Opinion
C.A. No. 07C-10-278 PLA.
Submitted: August 20, 2010.
Decided: August 24, 2010.
UPON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
DENIED.
This 23rd day of August, 2010, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Trial Costs and Prejudgment Interest, it appears to the Court that:
1. This personal injury case arising from an automobile accident was heard by a Superior Court jury on August 9 and 10, 2010. The trial resulted in an $80,000.00 verdict in favor of the Plaintiff, Steven Sewell. Nearly two years prior to the trial, on August 26, 2008, the parties entered into a stipulation that Defendant Yannick R. Menager would waive service of process of the Complaint "in exchange for a limit of damages on the part of Plaintiff, Steven A. Sewell, in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND DOLLARS ($50,000), inclusive of costs, fees, and interest."
Def.'s Resp. in Opp'n to Pl's Mot., Ex. A.
2. Pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 54(d) and 6 Del. C. § 2301(d), Plaintiff has moved for trial costs in the amount of $5,895.89 and prejudgment interest on the jury award. Menager argues that the stipulated $50,000 cap on damages in this case precludes Plaintiff from recovering either the usual trial costs or prejudgment interest.
3. The Court agrees with Menager that Sewell relinquished his right to pursue trial costs and prejudgment interest by virtue of the August 2008 stipulation. The stipulation states that the limitation on damages was "inclusive of costs, fees, and interest." Sewell does not dispute the validity of the stipulation. The stipulation represents a contractual agreement between the parties, and its plain language clearly contemplated that Sewell would be unable to pursue a claim for costs or interests against Menager in the event that the jury returned a verdict greater than $50,000.
4. Sewell's reliance on the recent case of Enrique v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. to argue that "an award of pre-judgment interest is appropriate even though it pushes the award beyond" an otherwise applicable damages limitation is misplaced. The issue in Enrique concerned whether a plaintiff could recover prejudgment interest pursuant to § 2301(d) when the award of interest would cause a defendant insurer's liability to exceed the plaintiff's underinsured motorist policy limits. The Court concluded that the insurer's total liability could exceed policy limits by virtue of an award of prejudgment interest because "prejudgment interest does not arise out of the action's underlying controversy, and is not taxed to the defendant's policy's [ ] limit of liability as damages, but rather is an expense associated with the defense costs and strategy of the case." Limiting awards of prejudgment interest along with damages "would strip § 2301(d) of its purpose" in encouraging timely settlements of cases in which the plaintiff deserves payment of the full policy limits.
2010 WL 2636845 (Del. Super. June 30, 2010).
Id. at *2.
Id. (quoting Cox v. Peerless Ins. Co., 774 F. Supp. 83, 86 (D. Conn. 1991)).
Id.
5. The stipulation in this case does not implicate the same concerns as the insurance policy limits addressed in Enrique. Unlike an insurance policy limit, the stipulated limitation in this case expressly included costs and interest. While § 2301(d) serves a valuable purpose in discouraging defendants from delaying settlements in meritorious cases, the stipulation between the parties in this case also benefited the plaintiff: Sewell agreed to limit his total recovery to $50,000 in exchange for Menager's waiver of service, without which it was possible that Sewell would have been unable to proceed with his suit. While the situation in this case was unusual, nothing in § 2301(d) suggests that its benefits cannot be voluntarily waived by a plaintiff, and the Court perceives no basis for undermining the unambiguous agreement of the parties.
6. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for Trial Costs and Prejudgment Interest is hereby DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.