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, MARC T. AMY, and BILLY HOWARD EZELL, Judges.
Safeway Insurance Company and its insured, Reshunda Matthews, appeal the trial court's assessment of fault in a vehicular accident case. Ms. Matthews was assessed with seventy-five percent of the fault while the driver of the other vehicle was assessed with twenty-five percent of the fault. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
The accident occurred on March 3, 2003, on Leland Street in Alexandria. Crystal Vallery was exiting a parking lot at the time. Adline Shackleford was a passenger in her vehicle sitting in the front. Two other girls were also in the vehicle. Ms. Matthews was proceeding down Leland Street. Both Ms. Vallery and Ms. Shackleford stated that Ms. Matthews came to a complete stop in the road to their left, a few feet from the driveway they were using to exit the parking lot. At the time, Mrs. Mathews was looking left and eating something out of a bowl. According to the ladies, Ms. Matthews was stopped for a minute to a minute and a half.
Ms. Matthews agreed that she was looking left because she thought she saw a friend getting into a confrontation in a club parking lot. Ms. Matthews said she was slowing down. Ms. Matthews also stated that she did not see the other vehicle until the cars actually collided.
Ms. Shackleford filed suit. In lieu of a live trial, the parties entered into certain stipulations and submitted certain evidence in order that the matter be tried on briefs. In assessing fault the trial court stated in written reasons for judgment that, "[i]t is clear from the testimony that the defendant was not paying attention by the fact she never saw the Valley [sic] vehicle prior to impact and was looking away at the time of impact." Ms. Matthews and Safeway were assessed with seventy-five percent of the damages based on the percentage of fault assessed to Ms. Matthews.
DISCUSSION
The Appellants claim that the trial court should have assessed a majority of the fault to Ms. Vallery since she was the exiting motorist pulling out in front of the favored driver, Ms. Matthews. They allege that Ms. Vallery did not do anything to ascertain that she could pull into traffic safely and thus violated her duty to avoid the accident. Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:124 requires a driver entering a highway from a private road or driveway to "yield the right of way to all approaching vehicles so close as to constitute an immediate hazard." In Valin v. Barnes, 550 So.2d 352,355-56 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 552 So.2d 399 (La. 1989) (citations omitted) (quoting Davis v. Galilee Baptist Church, 486 So.2d 1021, 1024 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1986)), this court discussed:
A motorist who is about to enter a roadway from a private driveway is required to yield the right of way to all approaching vehicles so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Unusual, extreme, and high care toward favored traffic is required of such a motorist under the case law. Conversely, the duty of the driver on the favored street toward the intruding motorist is the much lesser ordinary care and that driver generally may rely on the assumption or presumption that those vehicles entering the roadway from less favored positions such as a private drive will not drive into the path of favored traffic. The motorist who is otherwise proceeding lawfully on the favored street is not required to look out for or search in anticipation of careless drivers who might enter his right of way from a private driveway in violation of the statute. The presumption or assumption may not be relied on by a motorist who is proceeding unlawfully before or after he sees the intruding vehicle.
Applying these precepts we keep in mind that the assessment of fault by the trier of fact is a factual determination that is subject to the manifest error standard of review. Duncan v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 00-66 (La. 10/30/00), 773 So.2d 670, cert. dismissed, 532 U.S. 992, 121 S.Ct. 1651 (2001).
Usually, the favored driver has been assessed no fault. However, we agree with the trial court that this is clearly one of those cases where the favored driver's inattentiveness led to this accident. The trial court's reasons indicate that it believed the testimony of both Ms. Vallery and Ms. Shackleford that Ms. Matthews was stopped in the road and eating something. She was not paying attention. Furthermore, when she proceeded to travel again, she never looked ahead or she would have noticed Ms. Vallery pulling out of the parking lot. Ms. Matthews admitted that she did not see the vehicle until after the collision. Ms. Vallery was proceeding ahead at a time when she did not anticipate an "immediate hazard" since Ms. Matthews was stopped in the roadway. Both Ms. Vallery and Ms. Matthews stated that Ms. Vallery attempted to back up when they observed that Ms. Matthews began moving forward. We see no manifest error in the trial court's assessment of seventy-five percent of the fault to Ms. Matthews.
For these reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Safeway Insurance Company of Louisiana and Reshunda Matthews.
AFFIRMED.
THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-16.3 Uniform Rules, Court of Appeals.