"[A] defendant may forfeit his constitutional right to pretrial bail by his conduct while out on bail. See Shabazz v. State, 440 So.2d 1200 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983). In Shabazz, we stated:
814 So.2d at 303. In support of this statement we cited the case of Shabazz v. State, 440 So.2d 1200 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983). The Shabazz court, citing other state cases specifically addressing the denial of pretrial bail stated, "[W]hatever force constitutional arguments against preventive detention have is diminished if the defendant has been released and demonstrated a deliberate intent to violate reasonable restrictions aimed at protecting public safety."
We have recognized that a defendant may forfeit his constitutional right to pretrial bail by his conduct while out on bail. See Shabazz v. State, 440 So.2d 1200 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983). In Shabazz, we stated:
The court set the appellant's bond at $ 50,000 after stating in the record that the offense for which the appellant was arrested was committed while the appellant was released on bail in two other cases. The court, in denying the petition, cited Shabazz v. State, 440 So.2d 1200 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), as authority for its denial. This court in Shabazz found that an accused's commission of a felony while on bail results in a "[f]orfeit[ure] [of] his constitutional right to bail. . . ."
Sprinkle, 368 So.2d at 559. See also Shabazz v. State, 440 So.2d 1200 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983); Ex parte Bynum, 294 Ala. 78, 312 So.2d 52 (1975); Trammell v. State, 284 Ala. 31, 221 So.2d 390 (Ala. 1969). The "State is not without its remedies. . . . the trial judge can raise the amount of the . . . bond, require additional sureties, and add additional conditions as seem necessary."
And Alabama courts "have consistently construed" the Alabama Constitution and § 15-13-2, Code of Alabama 1975, "as ensuring to an accused an absolute right to bail." Shabazz v. State , 440 So. 2d 1200, 1201 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) (citing Brakefield v. State , 269 Ala. 433, 113 So. 2d 669 (Ala. 1959) ; Holman v. Williams , 256 Ala. 157, 53 So. 2d 751 (Ala. 1951) ; Sprinkle v. State , 368 So. 2d 554 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) ). So those arrested in Alabama must enjoy the same liberty interest under the Alabama Constitution that Texas's Constitution created in "a right to bail that appropriately weighs the detainees’ interest in pretrial release and the court's interest in securing the detainee's attendance," ODonnell , 892 F.3d at 158. As for the Mathews balancing test, as in the factual findings in ODonnell —where the district court determined that "secured bail orders [we]re imposed almost automatically on indigent arrestees," id. at 159, even though officials knew the indigent could not afford such bail—the district court here found that "Cullman County mechanically applies a secured money bail schedule to detain the poor and release the wealthy," and "[i]t is not uncommon for a judge to set a bond in an amount
And Alabama courts "have consistently construed" the Alabama Constitution and § 15-13-2, Code of Alabama 1975, "as ensuring to an accused an absolute right to bail." Shabazz v. State, 440 So.2d 1200, 1201 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (citing Brakefield v. State, 113 So.2d 669 (Ala. 1959); Holman v. Williams, 53 So.2d 751 (Ala. 1951); Sprinkle v. State, 368 So.2d 554 (Ala.Crim.App.1978)). So those arrested in Alabama must enjoy the same liberty interest under the Alabama Constitution that Texas's Constitution created in "a right to bail that appropriately weighs the detainees' interest in pretrial release and the court's interest in securing the detainee's attendance," ODonnell, 892 F.3d at 158.
"The trial court is not without a solution to its perceived problem. As this Court stated in Daniels [v. State], 597 So.2d [1383] at 1384 [(Ala.Crim.App. 1991)], quoting Shabazz v. State, 440 So.2d 1200, 1202 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983): `The "State is not without its remedies. . . . [T]he trial judge can raise the amount of the . . . bond, require additional sureties, and add additional conditions as seem necessary."'" 717 So.2d at 871-72.
Under Alabama law a defendant has an absolute right to bail in all noncapital cases. Ala. Const. (1901), Art. I, § 16; Ala. Code 1975, § 15-13-2; Shabazz v. State, 440 So.2d 1200 (Ala.Crim.App. 1983). A system of bail based totally on some form of monetary bail, and not providing for release on a defendant's own recognizance in appropriate circumstances, would be unconstitutional.
Initially, we must note that a trial judge normally has the authority to impose on a defendant's bail any conditions that he believes necessary to preserve the safety of the public and to assure that the defendant will return to court at the appointed time. Rules 7.2 and 7.3(b), Ala.R.Crim.P.; see also Shabazz v. State, 440 So.2d 1200, 1202 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983). Judge Phelps seeks to couple this inherent authority of the judiciary to set conditions on bail with the legislative directive in § 15-22-35 that the officers of the Board cooperate with the judiciary: Section 15-22-35 provides: