The trial court, therefore, treated the defendants' motion for summary judgment as the equivalent of a common-law motion for judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., Sewer Commission v. Norton, 164 Conn. 2, 5, 316 A.2d 775 (1972) (stating that motion for judgment on pleadings "requires a situation where the parties are willing to admit the facts and place their entire case on the legal issues raised, waiving the right to replead if the legal issue is decided against them" [internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, we accept as undisputed the facts pleaded in the complaint, and unless otherwise noted, quotations from the record originate from that pleading.
In re Juvenile Appeal (85-AB), 195 Conn. 303, 312, 488 A.2d 778 (1985); New Haven Redevelopment Agency v. Research Associates, Inc., supra, 120; State v. Fahey, 146 Conn. 55, 57, 147 A.2d 476 (1958); 47 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments 1054. Because the lack of a final judgment is a jurisdictional defect, we must dismiss the appeal. Pinnix v. LoMorte, supra, 343; Guerin v. Norton, 167 Conn. 282, 284, 355 A.2d 255 (1974); Sewer Commission v. Norton, 164 Conn. 2, 6, 316 A.2d 775 (1972); New Haven Redevelopment Agency v. Research Associates, Inc., supra, 120. At oral argument the plaintiffs offered to withdraw their claims for injunctive relief and for damages in this action, reserving the right to bring a separate suit to obtain such relief. It is futile for the plaintiffs to attempt to waive their claims for additional relief in order to meet the final judgment requirement, because a jurisdictional defect renders the appeal void ab initio and is, therefore, not waivable. Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 182 Conn. 545, 549, 438 A.2d 755 (1980).
" Luliewicz v. Eastern Malleable Iron Co., 126 Conn. 522, 525, 12 A.2d 779. Since the lack of a final judgment is a jurisdictional defect, the appeal must be dismissed. Sewer Commission v. Norton, 164 Conn. 2, 6, 316 A.2d 775; Cone v. Darrow, 148 Conn. 109, 112, 167 A.2d 852; Costecski v. Skarulis, 103 Conn. 762, 763, 131 A. 398.
Our Supreme Court, however, recognized the motion in Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio , 146 Conn. 188, 191, 148 A.2d 554 (1959). See Sewer Commission v. Norton , 164 Conn. 2, 5, 316 A.2d 775 (1972) ; Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer , 160 Conn. 404, 408–409, 279 A.2d 540 (1971).On May 15, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to open the judgment.
The proper time for her to appeal would be when a judgment for costs had been rendered against her, if that eventuality should occur. See Sewer Commission v. Norton, 164 Conn. 2, 5, 316 A.2d 775 (1972); Clover Farms, Inc. v. Kielwasser, 134 Conn. 622, 623, 59 A.2d 550 (1948). We are persuaded that by voluntarily vacating the premises prior to the trial of the summary process action, Maria Martindale no longer had any interest in the litigation.
Because, as it concerns the issue of underinsured motorist coverage, all parties agree as to the material facts which may be considered, but differ only as to the legal conclusions to be drawn from those facts, these motions for summary judgment are somewhat akin to a common-law motion for judgment on the pleadings. Miller’s Pond Co., LLC v. New London, 273 Conn. 786, 789 n.5, 873 A.2d 965 (2005); see also Sewer Commission v. Norton, 164 Conn. 2, 5, 316 A.2d 775 (1972) ("[a] motion for judgment on the pleadings is of limited utility, for it requires a situation where the parties are willing to admit the facts and place their entire case on the legal issues raised, waiving the right to replead if the legal issue is decided against them" [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Our resolution of the [present motion] revolves around our interpretation of ... the language of the [named] plaintiff’s insurance policy.
Nevertheless, such a motion was recognized in DelVecchio v. DelVecchio, 146 Conn. 188, [191], 148 A.2d 554 (1959)." Hawthorne v. Lowe, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 301393 (March 31, 1995, Cocco, J.); see also Sewer Commission v. Norton, 164 Conn. 2, 5, 316 A.2d 775 (1972) (court recognized a motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the special defense filed by the defendants and held that this "judgment was interlocutory only and not a final judgment from which an appeal lies."); Beach v. Korff, 24 Conn. Sup. 494, 495. 194 A.2d 838 (1963) (court recognized that a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be ordered as a matter of law if "the plaintiff in his reply simply admitted the allegations of the defendant's special defense instead of alleging therein matters of avoidance.");Neubauer v. Liquor Control Commission, 7 Conn. Sup. 512, 516 (1940), affd, 128 Conn. 113, 20 A.2d 669 (1941) ("a motion for judgment on the pleadings is recognized in our practice."). "The motion [for judgment on the pleadings] would seem to be available . . . to a plaintiff when the defendant admits the allegations of the complaint and pleads no special defense . . . Cooper v. Ketover, 35 Conn. Sup. 38, 44, 393 A.2d 64 (1978), citing 1 Stephenson, Conn.Civ.Proc.