Opinion
23-CV-9228 (LTS)
02-14-2024
DANNY AMEN VALENTINE SHABAZZ, Plaintiff, v. AUBREY DRAKE GRAHAM; LUCIANNE GRAINGE, UNIVERSAL MUSIC GROUP, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging claims of criminal copyright infringement. By order dated November 13, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint but grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to replead his claims in an amended complaint.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Danny Amen Valentine Shabazz brings this action against Aubrey Drake Graham, popularly known as the musical artist Drake; and Lucianne Grainge, who is affiliated with Universal Music Group (“UMG”), asserting claims for criminal copyright infringement. The following allegations are taken from the complaint, in which Plaintiff refers to himself as “Danny.”
The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.
Since 2007, Danny and his company Covenant Music Inc has been a part of the Universal Music Group/Motown/ Republic/SRC system as a partner in projects. Due to Danny getting exhausted from 2007-2009 workflow with Wu Tang Clan's 8 Diagrams album as an executive with a 2 million dollar budget and a 36,000 dollar payment to Covenant Music Group. Out of that album came multiple
projects and derivatives one being the artist Drake who was brought into the fold by Kevin “Kato” McKenzie and KK Rosemond. Kato was the project manager originally for Drake and I was the Covenant Wu Tang Executive who received a check that was cashed at Wachovia. Vashon Rap Straws was the Head of Radio Promotions and Derek “D the Weatherman” Pearson was the Head of Radio at Motown. We all worked on the 6th floor with Monique Baines being Steven Rifkind assistant. Sylvia Rhone was the then President of Motown and she oversaw budgets for the whole Motown staff. She and Danny had a cordial relationship. Danny didn't at the time have a lawyer to oversee the multiple projects that were coming out of the UMG building and that hindered Danny from receiving the rest of his pay and crest on Drake and other artists like Akon and The Dream. Lucianne Grainge came into the fold much later after Doug Morris and Sylvia Rhone departed for Sony. As of today Danny has been in contact with UMG and Vashon over the last 3 years with Lucianne greenlighting Unc and Phew and allowing them to sell the catalog to Hybe Corporation. Unc and Phew album is a derivative of 8 Diagrams and Danny copyright Protect Ya Neck or spelled Protect Your Neck at the copyright office. Drake's album and career is derived from works from Wutang and Danny other acts under the Covenant Music Inc. Danny has not been paid for any of these works and Lucianne continues to greenlight these projects after repeated attempts to collect his money and pay his staff which consist over thousands of people who are not being paid correctly or able to even organize the back office correctly. These projects were completed in the New York UMG building at 1755 Broadway Ave, New York, New York 10019 and Danny lived in Jersey City on Magnolia Ave 07306. Danny also worked at 703 47th and 7th Ave New York, New York 10036.(ECF 1 at 2-3.)
Plaintiff refers to a copyright registration number for a work called “Drake,” which was allegedly created in 2009, and “published” in 2020. (ECF 1 at 4-5.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “owe” him:
on all Drake projects and a 15 percent fee of the budgets he was allocated. He also owes [Plaintiff] 15 percent of the 500 million and all Quality Controls projects which will be addressed in another claim unless the judges decide to rule on an order for UMG to pay all fees. The USSS specially said [Plaintiff] needs 24 hour security and we are being neglected.(Id. at 3.)
DISCUSSION
A. Criminal Copyright Claims
Plaintiff asserts claims for criminal copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 506 and 18 U.S.C. § 2139. However, Plaintiff cannot initiate the prosecution of an individual in this Court because “the decision to prosecute is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor.” Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 87 (1981). Nor can Plaintiff or the Court direct prosecuting attorneys to initiate a criminal proceeding against Defendant, because prosecutors possess discretionary authority to bring criminal actions, and they are “immune from control or interference by citizen or court.” Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 457 F.2d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1972). Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims for criminal copyright infringement for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B. Civil Copyright Claims
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert civil claims for copyright infringement, his allegations are insufficient to state a viable claim. The Copyright Act gives the owner of a copyright certain “exclusive rights,” 17 U.S.C. § 106, to protect “original works of authorship,” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). “[T]he author is the party who actually creates the work, that is, the person who translates an idea into a fixed, tangible expression entitled to copyright protection.” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989). “To state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must allege ‘both (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) infringement of the copyright by the defendant.'” Spinelli v Nat'l Football League, 903 F.3d 185, 197 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff provides information about a copyright registration number for a work called “Drake,” and refers to a work called “Protect Your Neck,” and claims that Drake's “album and career is derived from works from Wutang and Danny other acts.” (ECF 1 at 3, 5.) Even if the Court assumes that Plaintiff is the owner of a valid copyright, these allegations are insufficient to show that Defendants violated infringed or otherwise violated that copyright. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's civil claims for copyright infringement for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C. Supplemental Jurisdiction
A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of state law claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). Because Plaintiff does not currently state a federal claim, the Court declines, at this time, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction of any state law claims that Plaintiff may be asserting. See Kolari v. New York-Presbyterian Hosp., 455 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Subsection (c) of § 1367 ‘confirms the discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.'” (quoting City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997))).
LEAVE TO REPLEAD
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). In an abundance of caution, and in light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff 30 days' leave to plead facts in support of a civil copyright infringement claim in an amended complaint. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the time allowed, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in this action.
LITIGATION HISTORY AND WARNING
A review of Public Access to Court Electronic Records (“PACER”) shows that since 2021, Plaintiff has filed approximately 20 pro se complaints in multiple federal courts, and has previously asserted copyright infringement claims similar to those set forth in this matter. See Anderson v. Jennings, No. 23-CV-651, 2024 WL 36002, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 3, 2024) (dismissing criminal copyright infringement claims because Plaintiff's claims were “confusing and missing relevant context”); Shabazz v. United States, ECF 1:23-CV-10546, 2 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2023) (directing Plaintiff to pay the filing fee or an IFP application within 30 days); Shabazz v. Yoon, ECF 1:23-CV-10908, 2 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2023) (same); Shabazz v. Diggs, ECF 1:23-CV-9084, 5, (LTS), 2024 WL 37079, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2024) (dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim, with 30 days' leave to replead); Shabazz v. Diggs, No. 23-CV-12046, 23-CV-16641, 2023 WL 6276277, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2023) (dismissing criminal copyright infringement claims because Plaintiff's “bald assertions and conclusory allegations [were] insufficient to state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face.”); Shabazz v. Matthews, No. 23-CV-1757, 2023 WL 4089361, at *5 (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2023) (“Shabazz's allegations lack a factual basis and do not support any plausible claim in accordance with Rule 8.”); Shabazz v. Bakish, No. 23-CV-1639, 2023 WL 4685521, at *1 (D.D.C. July 12, 2023) (dismissing criminal copyright infringement claims for failure to state a claim); Shabazz v. Passino, No. 23-CV-1638, 2023 WL 4685516, at *1 (D.D.C. July 12, 2023) (same).
Plaintiff has filed cases under the last names Shabazz and Valentine-Shabazz.
Plaintiff also sued Lucianne Grainge in that complaint.
Plaintiff's pleadings asserting other types of claims have been dismissed for failure to state a claim or for failure to comply with court orders. See Shabazz v. BET Network, ECF 1:23-CV-9923, 3 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2024) (dismissing action without prejudice for failure to pay the fee or file an IFP application as directed); Shabazz v. Watson, No. 23-CV-4048, 2023 WL 6940717, at *3 (N.D.Ga. Nov. 6, 2023) (dismissing complaint for failure to update address); Shabazz v. Bruce, No. 23-CV-1399 (D.N.J. July 17, 2023) (same); Valentine-Shabazz v. Sinacola, No. 22-CV-3342 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2022) (same); Valentine-Shabazz v. Tracy, No. 22-CV-512 (D. Del. June 21, 2022) (same); Shabazz v. Bruce, No. 23-CV-1604, 2023 WL 4531769, at *1 (D.D.C. July 12, 2023) (dismissing complaint because, “[a]s presented, neither the Court nor the defendants can reasonably be expected to identify plaintiff's claims, if any.”). Plaintiff is already subject to a filing injunction in another jurisdiction. See Estate of Valentine-Shabazz v. Buccini, No. 22-CV-3343, 2022 WL 4291334, at *4 (E.D. Pa., Sept. 16, 2022) (“This Court concludes that Valentine-Shabazz's abusive litigation activity warrants a pre-filing injunction at this time. Valentine-Shabazz has demonstrated a continuing pattern of abuse by emailing a volume of submissions to the Clerk of Court that are nonsensical, nonresponsive to this Court's Orders, and noncompliant with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
In light of Plaintiff's litigation history, this Court finds that Plaintiff was or should have been aware of the elements of a copyright claim when he filed this action. See Sledge v. Kooi, 564 F.3d 105, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing circumstances where frequent pro se litigant may be charged with knowledge of particular legal requirements). Plaintiff is warned that if he abuses the privilege of proceeding IFP by filing duplicative or meritless complaints, the Court may order him to show cause why he should not be barred from filing new actions IFP unless he receives prior permission. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), with 30 days' leave to replead.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
The Clerk of Court is instructed to hold this matter open on the docket until a civil judgment is entered.
SO ORDERED.