Opinion
No. 768 C.D. 2012
02-28-2013
Douglas Seville, Appellant v. Paul Stowitzky and Jacqueline S. Marquardt
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Douglas Seville (Seville) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court), which dismissed Seville's complaint upon the motion for summary judgment filed by Appellees Paul Stowitzky and Jacqueline S. Marquardt, officials at the State Correctional Institution at Mercer. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
On January 14, 1974, Seville was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to eight to twenty years in prison, resulting in a maximum sentence set to expire in August 1993. Subsequently, Seville committed several parole violations and, because of the addition of back time, Seville's maximum sentence was recalculated to expire in August 2010. On November 5, 2007, Seville filed a complaint claiming that, inter alia, Appellees were detaining him unlawfully. (Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 2.) By order dated August 6, 2009, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, despite the fact that the pleadings had not yet closed. (C.R., Item No. 18.) On appeal, by order dated April 23, 2010, we reversed the trial court's order without prejudice, and we remanded the matter to the trial court so that the trial court could correct the record and/or allow the pleadings to be completed or closed. (C.R., Item No. 22.) We further noted that following such actions, the trial court could reconsider the motion for summary judgment filed by Appellees. (Id.)
We discern this procedural history from the docket entries and the opinion of the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko, dated August 2, 2012, which was issued pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925.
It appears that the trial court received the remitted record on July 2, 2010, and that Appellees thereafter filed preliminary objections on August 30, 2010. (C.R., Item Nos. 22 and 24.) Shortly thereafter, the trial court entered a case management order, dated September 16, 2010, placing the matter on an expedited track. (C.R., Item No. 26.) The case management order directed that all pre-trial motions be filed by May 2, 2011. By order dated October 22, 2010, the trial court overruled the preliminary objections. (C.R., Item No. 29.) It appears that the pleadings closed on November 29, 2010, when Seville filed a reply to new matter. (C.R., Item No. 31.) On May 19, 2011, Appellees simultaneously filed (1) a request for an extension of time to file their motion for summary judgment, (2) their motion for summary judgment, and (3) a brief in support of summary judgment. (C.R., Item Nos. 32, 33, and 34.) In the request for an extension of time, counsel stated that he did not recall having received the case management order, and that he only learned of the deadline when he reviewed the docket on May 16, 2011. (C.R., Item No. 32.) By order dated June 13, 2011, the trial court granted Appellees' motion for extension of time to file their motion for summary judgment. (C.R., Item No. 35.) Handwritten on the order are the words "within 10 days" and "10 days to respond." (Id.) Seville filed an answer and brief promptly thereafter. (C.R., Item No. 36.) By order dated September 13, 2011, the Honorable Howland W. Abramson dismissed Appellees' motion for summary judgment for failure to attach the pleadings to the motion (based upon a violation of a local rule). (C.R., Item No. 37.)
The case management order provided that a pre-trial conference would be scheduled for any time after June 6, 2011, and that the trial court expected that the matter would be ready for trial July 5, 2011. (C.R., Item No. 26.)
On September 19, 2011, within six days of the issuance of Judge Abramson's order, Appellees again filed a request for a time extension to file a motion for summary judgment and the motion for summary judgment, this time with the pleadings attached. (C.R, Item Nos. 38 and 39.) Judge Abramson denied the request for a time extension by order dated September 22, 2011. (C.R., Item No. 40.) On September 26, 2011, the trial court placed the matter in the November 2011 trial pool. (C.R., Docket Sheet.) On October 24, 2011, Judge Abramson dismissed Appellees' motion for summary judgment as untimely. (C.R., Item No. 41.)
Although not indicated on the docket, it appears that Judge Abramson retired from the bench before the matter went to trial. The trial court reassigned the matter to the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko for handling, and on January 3, 2012, the trial court placed the matter in the April 2012 trial pool. (C.R., Docket Sheet.)
Also on January 3, 2012, Judge Tereshko ordered that Appellees' September 19, 2011 motion for summary judgment be considered timely filed and vacated Judge Abramson's September 22, 2011 and October 24, 2011 orders. (C.R., Item No. 42.) On January 11, 2012, Seville filed an answer to the motion for summary judgment and a motion for reconsideration of Judge Tereshko's January 3, 2012 order. (C.R., Item Nos. 43 and 44.) Judge Tereshko issued an order dated January 25, 2012, dismissing Seville's complaint upon Appellees' motion for summary judgment. (C.R., Item No. 45.) This appeal followed.
In his January 3, 2012 order, Judge Tereshko incorrectly lists the date of Judge Abramson's September 22, 2011 order as September 26, 2011, which is the date Judge Abramson's September 22, 2011 order was docketed.
Seville filed his appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which transferred the appeal to this Court on March 12, 2012. (C.R., Item No. 48.)
In his opinion issued pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925, Judge Tereshko explained that he granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Seville's complaint based on the principles governing the coordinate jurisdiction rule. "Generally, the coordinate jurisdiction rule commands that upon transfer of a matter between trial judges of coordinate jurisdiction, a transferee trial judge may not alter [the] resolution of a legal question previously decided by a transferor trial judge. More simply stated, judges of coordinate jurisdiction should not overrule each other's decisions." Zane v. Friends Hosp., 575 Pa. 236, 243, 836 A.2d 25, 29 (2003) (citations omitted). Departure from the coordinate jurisdiction rule is permitted, however, "in exceptional circumstances such as where there has been an intervening change in the controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed." Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 575-76, 664 A.2d 1326, 1332 (1995).
Judge Tereshko reasoned that his order did not usurp any substantive ruling made by Judge Abramson, because Judge Abramson did not reach the merits of Appellees' motion for summary judgment, but merely ruled on whether Appellees' motion for summary judgment was timely. Judge Tereshko further reasoned that the timeliness issue was rendered moot by a change in circumstances from the time Judge Abramson ruled on Appellees' motion for summary judgment, as the trial date was moved from November 2011 to April 2012, which allowed Judge Tereshko to consider Appellees' motion for summary judgment as timely filed. Judge Tereshko noted that by considering Appellees' motion for summary judgment as timely filed, and by giving Seville thirty days to respond, the trial court effectuated the proper administration of justice.
Judge Tereshko also stated that there was no basis for Seville's civil action, because the claims Seville raised in his complaint were barred by res judicata, as they had been previously resolved on the merits after being fully litigated in prior proceedings that had been initiated by Seville. Judge Tereshko, therefore, determined that his January 25, 2012 order dismissing Seville's complaint upon Appellees' motion for summary judgment corrected a clearly erroneous order and prevented manifest injustice from occurring.
On appeal to this Court, Seville argues, in essence, that under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, Judge Tereshko erred in issuing his order to dismiss Seville's complaint upon Appellees' motion for summary judgment. In response, Appellees contend that Judge Tereshko did not abuse his discretion in issuing his order to dismiss Seville's complaint upon Appellees' motion for summary judgment for essentially the same reasons stated in Judge Tereshko's opinion issued pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925.
"The standard of review of the trial court's order granting summary judgment is limited to deciding whether the court committed an error of law or abused its discretion." Manley v. Fitzgerald, 997 A.2d 1235, 1238 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).
Appellees also argue that if res judicata does not bar Seville's complaint, then the doctrine of collateral estoppel does, since the issue of whether Appellees have unlawfully detained Seville has already been litigated and resolved in the prior actions initiated by Seville mentioned above.
In addressing Seville's argument, we note that "the coordinate jurisdiction rule applies only to decisions rendered upon legal questions." Lock v. City of Philadelphia, 895 A.2d 660, 668 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (holding that coordinate jurisdiction rule is inapplicable to "case management order intended to facilitate . . . litigation by setting discovery deadlines" because "order did not dispose of any substantive legal issues"). Here, Judge Abramson did not rule on the substantive legal issues implicated by Appellees' motion for summary judgment when he issued the order dismissing the motion on October 24, 2011. Rather, Judge Abramson only ruled on the timeliness of the motion in light of the upcoming trial session. Thus, we are unconvinced that the coordinate jurisdiction rule is applicable in this instance.
To the extent that Seville's arguments can be interpreted to challenge the merits of Judge Tereshko's January 25, 2012 order, we reject those arguments because Seville fails to raise any issues relating to the merits of the order in his statement of matters complained of on appeal as required by Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b). See Lower Paxton Twp., Bd. of Supervisors v. Okonieski, 620 A.2d 602, 604 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (holding that failure to raise issue below or in statement of matters complained of on appeal constitutes waiver of that issue). --------
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.
PER CURIAM
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of February, 2013, the January 25, 2012 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is hereby AFFIRMED.