This type of employment action represents the kind of de minimis matter that does not constitute an adverse employment action under Title VII. See Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of the Rochester Area, 925 F. Supp. 977, 989 (W.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1370, 1997 WL 138836 (2d Cir. 1997) (table); Harlston, 37 F.3d at 382. Even if the court were to find that plaintiff has made out a prima facie case with respect to this allegation, an employer's decision to deny an employment benefit to an employee does not violate Title VII when that decision is motivated by personal animosity.

Yet, several district courts within the Second Circuit have held that disciplinary letters or written reprimands, even when placed in an employee's personnel file, are not adverse employment actions absent some present, tangible effect on the employee's terms of employment. See Cristofaro v. Lake Shore Central School District, No. 06-CV-0487S, 2011 WL 635263 at *10 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2011) ("[c]ourts have held that disciplinary write-ups, whether placed in a personnel file or not, which are not accompanied by any adverse change in the terms and conditions of her employment do not amount to an adverse employment action"); Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rochester, 925 F. Supp. 977, 989 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that placement of reports in plaintiff's personnel file was too inconsequential to constitute an adverse employment action given that plaintiff was never demoted, or denied pay or benefits because of the reports); O'Hazo v. Bristol-Burlington Health District, 599 F.Supp.2d. 242, 248, 258 (D. Conn. 2009) (written reprimand for failure to check shipment list regarding shellfish, which resulted in a patron becoming sick after consuming shellfish, was not an adverse employment action without a showing that the reprimand changed the terms or conditions of plaintiff's employment). In Henton v. City of New London, No. 3:06 CV 2035(EBB), 2008 WL 2185933 at *12 (D. Conn. May 23, 2008), the court held that even the combination of being approached for tardiness, being subjected to a disciplinary hearing, and receiving a written reprimand, all within the same month, was not enough to constitute adverse employment action.

Kodengada's encounters with Baschiera largely reflected a clash of personalities rather than a discriminatory animus. See, e.g., Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 925 F. Supp. 977, 982 (W.D.N Y 1996) (granting summary judgment on hostile environment claim where many of the incidents "involved nothing more than occasional brief comments, some of which reflected a clash of personalities more than a discriminatory animus."); see also Valdez v. Mercy Hospital, 961 F.2d 1401, 1403 (8th Cir. 1992) (personality conflicts between co-workers and plaintiff did not rise to the level or severity or pervasiveness necessary to demonstrate a discriminatorily hostile work environment). "Title VII . . . is not a shield against harsh treatment at the workplace." Shabat, 925 F. Supp. at 984.

To hold otherwise would be to hold that things never change, a proposition clearly without a basis in reality." Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 925 F. Supp. 977, 988 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1370 (table), 1997 WL 138836 (2d Cir. 1997). See also Danzer v. Norden Systems, Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Shabat with approval); Billet v. CIGNA Corp., 940 F.2d at 826 ("prior good evaluations alone cannot establish that later unsatisfactory evaluations are pretextual"); Jensen v. Garlock, Inc.

Jemison's use of the slur "porch monkey," which the Fourth Circuit explained is a racial slur "about as odious as the use of the word 'nigger,'" Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., No. 13 Civ. 1473, 2015 WL 2116849, at *12 (4th Cir. May 7, 2015) (en banc), and reference to Plaintiff as "stupid African" sufficiently alleges that Jemison's conduct was based on Plaintiff's race, color, and national origin. Defendant argues that Jemison's conduct is based on personal animosity towards Plaintiff, not Plaintiff's race, national origin, or color. Def.'s Mem. at 9 (citing Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rochester Area, 925 F. Supp. 977, 982 (W.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd sub nom., Shabat v. Billotti, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997)); Def.'s Reply Mem. at 3 (citing Brodt v. City of New York, 4 F. Supp. 3d 562, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). In Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rochester Area, 925 F. Supp. at 982, the court found comments about plaintiff's religion or national origin "involved nothing more than occasional, brief comments, some of which reflect a clash of personalities more than discriminatory animus," and did not create an "abusive work environment, permeated with discrimination."

" 925 F.Supp. 977, 981 (W.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Shabat v. Billotti, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997) (unpublished table opinion). Id.

And, even if we were to agree that the phrase "scary person" is imbued with racial animus, "mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee . . . does not implicate Title VII." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. at 21; see also Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rochester Area, 925 F. Supp. 977, 984 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). This one instance of a purportedly racial comment does not make a federal case.

Courts have granted summary judgment where significantly more severe instances of discrimination were alleged. In Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 925 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd sub nom Shabat v. Billotti, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997), plaintiff's claims were dismissed despite comments from coworkers and supervisors asking the Jewish Israeli plaintiff whether people from the Mideast beat their wives; asking why he could not accept Jesus Christ as the Messiah since Jesus was also Jewish; stating that there was no such holiday as Yom Kippur; asking plaintiff who he had killed to make "matzah cake," an "allusion to a once-common myth spread by anti-Semites that Jews killed children and used their blood when baking matzah for Passover;" and rebuking plaintiff for inviting coworkers to the "barbaric ceremony" of his son's circumcision. Shabat v. Blue Cross, 925 F. Supp. at 982.

The remarks, although insensitive and offensive, were not so severe, pervasive, and insulting as to constitute an objectively hostile work environment. See, e.g., Alfano, 294 F.3d at 376-81;Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 925 F.Supp. 977, 982 (W.D.N.Y 1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997). While the remarks that the plaintiff alleges that Rosario made as threats were insensitive, they are also insufficient to support a claim of religious discrimination based on a hostile work environment.

This subjective belief, and Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the pace of his career progress, is not enough to raise an issue of discrimination sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment. See Shabat v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of the Rochester Area, 925 F. Supp. 977, 987 (W.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997). Additionally, Plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge.