We agree with the Appellate Division, for the reasons stated in its memorandum, that the evidence of defendant Red Diamond's negligence was sufficient and that the trial court's instructions on proximate and intervening cause, when read in the context of the entire charge, were not erroneous. Red Diamond's request to charge that decedent's knowledge of the dangers of dry ice would be a superseding cause as a matter of law fails to take into account the possibility of momentary forgetfulness by the decedent. Inasmuch as momentary forgetfulness is not contributory negligence as a matter of law ( Serrano v Corcoran Plate Glass Co., 33 N.Y.2d 544; Torrie v Virtuoso Bldg. Co., 58 A.D.2d 982; see, 1 N.Y. PJI2d 71 [1984 Cum Supp]), it follows a fortiori that momentary forgetfulness should not be deemed a superseding cause that relieves a defendant of all liability as a matter of law. Red Diamond's additional request to charge that knowledge by decedent's employer of the dangers of dry ice, coupled with its failure to warn the decedent, would be another superseding cause was also properly rejected by the trial court.

"The failure to have in mind the existence of a dangerous condition at the time one encounters it, even though there had been knowledge of the condition in the past, presents a question of fact. It is for the jury to say whether the failure to have the danger in mind was the result of such poor memory or such inattentiveness on the part of the injured person as to charge her with falling below the standard of a reasonably prudent person" (Washington v Longview TerraceApts., 37 A.D.2d 809, 809-810; also Serrano v Corcoran Plate Glass Co., 33 N.Y.2d 544; Heil v Schaefer Brewing Co., 47 A.D.2d 754, affd 38 N.Y.2d 935; and see, Wartels v County Asphalt, 29 N.Y.2d 372, 379-380). There was evidence that the Labor Department regulations require the general contractor to keep roof openings covered or barricaded; that Virtuoso knew of such regulations; and on prior occasions had fence-barricaded openings of the nature of the one through which plaintiff fell.