Comparators are similarly situated when the “employees are ‘subject to the same workplace standards' and their ‘circumstances bear a reasonably close resemblance.'” Maynard v. Stonington Cmty. Ctr., No. 3:15-CV-483 (RNC), 2017 WL 1246330, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2017) (quoting Brown v. Daikin Am. Inc., 756 F.3d 219, 230 (2d Cir. 2014)). “While courts are ‘cautioned against deciding whether two comparators are similarly situated on a motion to dismiss,' a general allegation that plaintiffs were treated differently from those similarly situated is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss[.]” Servidio Landscaping, LLC v. City of Stamford, No. 3:19-CV-01473 (KAD), 2020 WL 7246441, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 9, 2020) (quoting Hu v. City of New York, 927 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2019)); Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles, 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, requiring “a complaint allege facts sufficient to establish ‘a plausible claim for relief'” rendered the Second Circuit's decision in DeMuria v. Hawkes, 328 F.3d 704, 707 (2d Cir. 2003) obsolete insofar as it held that an Olech claim was “adequately pled . . . even without specification of others similarly situated”); see also Paupaw-Myrie v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist., 653 F.Supp.3d 80, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)
Second, “[t]he Supreme Court has also recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges (1) that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and (2) that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Servidio Landscaping, LLC v. City of Stamford, No. 3:19-CV-01473 (KAD), 2020 WL 7246441, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 9, 2020) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted)) (hereinafter, an “Olech claim”)
Second, “[t]he Supreme Court has also recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a ‘class of one,' where the plaintiff alleges [(1)] that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and [(2)] that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Servidio Landscaping, LLC v. City of Stamford, No. 3:19-CV-01473 (KAD), 2020 WL 7246441, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 9, 2020) (quoting Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted)) (hereinafter, an “Olech claim”).
“First, under a selective treatment theory, Plaintiffs must show that ‘(1) the [Plaintiffs], compared with others similarly situated, [were] selectively treated; and (2) that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as . . . malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.'” Servidio Landscaping, LLC v. City of Stamford, No. 3:19-CV-01473 (KAD), 2020 WL 7246441, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 9, 2020) (quoting LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609-10 (2d Cir. 1980) (alterations in original)) (hereinafter, a “LeClair claim”).
Additionally, while courts are "cautioned against deciding whether two comparators are similarly situated on a motion to dismiss," id. at 97, "a general allegation that plaintiffs were treated differently from those similarly situated is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." Servidio Landscaping, LLC v. City of Stamford , 2020 WL 7246441, at *3 (D. Conn. 2020) (citing Ruston v. Town Bd. for Town of Skaneateles , 610 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2010) ). Larsen does not allege enough facts to suggest that she was similarly situated to any proposed comparator, let alone that she was differently treated from any comparator.