To hold otherwise would render the dual filing system meaningless by assigning plaintiffs the risk of administrative delay in the transmission of a charge from one agency to another. Zielinski, 899 F.Supp.2d at 353 (citing Seybert v. Int'l Grp., Inc., No. 07-3333, 2009 WL 722291, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009)).
, e.g., Robinson v. SEPTA, 2024 WL 1936242, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 2024) (noting that Jensen recognizes retaliatory harassment as actionable under Title VII and explaining that, as taught by White, “[i]n a retaliatory harassment claim, harassment that well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination is sufficient to establish an adverse employment action”) (quotations removed); Vollmar v. SPS Techs., LLC, 2016 WL 7034696, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2016) (explaining that “the standard for an adverse action in retaliation claims differs” from the standard in a pure discrimination claim, and that [i]n retaliation claims, if the action taken by the [defendant] would tend to dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in future protected action, it would suffice to form the adverse action requirement.”) (quotations removed); Seybert v. Int'l Grp., Inc., 2009 WL 722291, at *22 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009) (noting that “retaliatory harassment may constitute a ‘materially adverse' action for retaliation claims” and holding that a supervisor's pattern of yelling at a plaintiff, berating her, giving her poor performance reviews, and interfering with her work qualified as material adversity).
Two of this Court's prior summary judgment decisions are particularly relevant to this case: Willauer v. Riley Sales, Inc., 2009 WL 2959822, (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2009) and Seybert v. International Group, Inc., 2009 WL 72291, (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009).
Although a "claimant must file a PHRC complaint within 180 days of the challenged conduct," Clarkson v. SEPTA, 700 F. App'x 111, 114 (3d Cir. 2017), "a claimant's filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which is then transmitted to the PHRC, satisfies all the pleading requirements of PHRA." Seybert v. Int'l Grp., Inc., No. 07-3333, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21543, at *43-44 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009) (citing Lukus v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 419 A.2d 431, 452 (Pa. Super. 1980)). Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to meet those requirements.
The EEOC and PHRC have a work sharing agreement by which the two agencies each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges, even those that are not jurisdictional with the agency initially in receipt of the charges. Seybert v. Int'l Grp., Inc., No. 07-3333, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21543 *1, *40 (E.D. Pa. March 17, 2009). Under this work sharing agreement, "filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within the 180 [day] mandatory filing period, together with a request that the EEOC dual-file it with PHRC, is sufficient to preserve claims under the PHRA."
Plaintiffs cannot rely solely on the existence of the work-share agreement between the PHRC and EEOC to demonstrate dual filing in and of itself but must show a request to dual file within the 180-period. Hatten v. Bay Valley Foods, LLC, No. 11-1122, 2012 WL 1328287, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2012); Seybert v. Int'l Grp. Inc., No. 07-3333, 2009 WL 722291, at * 17 (E.D. Pa. March 18, 2009); see also Yeager v. UPMC Horizon, 698 F. Supp. 2d 523, 536-39 (W.D.Pa. 2010) (holding a PHRA charge of discrimination was untimely where no election to dual file was indicated within the 180-day statutory period). Under Pennsylvania law, however, a discrimination charge forwarded by the EEOC to the PHRC pursuant to the work-share agreement between the two agencies satisfies the PHRA's filing requirements.
"Under Pennsylvania law, a charge of discrimination that has been forwarded by the EEOC to the PHRC pursuant to the Worksharing Agreement may be sufficient to satisfy the filing requirements of the PHRA." Seybert v. Int'l Grp., Inc., No. 07-3333, 2009 WL 722291, at *14 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009) (citing Lanz v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Pa., No. 96-2671, 1996 WL 442795 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 1996)). However, evidence of "the worksharing agreement alone cannot serve to show that [the plaintiff] invoked the Pennsylvania state administrative remedy as required by the PHRA."
To set forth a prima facie case of retaliatory harassment, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) she was subject to 'materially adverse' action against her, and (3) there was a causal connection between her protected activity and the employer's action. Seybert v. International Group, Inc., No. 7-3333, 2009 WL 722291, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2009) (citing Moore, 461 F.3d at 340-41). Timing alone cannot establish causation unless the period between the protected act and the retaliatory act is "unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive."
Each United States District Court in Pennsylvania has held that when a claimant files a charge with the EEOC and requests that the EEOC dual-file the charge with the PHRC, the charge is consideredfiled with the PHRC on the date the request for dual-filing is made. See Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 2011 WL 3031264, at *5–6, 2011 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 80431, at *16 (M.D.Pa.2011); Yeager v. UPMC Horizon, 698 F.Supp.2d 523, 537–539 (W.D.Pa.2010); Seybert v. The International Group, Inc., 2009 WL 722291, at *17, 2009 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 21543, at *49–50 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 18, 2009) (Pratter, J.). I agree with the above district court findings.
Consequently, a claimant cannot rely on the work-share agreement alone to show that the PHRC received his or her claim, but rather, must show a request to dual file with the PHRC within the 180 day mandatory filing period. Seybert v. Int'l Grp. Inc., Civil Action No. 07-3333, 2009 WL 722291, at *17 (E.D. Pa. March 18, 2009). See Yeager v. UPMC Horizon, 698 F. Supp.2d 523, 536-39 (W.D. Pa. 2010) (PHRA charge of discrimination was untimely where no election to dual file was indicated within the 180-day statutory period).