Opinion
Civil Action 3:21-cv-219
08-11-2022
ANTHONY L. SEVERINO, Plaintiff, v. SCI SOMERSET OF PA D.O.C. and BCI-PREA COORDINATOR, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed.
II. Report
Plaintiff Anthony L. Severino (“Severino”) brings this pro se civil rights action in which he asserts claims arising out of his conditions of confinement at the State Correctional Institution at Somerset, Pennsylvania (“SCI Somerset”). He names as Defendants “SCI Somerset of PA D.O.C.” and “BCI-PREA Coordinator.” As discussed herein, because Severino has failed to comply with this Court's orders regarding the deficiencies of his Complaint and further, because the Complaint fails to state a claim as a matter of law, this action should be dismissed.
A. Brief Summary of Factual Allegations in the Complaint
Among other matters, Severino asserts in the Complaint (ECF No. 9) that in January 2020, after he was assaulted by two staff members, “Somerset” retaliated against him for reporting this incident. He also alleges that he has been sprayed with O.C. even though he is on a “no spray” list; has been denied healthcare; has been housed in violation of Department of Corrections (“DOC”) policy; and denied showers for weeks at a time. Further, he is serving an illegal state sentence; he was assaulted by a guard; and when Severino attempted to report a PREA incident, he was unable to do so.
PREA stands for Prison Rape Elimination Act.
Severino also makes allegations of retaliation and assault by parties who are not named as defendants. He claims that he was denied the use of a handicapped shower and the bottom bunk even though he has medical clearance for these accommodations; that he was evaluated for the “SOP” [Sexual Offenders Program] and was told that the prison needed bodies to keep its funding, but this added three years to his sentence; that he reported a PREA incident and was written up by the PREA Lieutenant; that “Somerset” is aware of many of these incidents but has ignored them or denied that they occurred; and that despite his medical issues, “Somerset” refuses to help him.
In subsequent submissions, Severino stated that the “reason why SCI Somerset and the PREA Coordinator are responsible and liable is because I reported repeatedly of staff misconduct and these two defendants refuse to full policy [sic] of the law. They condone their employees behavior and actions, regardless of evidence that supported my claims.” (ECF No. 11.) See also ECF No. 13 at 1 (stating that “all staff\employees I've named in 1983 are not Defendants. SCI Somerset and BCI PREA Coordinator are the Defendants. Their employee's acted on their authority.... These two defendants condone their employees actions instead of following policy\Law.”)
B. Relevant Procedural History
Severino commenced this action in December 2021. Subsequently, Defendants filed a motion for more definite statement (ECF No. 7). Among their contentions were that the Complaint failed to present a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8; legal conclusions are interwoven into almost every paragraph; and the Complaint is unclear as it combines various incidents with dates and makes allegations against not only the named Defendants but other individuals not named as defendants as well as “staff” or “officers.” Thus, Defendants asserted, it is not clear what legal claims Plaintiff is alleging or the specific facts that purport to support these claims.
On April 19, 2022, the Court granted Defendants' motion and directed Severino to file an Amended Complaint by May 20, 2022 (ECF No. 10). In the Memorandum Order, the Court provided explicit details and instructions to Severino regarding the deficiencies of the Complaint and how to address them. This included advising Severino as to the necessary components of a complaint as well as the fact that it is procedurally deficient to name an entity such as SCI Somerset as a party. Id.
Severino submitted a one-page “response” to this Court's order on May 17, 2022. Contrary to the Court's direction, he did not file an Amended Complaint. Rather, he contested the instructions provided by the Court (ECF No. 11). As a result, the Court again ordered Severino to file an Amended Complaint in compliance with the previous order by June 24, 2022 (ECF No. 12). He was also provided another copy of the previous order that included detailed instructions. Id.
Severino then submitted another “response” to the Court's order, again arguing that only the prison and the PREA Coordinator were the proper defendants, asserting that there were over 200 incidents and insisting that Defendants' counsel should obtain the grievances relating to them from the named Defendants (ECF No. 13). He also requested that counsel be appointed to represent him.
On July 5, 2022, the Court entered a Memorandum Order that recounted the history of this matter, rejected Severino's arguments and denied his request for counsel. The Order notified Severino that the prison was not a proper defendant and that he had not alleged sufficient facts against the PREA Coordinator that state a claim. The Court concluded by stating: “Plaintiff will be given one final opportunity to comply with this Court's order and submit an amended complaint that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as the Court's directives and names defendants against whom a suit can be brought. Failure to do so will result in a recommendation that this case be dismissed.” (ECF No. 14.)
Severino submitted a two-page document on August 5, 2022. While docketed by the Clerk's Office as an “Amended Complaint,” it is more accurately described as a document that contains some additional details regarding some incidents. Like his previous responses, however, this filing identifies only SCI Somerset and the PREA Coordinator as defendants in the caption and otherwise fails to conform to this Court's orders.
C. Failure to Comply with Court Orders
“Under Rule 41(b), a district court has authority to dismiss an action sua sponte if a litigant fails to prosecute or to comply with a court order.” Qadr v. Overmyer, 642 Fed.Appx. 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b)); see also Adams v. Trustees of New Jersey Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 871 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962), in which the Supreme Court stated “ that a court could dismiss sua sponte under Rule 41(b).”) The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has set out a six-factor balancing test to guide a court in determining whether a case or claim should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). The court must consider: 1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; 2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; 3) a history of dilatoriness; 4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; 5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and 6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at 868. There is no “magic formula” or “mechanical calculation” to determine whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute, Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992), and not all of the six factors need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, the court must “properly consider and balance” each of the six factors based on the record. See Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868).
As recently emphasized by the Court of Appeals, “dismissal with prejudice is an ‘extreme' sanction” that should be employed as a “last, not first, resort.” Id. (quoting Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976), and Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867, 869). Close calls should “be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.” Id. (citing Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Emps.' Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 1994)). Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals “has not hesitated to affirm the district court's imposition of sanctions, including dismissals in appropriate cases.” Id. (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867 n.1).
Turning to the first Poulis factor, the Court must consider the extent to which the dilatory party is personally responsible for the sanctionable conduct. See Adams, 29 F.3d at 873 (“[I]n determining whether dismissal is appropriate, we look to whether the party bears personal responsibility for the action or inaction which led to the dismissal.”). Since the filing of this matter, Severino has taken none of the necessary first steps to prosecute this case and has failed to comply with multiple court orders regarding how to cure the deficiencies of his Complaint. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is solely responsible for his own conduct, including his failure to comply with orders of the Court. See, e.g., Colon v. Karnes, 2012 WL 383666, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2012) (“Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and thus is responsible for his own actions.”). This factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
The second Poulis factor assesses whether the adverse party has suffered prejudice because of the dilatory party's behavior. Relevant concerns include “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories[,] the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party,” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874, and “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). Although this factor does not weigh heavily here, the Court notes that Severino's “continued inaction frustrates and delays resolution of this action” by preventing Defendants from seeking a timely resolution of his claims. See Mack v. United States, 2019 WL 1302626, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2019).
The third Poulis factor weighs strongly in favor of dismissal. Despite being warned on multiple occasions that failure to comply with orders from the Court may result in a recommendation that this matter be dismissed for failure to prosecute, Severino has failed to comply with the Court's orders. This conduct is sufficient to establish a history of dilatoriness. See Mack, 2019 WL 1302626, at *2 (“Mack has established a history of dilatoriness through his failure to notify the Court of his whereabouts and failure to comply with Court Orders and rules.”).
With respect to the fourth Poulis factor, “[w]illfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. Severino has intentionally failed to comply with the Court's orders, weighing in favor of dismissal.
The fifth factor address the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869. Courts have held that “where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative.” Nowland v. Lucas, 2012 WL 10559, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2012) (citing Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 26263 (3d Cir.2008)). As such, this factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
Finally, the Court must consider the potential merit of Severino's claims. A claim will be deemed meritorious “when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70.
“In the Third Circuit, it is well-settled that a prison or correctional facility is not a ‘person' that is subject to suit under federal civil rights laws.” Regan v. Upper Darby Twp., 2009 WL 650384, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2009) (collecting cases); see also Levys v. Harper, 2018 WL 2745261, at *3 (W.D. Pa. May 15, 2018). Thus, despite Severino's views to the contrary, naming SCI Somerset as a defendant in this case is defective.
Similarly, no facts are alleged against the “PREA Coordinator” other than allegedly “condoning” behavior by other individuals not named as defendants who were allegedly involved in certain incidents. However, as the Court of Appeals has held, “to be liable under § 1983, each individual defendant “must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing.” Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). Moreover, in a civil rights case, “liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207. “It is ...well established that the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show the actual knowledge necessary for a defendant to be found personally involved in the alleged unlawful conduct.” Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2013). Thus, as the PREA Coordinator cannot be held liable for the alleged acts of other prison personnel, and no facts have been pleaded that suggest any personal involvement, Severino's claims cannot be sustained.
Thus, as currently pleaded, Severino's claims cannot asserted against the two defendants he has named. He has been provided with multiple opportunities to attempt to cure these issues, but not only has he failed to do so, but has insisted that, in his view, he has properly stated claims for relief. For the reasons identified above, however, he has not done so. Thus, the final factor also weighs in favor of dismissal.
On balance, the Court concludes that all of the six Poulis factors support dismissal. While the Court is mindful of this Circuit's strong policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits, such a resolution is impossible where a plaintiff refuses to comply with Court orders and present his Complaint in a manner that can be addressed. Consequently, the Court concludes that the extreme sanction of dismissal is supported by the Poulis factors and the record at hand.
D. Failure to State a Claim
Finally, even setting aside Severino's refusal to comply with this Court's orders, the fatal defects in his Complaint, which he has been given multiple opportunities to correct, independently require dismissal of the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring the court to review any complaint in a civil action in which a prison seeks redress from a governmental entity and to dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted).
As previously discussed, Severino cannot sue SCI Somerset and has failed to state a claim against the PREA Coordinator. As such, this action should be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons expressed above, it is respectfully recommended that this case be dismissed.
Litigants who seek to challenge this Report and Recommendation must seek review by the district judge by filing objections by August 29, 2022. Any party opposing the objections shall file a response by September 12, 2022. Failure to file timely objections will waive the right of appeal.