Opinion
No. 56998-8-I.
October 2, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Snohomish County, No. 05-2-09526-0, James H. Allendoerfer, J., entered August 22, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Gary Edward Lofland, Attorney at Law, 9 N 11th Ave, Yakima, WA, 98902-3016.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Robert H Lavitt, Schwerin Campbell Barnard LLP, 18 W Mercer St Ste 400, Seattle, WA, 98119-3971.
Alethea Hart, Snohomish County Prosecuting Attorney's, 3000 Rockefeller Ave, Everett, WA, 98201-4046.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sunrise Services, Inc. appeals an award of attorney fees to the Service Employees International Union Local 775 (SEIU), which was granted after the dissolution of a temporary restraining order (TRO) blocking the release of public documents to SEIU. Sunrise argues that the award constituted an abuse of the court's discretion because the TRO was not dissolved but was extended and it expired by its own terms. Additionally, Sunrise argues that the TRO was necessary to protect its rights until a hearing and the court did not make sufficient findings to support the award. Because we find that the TRO was dissolved, that equitable principles do support the award of attorney fees, and that the court made sufficient findings, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees to SEIU. We affirm.
FACTS
SEIU represents long-term care and disability service workers whose services are ultimately administered by the State. In May 2005, in accordance with the Public Disclosure Act (PDA), chapter 42.17 RCW, SEIU requested that Snohomish County release records relating to Sunrise, a private agency whose home care workers are not unionized. SEIU requested disclosure of public records containing the names of Sunrise's home care employees, including, but not limited to, employees attending state-mandated training and lists of employees on health insurance. SEIU later requested documents relating to Snohomish County inspections of Sunrise and contracting arrangements between Snohomish County and Sunrise. In compliance with the request, Snohomish County prepared all the requested files for release.
The Public Disclosure Act was recodified, effective July 1, 2006, as chapter 42.56 RCW.
In June 2005, Sunrise obtained a TRO to prevent Snohomish County from releasing records containing names of its employees until it could request an injunction against the release. Sunrise asserted in its petition for the TRO, inter alia, that the request was exempted from the PDA because SEIU sought the names for a commercial purpose, particularly to organize its employees for collective bargaining. Although SEIU was not initially served, it eventually intervened as a party of interest and the parties stipulated to continue the TRO until a hearing set for July 21, 2005. SEIU moved to dissolve the TRO and oppose the preliminary injunction against the disclosure of the public documents. At the hearing, the court denied Sunrise's motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the dissolution of the TRO "effective 7/22/05 at 4:30 p.m." SEIU subsequently requested $9,917.50 in attorney fees; the court awarded SEIU a lesser amount of $7,141.50. Sunrise appeals, assigning error to the attorney fees award.
ANALYSIS Final Judgment
Sunrise argues that the judgment entered by the court awarding attorney fees did not contain an express determination of findings pursuant to CR 54 (b) and, therefore, may not be a final judgment from which an appeal may be taken. CR 54 (b) requires that when a court makes a final judgment regarding fewer than all the claims before it, or regarding fewer than all the participating parties, it must make specific findings accompanied by a determination that there is no "just reason for delay." The court resolved all claims before it by rejecting Sunrise's legal theories supporting injunctive relief and awarding attorney fees for SEIU's efforts to dissolve the wrongfully issued TRO. Because the court did not leave any unresolved claims or issues, it had no requirement under CR 54(b) to accompany its conclusions with determinations explaining why there is no "just reason for delay." Accordingly, the judgment terminated the proceedings below and the appeal is properly before this court.
Attorney Fees
Sunrise claims that equitable principles do not support the attorney fees award. Washington courts have the discretion to award attorney fees to a prevailing party based on principles of equity. See Confederated Tribes v. Johnson, 135 Wn.2d 734, 758, 958 P.2d 260 (1998). Equitable grounds support allowing recovery of "attorneys' fees reasonably incurred in dissolving a wrongfully issued injunction or restraining order." Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wn.2d 103, 143, 937 P.2d 154 (1997) (citations omitted); see also Seattle Fire Fighters Union, Local 27 v. Hollister, 48 Wn. App. 129, 138, 737 P.2d 1302 (1987) (affirming an award of reasonable attorney fees to a party that successfully dissolved a TRO that wrongfully prevented the release of documents requested under the PDA).
Equitable principles support the court's award of attorney fees to SEIU. After Sunrise obtained the TRO blocking the release of public documents, SEIU intervened in order to access the documents and successfully argued for the dissolution of the TRO. Sunrise does not challenge the trial court's determination that the PDA mandated the release of the documents or its decision to dissolve the TRO; therefore, the TRO was wrongfully issued. Accordingly, the award of attorney fees to SEIU was in compliance with underlying equitable principles.
We are not persuaded by Sunrise's assertions that equitable principles do not support the award of attorney fees. Sunrise first argues that the court order did not dissolve the TRO but in fact extended it one day beyond its expiration date in accord with the parties' stipulation. This argument elevates form over substance, placing undue emphasis on the timeline in the stipulation while ignoring the substance of the court's ruling. In its judgment, the court stated: "Intervenor SEIU 775's Motion to Dissolve Restraining Order is GRANTED . . . Sunrise's Motion for preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED." (Emphasis in original.) Even though the court extended the effective date of the TRO, it clearly determined that there was no legal basis by which Sunrise could prevent disclosure of the public documents and that the TRO was wrongfully issued. The fact that the court extended the TRO one day beyond its ruling does not affect the court's determination that it was wrongfully issued.
The court's reasoning for continuing the effect of the TRO is not clear in the record. Snohomish County indicates, however, that it was to give Sunrise an opportunity to consider whether to seek immediate review of the court's decision.
Sunrise also argues that equitable principles do not permit the attorney fees award because the TRO was necessary to protect its rights until the hearing on the merits. In particular, Sunrise relies on Confederated, 135 Wn.2d at 758, which states:
"[I]njunctive relief prior to trial is necessary to preserve a party's rights pending resolution of the action." The court in Confederated, however, reaffirmed the rule that attorney fees are appropriate "[for] a party who prevails in dissolving a wrongfully issued . . . temporary restraining order." Confederated, 135 Wn.2d at 758. Because Sunrise did not establish that it was entitled to restrain the release of the records, the TRO was wrongfully obtained.
Finally, Sunrise argues that the court did not make appropriate findings to support the award of attorney fees. Sunrise, however, does not point to any specific deficiencies in the court's findings that undermine the award. In fact, the record reflects that the court considered the arguments submitted by both parties and accepted Sunrise's argument that the $300 per hour rate was excessive and that a reported charge was unrelated to the proceedings. The judgment shows that the court applied the low end rate charged by SEIU's counsel for general litigation, $205 per hour, made a deduction for work that was performed in an unrelated matter, and clearly found the balance to be reasonable.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
SCHINDLER and GROSSE, JJ., concur.