Severe v. Miller

13 Citing cases

  1. Dewey v. Zack

    272 Ill. App. 3d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 10 times

    Prior to the 1987 amendment to section 13-203, the appellate court repeatedly determined that section 13-203 governed the limitations periods for Family Expense Act claims because they were derivative claims. (See, e.g., Janetis v. Christensen (1990), 200 Ill. App.3d 581, 588; Severe v. Miller (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 550, 554-55.) This was because the right of action to recover medical expenses, and other expenses governed by the Family Expense Act, arose out of the injury to another, a minor.

  2. Beck v. Yatvin

    603 N.E.2d 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    โ€ข 2 Our court also has held that an action pursuant to the family expense statute is derivative since the right of action arises out of injury to the person of another; thus, the statute of limitations for "actions for damages for loss of consortium or other actions deriving from injury to the person of another" applies. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 13-203; Severe v. Miller (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 550, 458 N.E.2d 173.) Section 13-203, prior to the 1987 amendment read, in pertinent part: "Actions for damages * * * shall be commenced within the same period of time as actions for damages for injury to such other person."

  3. Evangelou v. Children's Memorial Hospital

    592 N.E.2d 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 1 times

    However, as early as 1983, this court held that the limitations period for family expense claims was not tolled under the pre-1987 version of section 13-203. (See Severe v. Miller (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 550, 458 N.E.2d 173; Fess v. Parke, Davis Co. (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 133, 446 N.E.2d 1255, appeal denied (1983), 94 Ill.2d 552, 458 N.E.2d 175.) In those two cases, the court reasoned that the plain meaning of the tolling statute restricts its effect to the benefit of minors and that the scope of the tolling statute is not to be judicially enlarged.

  4. Janetis v. Christensen

    200 Ill. App. 3d 581 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 24 times
    In Janetis v. Christensen, 200 Ill. App.3d 581, 558 N.E.2d 304 (1990), the patient alleged a doctor's negligence in failing to diagnose colon cancer and a doctor's negligence in failing to properly read X rays of his colon in April 1982 when he was diagnosed with hemorrhoids.

    Nonetheless, we find that the circuit court properly dismissed this count as time barred. Although such an action is derivative, since the right of action arises out of the injury to the person of another, it is not an action for damages for injuries but is an action for damages arising from the spouse's liability under the family expense act. (See Severe v. Miller (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 550, 555, 458 N.E.2d 173, 177.) As such, the applicable limitations period is that set forth in section 13-203 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides:

  5. Reimers v. Honda Motor Co.

    150 Ill. App. 3d 840 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 13 times
    In Reimers v. Honda Motor Co., 150 Ill.App.3d 840, 843, 104 Ill.Dec. 165, 502 N.E.2d 428 (1986), this court held that because a parent's right to recover medical expenses arises out of the injury to the minor child, it is governed by the applicable statutory limitations period for derivative causes of action.

    As plaintiffs parents were not within the class of persons intended to be benefitted by the tolling statute, their cause of action for medical expenses cannot be tolled. Swider v. Holy Cross Hospital (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 740, 742, 497 N.E.2d 474; Severe v. Miller (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 550, 555, 458 N.E.2d 173; Fess v. Parke, Davis Co. (1983), 113 Ill. App.3d 133, 135, 446 N.E.2d 1255, appeal denied (1983), 94 Ill.2d 552. โ€ข

  6. Curtis v. Womeldorff

    496 N.E.2d 500 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 4 times

    The parents' action for medical expenses is derivative, because it arises from the injury to their minor child and from their obligation to pay those expenses under "An Act to revise the law in relation to husband and wife" (the Husband and Wife Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 1015). This court has recognized that, in such an action, section 13-203 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 110, par. 13-203) is the appropriate period of limitations ( Severe v. Miller (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 550, 458 N.E.2d 173), and such actions are governed by the same period as the underlying action. The parents' action, however, is not tolled during the injured person's minority.

  7. Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper

    346 Md. 679 (Md. 1997)   Cited 41 times
    In Johns Hopkins Hospital v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 697 A.2d 1358 (1997), we applied the holdings in Garay to a medical malpractice action based upon a hospital's negligent treatment of heart and lung abnormalities which the infant plaintiff suffered at birth.

    Virtually every jurisdiction that has addressed this issue accords in the view that parental claims for medical expenses are not tolled during the minority of an injured child. See Doran v. Compton, 645 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (applying Texas law); Perez v. Espinola, 749 F. Supp. 732 (E.D.Va. 1990) (applying Virginia law); Davis v. Drackett Products Co., 536 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.Ohio 1982) (applying Ohio law); Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 448 F. Supp. 10 (E.D.Mo. 1977) (applying Missouri law), aff'd, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978); Myer v. Dyer, 542 A.2d 802 (Del.Super. Ct. 1987); Rose v. Hamilton Medical Center, Inc., 184 Ga. App. 182, 361 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 910 (1987), Severe v. Miller, 120 Ill. App.3d 550, 76 Ill.Dec. 34, 458 N.E.2d 173 (1983); Walter v. City of Flint, 40 Mich. App. 613, 199 N.W.2d 264 (1972); Ostrander v. Cone Mills, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. 1989); Macku v. Drackett Prods. Co., 216 Neb. 176, 343 N.W.2d 58 (1984); D'Andria v. County of Suffolk, 112 A.D.2d 397, 492 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1985); Vaughan v. Moore, 89 N.C. App. 566, 366 S.E.2d 518 (1988); Day v. MacDonald, 67 Ohio App.3d 240, 586 N.E.2d 1135 (1990); Brown v. Jimerson, 862 P.2d 91 (Okla.Ct.App. 1993); Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa. Super. 613, 561 A.2d 1261 (1989); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).

  8. Garay v. Overholtzer

    332 Md. 339 (Md. 1993)   Cited 56 times
    Holding that parents have common law and statutory duty to support and care for their children

    See Doran v. Compton, 645 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981) (applying Texas law); Perez v. Espinola, 749 F. Supp. 732 (E.D.Va. 1990) (applying Virginia law); Davis v. Drackett Prods. Co., 536 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.Ohio 1982) (applying Ohio law); Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 448 F. Supp. 10 (E.D.Mo. 1977) (applying Missouri law), aff'd, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978); Myer v. Dyer, 542 A.2d 802 (Del. Super. Ct. 1987); Rose v. Hamilton Medical Center, Inc., 184 Ga. App. 182, 361 S.E.2d 1, cert. denied, 184 Ga. App. 910 (1987); Severe v. Miller, 120 Ill. App.3d 550, 76 Ill.Dec. 34, 458 N.E.2d 173 (1983); Walter v. City of Flint, 40 Mich. App. 613, 199 N.W.2d 264 (1972); Ostrander v. Cone Mills, Inc., 445 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. 1989); Macku v. Drackett Prods. Co., 216 Neb. 176, 343 N.W.2d 58 (1984); D'Andria v. County of Suffolk, 112 A.D.2d 397, 492 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1985); Vaughan v. Moore, 89 N.C. App. 566, 366 S.E.2d 518 (1988); Day v. MacDonald, 67 Ohio App.3d 240, 586 N.E.2d 1135 (1990); Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa. Super. 613, 561 A.2d 1261 (1989); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983). But see Vedutis v. Tesi, 135 N.J. Super. 337, 343 A.2d 171 (1975) (N.J. Stat. Ann. ยง 2A:14-2.1 provides that parents' claim for damages as a result of injury to their child enjoys benefit of statute tolling child's claim where the parents assert their claim in the same action with their child's claim), aff'd, 142 N.J. Super. 492, 362 A.2d 51 (1976); Lauver v. Cornelius, 85 A.D.2d 866, 446 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1981) (limitations on both minor's action and parents' action against alleged child

  9. Swift v. Medicate Pharmacy Delivermed Mail Order

    2016 Ill. App. 152786 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    See Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Alphin, 60 Ill. 2d 350, 356 (1975); IPF Recovery Co. v. Illinois Insurance Guaranty Fund, 356 Ill. App. 3d 658, 665 (2005). No exceptions that toll a statute of limitations or enlarge its scope will be implied. Severe v. Miller, 120 Ill. App. 3d 550, 555 (1983); Fess v. Parke, Davis & Co., 113 Ill. App. 3d 133, 135 (1983); Fisher v. Rhodes, 22 Ill. App. 3d 978, 981 (1974). As this court has recognized, "if the legislature had intended to except any class of persons from the effect of the statute, it would have done so and courts will not assume such authority or dominion."

  10. Dow Chemical Co. v. Dep't of Revenue

    224 Ill. App. 3d 263 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 10 times
    Stating that "[although it might seem reasonable to judicially toll the statute of limitations in order to fashion a remedy for [the plaintiff], such a decision is not supported by Illinois case law which holds that no exceptions which toll a statute of limitations or enlarge its scope will be implied," and noting that the case seemed to be one "which calls for a legislative remedy rather than a judicial one"

    Although it might seem reasonable to judicially toll the statute of limitations in order to fashion a remedy for Dow, such a decision is not supported by Illinois case law which holds that no exceptions which toll a statute of limitations or enlarge its scope will be implied. (See Severe v. Miller (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 550, 555, 458 N.E.2d 173, 176. See also Morgen v. People (1959), 16 Ill.2d 374, 158 N.E.2d 24.