Opinion
09-26-2023
S.F., Plaintiff, v. J.S., Defendant
Counsel for Plaintiff Gallet Dreyer & Berkey, LLP By: Allen A. Drexel, Esq. Counsel for Defendant Kule Seid-Vazana & Associates P.C. By: Danielle J. Seid-Vazana, Esq.
Unpublished Opinion
Counsel for Plaintiff Gallet Dreyer & Berkey, LLP By: Allen A. Drexel, Esq.
Counsel for Defendant Kule Seid-Vazana & Associates P.C. By: Danielle J. Seid-Vazana, Esq.
Ariel D. Chesler, J.
Introduction
In this motion sequence, Defendant moves to dismiss the action or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, contending that no valid marriage exists between the parties, and that Plaintiff thus has no cause of action for divorce. Plaintiff cross-moves, inter alia, for an order resolving the motion for summary judgment in her favor, and for certain sanctions.
For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion is denied in its entirety and the cross-motion is granted to the extent of granting summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor.
Factual Background
All of the facts necessary to determine the motion are undisputed and are found in the parties' submissions. The parties began dating in April 2019 and Plaintiff moved into Defendant's apartment in Manhattan in July 2019. Plaintiff remained living there until she left on February 16, 2023. The parties' child was born in 2022 and raised by the parties in New York. The parties became engaged to marry on November 25, 2019, in Grand Army Plaza near Central Park.
The parties had a religious wedding ceremony and party, which took place on June 21, 2021 at [REDACTED] wedding venue in New Jersey. In advance of the wedding, the parties created and sent out a "save the date" card, a wedding invitation, a wedding website and a gift registry. Defendant and his father, who are event producers, managed the planning of the wedding; Defendant created an excel spreadsheet to track, among other things, the guest list, seating, gift list, and a "run of show."
Approximately one month prior to the wedding, the parties submitted a sworn Application for Marriage License to the New Jersey Department of Health. Page two of the License Application reflects that a wedding license (License No. XX-XX) was duly granted on May 18, 2021, and would expire on August 15, 2021.
Also prior to the wedding the parties engaged in negotiations regarding the signing of a prenuptial agreement. However, Plaintiff felt the draft agreement was "one-sided" and was "unacceptable." Ultimately, days before the wedding the parties could not agree on terms and on or about June 19, 2021 Plaintiff advised Defendant that she would not sign the prenuptial agreement. The parties intended to continue discussion regarding a postnuptial agreement following the wedding. Regardless, they forged ahead with the planned wedding.
On June 21, 2021, the parties participated in a Jewish wedding ceremony witnessed by more than 200 friends and family. Rabbi X, a longstanding friend and mentor of Defendant whom he paid to bring from Israel specifically for the wedding, presided over the ceremony and solemnized the marriage.
Before the ceremony took place under the chuppah (a Jewish wedding canopy), the men and women were kept in separate rooms. In the men's room, an engagement contract was signed and then the parties' mothers came in and broke a plate with a hammer as part of this contract. The parties' Ketubah (a traditional Jewish marriage contract) was signed by Rabbi X and then two (2) witnesses, M.H. and E.P., both close friends of Defendant.
Next, Defendant came to the women's room, where Plaintiff had been offering blessings. Defendant covered Plaintiff's face with a veil, ensuring that the veiled person was, in fact, Plaintiff. Over his tuxedo, Defendant wore a kittel, which is a traditional white robe symbolizing rebirth.
Thereafter, the wedding ceremony took place under the chuppah. This was composed of two (2) parts - the kiddushin and the nissuin. First, the Rabbi asked several questions of the Defendant. When he agrees, he is asked to give the bride the ring that he owns. This "transfer of possession" is called "Kinyon," and shows the consent of both parties to enter into marriage. Just before presenting the bride with the ring, the groom says "Behold, by this ring you are consecrated to me as my wife according to the laws of Moses and Israel." Here, Defendant transferred the ring to Plaintiff and recited the statement. This statement, along with the act of Kinyon, makes the bride and groom married.
Following the kiddishin, or betrothel, the Ketubah is read aloud, and the second of the two ceremonies called nissuin takes place. Nissuin includes the giving of "seven blessings," which at this ceremony was done by several prominent rabbis of Defendant's choosing. The parties then drank a cup of grape juice, Rabbi X recited a final prayer, and the parties broke a glass. After the chuppah ceremony, the parties went to a personal suite, guarded by two witnesses, to consummate the marriage.
The wedding reception was held immediately after the ceremony and included separate dancing for the men and women in attendance. In addition to the gifts the parties received from their registry before the wedding, they also received envelopes with cash and checks in them at the reception. A professional videographer and photographer hired by Defendant's father were present throughout and captured the entire ceremony and reception.
No deficiencies or flaws regarding the religious components of the wedding ceremony are raised in the motion papers.
Following the wedding, the parties spent two nights at hotels. Then, they returned to share traditional meals with family. The parties and their family treated them as a married couple. For example, Defendant's mother insisted that Plaintiff cover her hair, a requirement for married women. In 2022, when preparing invitations for the bris of the parties' son, Defendant's sister referred to the parties as "J & S [SAME LAST NAME]
The parties also held themselves out as married and were treated as married. Defendant regularly introduced Plaintiff as his wife, and his family treated her as such. Defendant referred to them as "the [SAME LAST NAME]'s" in text correspondence with his family and he changed his FaceBook status to "married."
Both parties also wore their wedding bands throughout the marriage. Defendant also noted that he got married in his diary, and the couple celebrated their first anniversary with cake and received messages from family wishing them a happy anniversary.
The parties dispute whether the wedding ceremony was only intended to be "symbolic." Plaintiff also disputes Defendant's claim that they both agreed not to have the marriage license/certificate filed with the New Jersey Department of Health following the wedding. Ultimately, the certificate was never filed.
Defendant notes that there is no record of marriage of the parties on file with the New Jersey Department of Health and Vital Records Registry.
Both parties claim not to know where the unrecorded original certificate is located currently. Similarly, numerous photographs and videos from the wedding cannot be located.
Plaintiff learned shortly after the wedding that the certificate had not been filed. The day after the wedding, her brother-in-law offered to sign it as an officiant, but Defendant objected. Then, on November 14, 2021, Plaintiff brought the certificate to a friend's wedding where Rabbi X and the witnesses from the parties' wedding would be in attendance. Rabbi X and the witnesses signed the parties' certificate at that time and Defendant did not object. Defendant explains that he did not object because the parties' marriage license had expired as of August 15, 2021. In any event, Plaintiff claims that the morning after she had it signed it went missing; Defendant admitted that he had taken it and would agree to file it once Plaintiff had signed "the prenup."
While Defendant initially claimed he had four original copies of the certificate, he later represented that he could not locate them and suggested Plaintiff may have taken them, which she denies. Plaintiff believes Defendant has retained the certificates to advantage himself in this litigation.
For months after the wedding, the parties frequently discussed Defendant's retention of the certificate and his demand that Plaintiff sign the "prenup" in order for him to have it filed, including in couples therapy. This issue was a source of contention throughout the relationship.
While Plaintiff believed they were legally married, she was uncertain. During one conversation in December 2021 she described the couple as "Jewish married" and expressed concern about being an unwed mother. Defendant insisted and insists that they were not legally married unless and until he filed the certificate of marriage, which was not executed or filed before the marriage license expired.
During the period after the wedding while the parties disputed their marital status, both parties filed taxes as "single" for the year 2021. Plaintiff also obtained health insurance through Defendant as his "Sponsored Dependent." In addition, when the parties' son was born on May 31, 2022, the parties executed forms to obtain a Certificate of Parentage, legally establishing their son's paternity. The forms explained that they were only necessary for unmarried parents.
Plaintiff explains that the 2021 returns in question were prepared by Defendant's accountant, on whose advice she exclusively relied. She states the accountant and Defendant told her that it was necessary for her to sign the "Single" returns, as it benefited Defendant's business taxes. Plaintiff adds that because she was naive, and because she feared Defendant's hostile reaction if she refused to sign, she acquiesced. Defendant does not dispute this accounting, other than to say that he did not pay less in taxes.
Defendant states that filing as "single" actually cost him $30,000.
Similarly, Plaintiff states that Defendant's possession of the marriage certificate and claims regarding their status were used by him to coerce her to file "improper" forms regarding parentage of their son. In other words, because Defendant insisted they were not legally married she felt she had no choice but to sign these forms. Plaintiff also noted that Defendant registered her on his health insurance policy without any input from her.
Defendant provides an email exchange in which Plaintiff provides her opinion about which insurance plan she should obtain through Defendant, but this exchange does not address her being a Dependent versus a spouse.
Discussion
In our system of government, laws are drafted and passed by our representatives in the Legislature, approved by the Executive branch, and interpreted by the Judiciary. It is fundamental to this system that the meaning and interpretation of laws are not dictated by the individual. Nor is an individual's interpretation, understanding, or misunderstanding of applicable laws of any significance. Indeed, since the days of John Adams we have been "a government of laws, not of men."
This most basic principle applies equally to laws surrounding marriage. And, while marriage is a contract between two consenting individuals, it is a special status governed by laws and the State and not determined by those entering the contract.
Indeed, Domestic Relations Law 10 provides that marriage is a civil contract, requiring the consent of the parties. However, the commentaries explain that:
marriage is more than a mere contract; once the contract of marriage is executed by marriage, a relationship is created between the parties which is regulated by law. Upon the formation of marriage, the law steps in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. Maynard v. Hill, 8 S.Ct. 723, 125 U.S. 190, 31 L.Ed. 654 (1888). Marriage is an institution which involves the highest interests of society and which is controlled by law based upon principles of public policy. Fearon v. Treanor, 272 NY 268, 5 N.E.2d 815 (1936), appeal dismissed, 57 S.Ct. 933, 301 U.S. 667, 81 L.Ed. 1332, rehearing denied, 58 S.Ct. 6, 302 U.S. 774, 82 L.Ed. 600. Hence, although the formation of the marriage relationship is based upon a contractual agreement between the parties, once the marriage takes place, the rights, duties and obligations of each party to the marriage can be imposed, regulated or restricted by law. For example, although marriage is formed by consent, the parties are precluded from contracting to alter or dissolve the marriage. General Obligations Law § 5-311. Thus, the traditional principle is that marriage is a relationship formed by contract, but once formed, is a status protected by, and subject to law (see NY Dom Rel 10, Practice Commentaries by Alan D. Scheinkman).
In discussing this concept of marriage as a unique contract and status, Surrogate's Court explained In re Farraj (23 Misc.3d 1109(A) [Surrogate's Court, Kings County 2009], aff'd 72 A.D.3d 1082 [2d Dept 2010]):
However, it has long been recognized that a marriage is not merely an ordinary contract. Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 NY 282, 284 (1874) ("[Marriage] is more than a contract... It partakes more of the character of an institution regulated and controlled by public authority, upon principles of public policy; for the benefit of the community."). Marriage creates a personal status that carries with it non-transferable rights, duties, and obligations that are recognized and imposed by the state. Wade, 58 NY at 285 ("Neither the rights, duties nor obligations created by or flowing from [marriage] can be transferred, and the action scarcely resembles, in its main features, an action upon contract."). Marriage works as an important social institution that provides a cultural and religious infrastructure fundamental to our society. See Fearon v. Treanor, 272 NY 268, 272 (1936) ("It constitutes an institution involving the highest interests of society. It is regulated and controlled by law based upon principles of public policy affecting the welfare of the people of the State."). (see 23 Misc.3d 1109(A) at *2).
Because marital status is regulated and controlled by the State based on important policy concerns, individuals cannot determine whether or not they are lawfully married. For example, as discussed in the matter of N.B. v F.W. (62 Misc.3d 1012, 1017 [Supreme Court, New York County 2019]), "merely filing tax returns as a married couple would not, in and of itself, create a valid marriage where otherwise there would be none (i.e., not the equivalent of a common-law marriage or similar), as the court could not 'create' a marriage in a case where there is none."
Also critical to the analysis here is that in New York there is a "strong presumption favoring the validity of marriage." (In re McDonald, 276 A.D.2d 631, 632 [2d Dept 2000]; see also Fisher v. Fisher, 250 NY 313, 317 [1929]["Every presumption lies in favor of the validity of a marriage."]). In Fisher, the Court of Appeals remarked "[a] formal ceremony of marriage, whether in due form or not, must be assumed to be by consent, and, therefore, prima facie a contract of marriage per verba de praesenti" (250 NY at 316). In other words, there are public policy and legal considerations greater than the individual parties to a marriage, and which control and regulate the parties.
This "strong presumption of legitimacy" is even greater where, as here, legitimacy of children are concerned (see Amsellem v Amsellem, 189 Misc.2d 27, 29 [Sup Ct, Nassau County 2001] [ quoting Hynes v McDermott (91 NY 451 [1883]["The presumption of marriage, from a cohabitation, apparently matrimonial, is one of the strongest presumptions known to the law. This is especially true in a case involving legitimacy. The law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage; legitimacy, and not bastardy. Where there is enough to create a foundation for the presumption of marriage, it can be repelled only by the most cogent and satisfactory evidence"]).
Therefore, Defendant has a heavy burden in overcoming the presumption that favors the validation and legitimization of marriage, particularly since the parties obtained a marriage license, completed a public ceremony with a proper officiant, cohabitated, had a child together, and held themselves out as being married.
So, how is a marriage formed? Is love actually required? Is any particular purpose, vision for the future or shared values or goals required? Is a marriage's formation contingent on the subjective intent or understanding of one or even both of the parties to it, as Defendant contends?
Legally, a marriage is formed when two consenting people take the specific acts prescribed by the controlling statute to form a marriage. Any other answer would promote endless litigation based on subjective beliefs and claims unique to each couple, and would entirely undermine the strong presumption favoring the validity of marriage when certain standard, essential, and statutorily required steps have been taken.
Defendant contends that he and Plaintiff "were very clear in our understanding that no legal marriage would occur without a Prenuptial Agreement." Even accepting that one or both of the parties had such an "understanding," this was a misunderstanding of how the law works as they did not have the power to add this additional requirement to the laws of either New York or New Jersey. Once they completed the statutorily mandated acts of obtaining a license and participating in a solemn marriage ceremony, they were legally married. Of course, parties are free to enter into prenuptial agreements in accordance with the law, but that did not occur here.
Defendant claims that the parties both agreed "to move forward with only the religious traditions of the ceremony and further agreed to delay execution of the marriage certificate/license by the officiant/witnesses and not to record any such documents at the appropriate municipal office in New Jersey (where the wedding was to take place), until an agreed upon pre-nuptial agreement was executed."
However, the letter of the law and public policy considerations, including the strong presumption of legitimacy for a statutorily compliant marriage, far outweigh the parties purported understanding of their authority in this situation. It is a very serious thing to obtain a marriage license and take someone as a spouse in a public religious wedding ceremony. These intentional and voluntary actions demonstrate to the government, the couple's family and community, and to the public an actual intent to lawfully marry. Parties cannot secretly or privately hold an alternate intent which would trump the public actions they took to form a marriage. It is inconsequential that one or both of the parties may have thought they were not legally married. In any event, Plaintiff states she expected the marriage to be legally valid.
In T he Truman Show, the titular character Truman Burbank, who lives inside a reality television show, discovers that in his wedding photographs his purported wife (actually an actress playing his wife) has her fingers crossed as they kiss. In our reality, crossing fingers during a wedding ceremony or having some alternate hidden intent would have no legal impact so long as the statutory requirements to form a marriage were met.
To the extent parties can contract or waive rights and obligations under the law, they must do so in a written, subscribed and acknowledged document (see DRL 236[B][3]). Parties are always free not to go forward with a wedding ceremony until their financial concerns are settled. However, Defendant made the choice to proceed with the wedding without first resolving the issue of the prenuptial agreement.
The parties dispute whether this Court should apply the laws of New Jersey or New York. In order to decide whether the laws of New Jersey or New York apply, the court must first determine whether there is an "actual" conflict between the jurisdictions' laws in the case, before engaging in a choice of law analysis: if "no conflict exists between the laws of the jurisdictions involved, there is no reason to engage in a choice of law analysis." (see N.B. v F.W., 62 Misc.3d at 1017-18). Therefore, the initial question is whether there is a difference between the laws of New Jersey and New York on whether the marriage would be invalidated.
In both New York and New Jersey, a marriage is formed when a couple obtains a marriage license and partakes in a wedding ceremony before a proper officiant at which the parties solemnly declare that they take each other as spouses. The parties here satisfied these requirements.
In New Jersey, NJSA 37:1-10 requires two (2) steps which absolutely must be taken in order for a marriage contracted in New Jersey to be deemed legally valid: (a) obtaining a marriage license, and (b) having the marriage solemnized (see Nadhir v. Nadhir, 2014 WL 1796639, at *2 [N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 2014]["The only statute that applies, N.J.S.A. 37:1-10, provides that a marriage is absolutely void only if the parties do not obtain a marriage license and the marriage was not solemnized."]).
NJSA 37:1-10 provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed or taken to render any common law or other marriage, otherwise lawful, contracted before December first, nineteen hundred and thirty-nine, invalid by reason of the failure to take out a license as herein provided. But no marriage contracted on and after December first, nineteen hundred and thirty-nine, shall be valid unless the contracting parties shall have obtained a marriage license as required by section 37:1-2 of this Title, and unless, also, the marriage, after license duly issued therefor, shall have been performed by or before any person, religious society, institution or organization authorized by section 37:1-13 of this Title to solemnize marriages; and failure in any case to comply with both prerequisites aforesaid, which shall always be construed as mandatory and not merely directory, shall render the purported marriage absolutely void."
As was explained in Yaghoubinejad v. Haghighi (384 N.J.Super. 339, 341 [Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division 2006]), NJSA 37:1-10 "accomplishes three things. First, it abolishes common law marriage. Second, it requires that a license to marry be procured before the ceremony. Third, it requires that the marriage be solemnized by an authorized person or entity." The Court in Yaghoubinejad further explained that failure to comply with the statute results in a void marriage (Id at 342). Thus, in New Jersey failure to acquire a marriage license before a ceremonial marriage renders the marriage void. However, in New Jersey a "marriage [is] presumptively valid [where] a properly solemnized ceremony was preceded by acquisition of the requisite license" (Id at 344), which is the case here.
Defendant incorrectly contends that under New Jersey law his withholding of the marriage certificate and preventing it from being duly filed renders "any purported marriage absolutely void." The filing of a signed marriage license and certificate is not mandated by NJSA 37:1-10 and is not even mentioned as a mandatory step to a valid marriage in New Jersey. To the contrary, controlling case law in New Jersey provides that a marriage is presumptively valid where the parties first obtain a marriage license and have a properly solemnized ceremony. It is undisputed that both mandatory requirements were satisfied here.
NJRS 26:8-41 provides: "Every person or religious society, institution or organization solemnizing a marriage or civil union shall, within 5 days thereafter, transmit the certificate of marriage or civil union and the marriage or civil union license to the local registrar of the registration district in which the marriage or civil union occurs or to the clerk of the county board of health." However, unlike the mandatory requirements set forth in NJSA 37:1-10, the filing of the certificate is "merely directory" and failure to do so does not void the marriage (see In re Silverman's Estate, 94 N.J.Super. 189 [Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division 1967][ reviewing legislative history and describing the maintenance of proper records made possible by the filing of a marriage certificate as, merely, "desirable from the State's standpoint as well as from either spouse's." and holding that other procedural failings - in that case the misrepresentation of the bride's residence - does "not have the drastic effect of voiding a marriage which is otherwise valid."]).
Further evidence that the failure to file the certificate does not void the marriage is found in N.J. Reg D-30, which directs the person performing the ceremony in New Jersey to file the license and certificate but also provides: "Since failure to record the certificate may cause considerable inconvenience at a later date when proof of certificate is needed, you should make sure that this has been done." This language makes clear that failure to file the certificate may cause inconvenience but does not void the marriage. It is also significant that on the New Jersey Department of Health website, which is attached to the papers, an explanation is provided as to how to file a "delayed marriage certificate" even many years after a wedding has taken place. Notably, the site includes instructions for late filings for marriages that occurred within the last seven years and separate instructions for marriages that took place more than seven years ago. These instructions as to how to cure a failure to file the certificate make clear that such failure does not void an otherwise valid marriage and that the filing requirement is non-mandatory.
This delayed reporting procedure can be found in NJSA 37:1-17.2
Similarly, all that is required in New York to form a marriage is obtaining a license and solemnizing the marriage (see Domestic Relations Law sections § § 12 and 13). However, in New York the failure to obtain a marriage license does not void a properly solemnized marriage (see Dom Rel § 25). "Essentially, the Domestic Relations Law establishes that where parties participate in a solemn marriage ceremony officiated by a clergyman or magistrate wherein they exchange vows, they are married in the eyes of the law" (Persad v Balram, 187 Misc.2d 711, 713 [Sup Ct, Queens County 2001][ holding that the parties who participated in a Hindu marriage or Prayer ceremony at the home of one of the parties family in Brooklyn, New York, was valid even though the parties failed to obtain a valid marriage license]).
In sum, there has not been a showing of a conflict of the laws in New York and New Jersey as it relates to this matter. In both jurisdictions, the parties were required to obtain a marriage license and participate in a solemn marriage ceremony, which they did. There is thus no basis to conclude that either state would invalidate the marriage. Where no conflict exists between the laws of the jurisdictions involved, there is no reason to engage in a choice of law analysis (see Elson v Defren, 283 A.D.2d 109, 114 [1st Dept 2001]). In this case, there is no conflict and thus no need for such analysis. As there has been no showing that either state would invalidate the marriage, the court finds the marriage to be valid.
However, in the event it could be found that there is a conflict of laws, the starting point in any analysis is that "the validity of a marriage is determined by the laws of the state or county in which it was performed" (see Ponorovskaya v. Stecklow, 45 Misc.3d 597, 603 [Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2015]; Farraj, 72 A.D.3d at 1083). However, as noted by the Second Department in Farraj (72 A.D.3d at 1083-84), "[t]he Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 283, however, provides a more flexible approach, whereby "[t]he validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage" (Restatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws § 283 [1]).
Here, as in Farraj, due to the parties' extensive connections to New York, New York law would apply if there were a conflict between the laws. Specifically, New York has the most significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage. Just like the parties in Farraj, here "the intended and actual matrimonial domicile was New York, and the petitioner and the decedent held themselves out as a married couple in New York. Therefore, New York has a significant interest in the marriage between the petitioner and the decedent. While New Jersey has an interest in enforcing its marriage requirements, this interest is not particularly strong here, since the petitioner and the decedent left New Jersey immediately after the marriage ceremony, and lived in New York for the entirety of their marriage" (72 A.D.3d 1084).
It should be noted that unlike the parties here, the parties in Farraj had failed to obtain a marriage license, and therefore a conflict of laws existed between the laws of New York and New Jersey.
In this case, New Jersey's interest in enforcing its certificate filing requirements is much weaker than the interest in Farraj. Here, all the mandatory requirements in New Jersey were met and the failure to file the certificate can be corrected at any time under New Jersey's procedures. Otherwise, New Jersey has little to no interest in this couple or this marriage as the marital domicile was only in New York, and the parties' child was born and raised here by the parties.
New York has a very strong interest in upholding the validity of a marriage between two New York residents, whose marital domicile was in New York, and who had and raised a child in New York. The parties had or should have had a justified expectation that their marriage would be legally valid. They obtained a license, and voluntarily took each other as spouses in an elaborate, well-planned religious ceremony in front of more than 200 people. It is further significant that the parties held themselves out as married to their family and on social media, and wore wedding bands throughout the marriage.
In his reply papers, Defendant for the first time raises issues regarding Plaintiff's domicile. Specifically, he points to her driver's license, automobile registration, and voter registration. However, the relevant concern is the intended and actual marital domicile, which is undisputed to have been in New York (see Farraj, 72 A.D.3D at 1084; see also Lieb v. Lieb, 53 A.D.2d 67, 72 ]2d Dept 1976][defining "matrimonial domicile" as "that state where the parties when last together made their home."]). The Court also disregards other "new facts" submitted by Defendant for the first time on reply, such as a partial transcript of a conversation (see Ritt v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 182 A.D.2d 560, 562 [1st Dept 1992]).
In sum, were there to be a conflict of laws, New York law would apply, and pursuant to New York law, the parties' marriage is absolutely valid.
Defendant raises various items which he claims confirm that the parties did not believe they were married. These include that the parties filed taxes as single for the year 2021, obtained a certificate of parentage (issued only to non-married parents), and that Plaintiff was covered by Defendant's insurance as a sponsored dependent and not a spouse. While it may be true that these facts indicate the parties understanding/misunderstanding/confusion of their marital status, they cannot serve to invalidate a valid marriage. Merely filing taxes as single, accepting health insurance coverage as a Dependent, or unnecessarily obtaining a Certificate of Parentage cannot, on their own, invalidate a valid marriage (see e.g. N.B. v F.W., 62 Misc.3d at 1017 ["merely filing tax returns as a married couple would not, in and of itself, create a valid marriage where otherwise there would be none (i.e., not the equivalent of a common-law marriage or similar), as the court could not 'create' a marriage in a case where there is none."]).
Defendant is not aided by the holding in Mahoney-Buntzman v. Buntzman (12 N.Y.3d 415 [2009]), which found that a party is estopped from taking a position on an issue of fact that was contrary to information provided in tax filings. The holding in Mahoney-Buntzman does not apply to the question of marital status, which is a complex mix of fact and law (see In re Tran, 2014 WL 2216162 [Surrogate's Court, Ny Cty 2014][holding it inappropriate to estop party on issue of marital status, or for the Court to determine marital status, merely because a party filed taxes as "single" for 11 years]). This Court will not determine the parties' marital status based on the parties filing as single for one year, or based on the parties having mistakenly filled out other paperwork.
Defendant next argues that the parties' marriage is invalid even under New York law because the rabbi who solemnized the marriage did not register with the Clerk of New York City. This claim in unavailing as it has specifically been rejected by controlling appellate authority (See Shamsee v. Shamsee, 51 A.D.2d 1028 [2nd Dep't 1976]["The absence of such registration [with the city clerk] does not suffice to void a marriage."]; see also Persad v. Balram, 187 Misc.2d at 714).
Defendant's reliance on Ponorovskaya v. Stecklow (45 Misc.3d 597 [Supreme Court, New York County 2014]) is misplaced as the circumstances here are entirely distinguishable. In Ponorovskaya, the court declined to apply New York law to find a marriage valid where the parties did not complete the application for a marriage license, had a "symbolic" ceremony in Mexico, and knew or should have known that they were not complying with the Mexican formalities required. Further, neither one had a justifiable "expectation that they were legally married," and defendant "unequivocally knew both before and after the wedding that it did not constitute a valid marriage."
Critical differences exist also between the formal, elaborate, well-planned and complete Jewish wedding ceremony in this case, and the ceremony in Ponorovskaya. In Ponorovskaya, "there were no designated witnesses or the signing of a ketubah... [and] Perhaps most importantly, the ceremony was not officiated by a serious religious figure like a rabbi or an Imam" (Id at 609). Rather, the ceremony was described by the Court as: "a license-less marriage supposedly solemnized in what can only be described as a 'pseudo-Jewish' wedding ceremony conducted at a Mexican beach resort by a New York dentist who became a Universal Life Church minister on the internet" (Id at 598). That bears no relation to the serious, respected rabbi who solemnized the parties wedding during a full Jewish ceremony after the parties obtained a marriage license.
Nor is this case akin to Devorah H. v. Steven S. (49 Misc.3d 630 [Supreme Court, New York County 2015]). In Devorah H., the "wedding," although conducted by a rabbi, was spontaneous and sudden, "bare-boned," and lasted only a few minutes. Further, there may or may not have been witnesses, rings were not exchanged, and it is unclear if there was a Ketubah. In addition, the rabbi who officiated expected and advised the parties to obtain a marriage license and come back to him to conduct another ceremony, indicating his awareness that the impromptu ceremony had no legal import.
It must be noted separately that Defendant's view of the formation of marriage is dangerous and in this Court's view against the public policy of this state, which for some time in the realm of marriage has sought to promote equity, fairness, an equal playing field, and to reduce power imbalances and coercive dynamics that may and do occur between spouses. However, in Defendant's view, one spouse may hold a couple's marital status itself hostage until the other spouse caves to his demands in negotiating a nuptial agreement. In this case, he believed he could do so by literally holding the marriage certificate hostage until Plaintiff conceded to his demands. This cannot be countenanced by the Court, and is certainly not the law.
Conclusion
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211, all allegations of the challenged pleading must be taken as true, and all presumptions must be made in favor of the non-moving party (Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88 [1994]). A party moving for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, offering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact. (Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 320 [1986]). Only once the movant has met this burden does the burden then shift to the party opposing the motion to demonstrate via admissible evidence the existence of a factual issue (Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557 [1980]).
Because the parties' actions unquestionably satisfied the statutory requirements to form a marriage in both New Jersey and New York, as explained above, there is no basis to dismiss this action. Further, for the reasons explained above, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied. However, because the Court has determined there are no material issues of fact and further that the parties' marriage was legally valid and must be recognized as such, the Court now grants summary judgment on this issue in Plaintiff's favor. Defendant is therefore prohibited from further contesting the legal validity of the marriage, and the portion of his answer that denies the existence of a valid marriage is stricken.
As for the remainder of the cross-motion, the request for further sanctions is denied without prejudice to further applications for discovery sanctions, if appropriate, as well as other applications such as for counsel fees.
Finally, Plaintiff may file a delayed report of marriage with the New Jersey State Registrar pursuant to the procedures set forth in NJSA 37:1-17.2. To the extent necessary, Defendant shall cooperate with this process so as to ensure the marriage is properly recorded.
This constitutes the decision of the Court.