Opinion
No. CIV. S-06-1262 FCD KJM.
August 4, 2006
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter before the court is whether 1) the court may properly assert jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims against defendants for allegedly violating their due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and their equal protection rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and whether 2) plaintiffs have standing to raise these claims. This matter was set for a status conference and both parties were directed to brief these issues.
Plaintiffs allege in their amended complaint ("FAC") that defendants have caused, and will cause, plaintiffs to suffer:
[I]rreparable injury in the form of lack of . . . unequal notice of the opportunity to apply for [Yolo County] grand jury service, exclusion from the grand jury selection process, exclusion from service on the grand jury and exclusion from service as foreperson as a result of defendants' actions unless injunctive relief is granted.
(Pls.' FAC, filed June 30, 2006, at ¶¶ 57-58).
Defendants first contend that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims against defendants, as defendants are immune from liability as state officials under the Eleventh Amendment ("11th Amendment"). Moreover, defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to establish standing to bring their claims in this court because they did not apply for grand jury service and did not show discriminatory intent on the part of defendants. Defendants also argue that plaintiffs lack standing to assert claims brought on behalf of Asians and "Non-whites" and to assert their due process claim under § 1983.
The court ruled on the preliminary issues of 11th Amendment immunity and standing at a hearing held on August 4, 2006. This order memorializes the court's rulings.
I. Jurisdiction
Defendants argue that, as state officials, they are immune from liability under the 11th Amendment. The 11th Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
It is a well-settled principle that "nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court." Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001). Moreover, the 11th Amendment bars suits against state officials when "the state is the real, substantial party in interest." Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), overruled on other grounds byLapides v. Bd. of Regents, 533 U.S. 613 (2002)).
However, the Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception to 11th Amendment immunity, declaring that "a suit challenging the constitutionality of a state official's action is not one against the State." Pennhurst State Sch., 465 U.S. at 102 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 156 (1908)). The Ex parte Young ("Young") doctrine may be invoked only in certain circumstances. The Ninth Circuit has reinforced that the purpose of the Young doctrine is to protect the sovereign immunity afforded to states under the 11th Amendment while preventing state officials from violating federal law. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997)). Specifically, a state official's alleged constitutional violation(s) must be ongoing and continuous, not just a one-time violation or recurring past violations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277-278 (1985). Furthermore, the state official must have "some connection with the enforcement of the [unconstitutional] act[,]" such that suit against the official is not equated with a suit against the state. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157. Similarly, the relief requested cannot "infringe upon a state's sovereignty to such a degree to render the suit against the state itself. . . ." Hardin, 223 F.3d at 1048 (citing Idaho, 521 U.S. at 296).
A. Ongoing and continuous violations
Defendants argue that here, plaintiffs "exclusive[ly] focus on [defendants] past conduct," not ongoing conduct, as the basis for their causes of action against defendants. (Dfs.' Memo. Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at 8:13-18). Accordingly, they contend that theYoung exception to 11th Amendment immunity is inapplicable. The court disagrees. Plaintiffs allege that defendants' practices and actions "have led to the systematic exclusion of persons of constitutionally cognizable groups." (Pls.' FAC at ¶ 37). Plaintiffs rely upon defendants' alleged past actions in recruiting candidates and selecting members of the Yolo County Grand Jury to declare that Hispanic, Asian and non-White persons have been consistently excluded from the recruitment and selection processes. (Id.) However, they also contend, in all three causes of action, that "plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury" from defendants' alleged failure to notify them of the opportunity to apply for grand jury service, and subsequently, from defendants' systematic exclusion of plaintiffs' from the grand jury selection process. (Id. at ¶¶ 52, 58, 62) (emphasis added). The court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded" allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n. 6 (1963). Accordingly, the court reasonably infers from plaintiffs' FAC that defendants' alleged discriminatory actions have persisted beyond the 2005-2006 grand jury recruitment and selection processes, thereby causing future "irreparable injury" to plaintiffs.
Moreover, while the 11th Amendment bars suits against state officials for retrospective relief, a suit seeking prospective relief is permissible. Ulaleo v. Paty, 902 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990). The Ninth Circuit has specifically held that an injunction is the relief available against state officials. Id. Plaintiffs request:
. . . a permanent injunction compelling defendants to cease the systematic exclusion of non-White persons, Asians and Hispanics from the Yolo County Grand Jury . . . and compelling defendants to adopt written procedures in accordance with the United States Constitution to insure the full and equal participation of non-White person, Asians and Hispanics in the . . . selection process and [participation on the] Yolo County Grand Jury, as grand jury members and forepersons.
(Pls.' FAC at ¶ 62(2)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, as plaintiffs seek prospective relief to prevent defendants from violating their constitutional rights in the future, they have sufficiently pled "ongoing and continuous" violations for purposes of the Young exception to 11th Amendment immunity.
B. State official's connection with unlawful act
Nevertheless, defendants argue that the Young doctrine does not protect plaintiffs' right to sue defendant Robin Weaver ("Weaver") because as Yolo County Grand Jury Commissioner, she is not responsible for selecting potential grand jurors. While a defendant must be connected to the alleged unlawful act to properly be sued as a state official, defendants fail to address the entirety of plaintiffs' FAC. In addition to alleging that defendants have systematically excluded Hispanics, Asians and non-Whites from the Yolo County Grand Jury selection process, that is, the application, interview, and final selection stages of jurors and a foreperson, plaintiffs also contend that defendants have excluded these populations from the recruiting process. (Pls.' FAC at ¶ 37). Accordingly, plaintiffs contend that they have been denied "their right to receiv[e] equal notice of the opportunity to apply for grand jury service." (Pls.' FAC at ¶¶ 50, 57, 61).
Defendant Weaver admits that she is "responsible . . . for administering the recruitment of grand jurors for the 2006-2007 Yolo County Grand Jury." (Weaver Decl., filed July 20, 2006, at ¶ 2). While "[a]ny process for recruiting grand jurors is under the ultimate control of the [Yolo County Superior Court] judges[,]" defendant Weaver details the steps she has taken in the past to recruit racial minorities, including sending letters to community groups. (Id. at ¶ 4). At this stage, the allegations in plaintiffs' FAC sufficiently assert that defendant Weaver participated in one of the very processes that plaintiffs challenge on constitutional grounds. As such, plaintiffs may properly invoke the Young exception to 11th Amendment immunity as to their claims against defendant Weaver, to the extent those claims arise from the exclusion of Hispanics, Asians and non-Whites from the grand juror recruitment process.
Therefore, the court may properly assert jurisdiction, pursuant to the Young doctrine, over plaintiffs' claims against defendants for alleged ongoing and continuous constitutional violations in recruiting and selecting Yolo County grand jurors and grand jury forepersons.
Defendants argue that the Supreme Court's decision inCarter v. Jury Commission does not abrogate 11th Amendment immunity for state officials who are alleged to have "engaged in racial discrimination in grand jury selection." (Dfs.' Memo. Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at 16:6-10). However, as the Young exception to 11th Amendment immunity is applicable in the case at hand, the court need not address this argument.
Defendants note that plaintiffs allege defendant Weaver violated California Penal Code § 903.1, requiring a jury commissioner to, "pursuant to written rules or instructions adopted by a majority of the judges of the superior court of the county, . . . furnish the judges of the court annually a list of persons qualified to serve as grand jurors. . . ." (Dfs.' Memo. Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at 9:3-6). Subsequently, they argue that the court may not assert jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims regarding an alleged violation of state law under theYoung doctrine. However, even if plaintiffs' claims against defendant Weaver arose from an alleged violation of state law, under the Young doctrine, the court may still assert jurisdiction over their claims to the extent plaintiffs allege defendant Weaver's actions violated federal law.
II. Standing
A. Failure to apply
The Supreme Court has delineated a three-part test to determine whether a party has established standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, that is, "an invasion of a legally protected interest" which is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent. Id. at 560 (citations omitted). Second, the injury must be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant. . . ." Id. Finally, there must exist a likelihood that the "injury will be redressed by a favorable decision" for the plaintiff. Id. at 561.
Defendants first argue that, since plaintiffs have not actually applied to become Yolo County grand jurors or forepersons, they lack standing to bring their claims alleging that they have been systematically excluded from the grand jury selection process. To support their argument, defendants cite the Supreme Court's opinion in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Iris. In Moose Lodge, the Supreme Court held that, since the plaintiff failed to apply for membership with a club and therefore was not injured by the club's membership policy, he lacked standing to litigate the constitutional validity of the membership policy. 407 U.S. 163, 167-168, 171 (1972). However, defendants fail to recognize the distinction between the facts of Moose Lodge and the facts at hand here. Plaintiffs allege, not only that they were racially discriminated by defendants in the selection process for Yolo County grand jurors and foreperson, but that they did not receive an "equal notice of the opportunity to apply for grand jury service" in the first place. (Pls.' FAC at ¶¶ 50, 56, 60). However, the Supreme Court in Moose Lodge did not address whether the plaintiff was unconstitutionally denied an opportunity to apply for membership with Moose Lodge. As such, defendants' reliance upon Moose Lodge is unavailing. Plaintiffs have pled a concrete, particularized and actual injury, caused by defendants' alleged unequal recruitment process for grand jury membership, such that they have standing to sue for injuries incurred from defendants' alleged conduct.
Similarly, defendants citations to the Supreme Court's opinion in Allen v. Wright and the Ninth Circuit's opinion inSmelt v. County of Orange are inapplicable in this case. InAllen, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing "to litigate their claims based upon the stigmatizing injury often caused by racial discrimination." 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984). Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs were not personally denied equal treatment, where the Government granted tax exemptions to racially-discriminatory private schools, to constitute a judicially cognizable injury. Id. at 752-756. In Smelt, the Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge Congress' definition of marriage on the ground that it denied them benefits, in part because the plaintiffs had not yet applied for any benefits. 447 F.3d 673, 683-684 (9th Cir. 2006). Neither case addresses circumstances similar to the case at hand, where plaintiffs have allegedly been denied notice of the opportunity to apply for membership on the Yolo County Grand Jury in the first place.
Moreover, plaintiffs' failure to apply for membership on the grand jury does not bar them from challenging racial discrimination in the grand jury selection process as well. According to defendants, the process instituted for selecting the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 Yolo County grand juries is comprised of four steps. The Yolo County Superior Court ("Superior Court") recruits applicants, candidates submit membership applications, a Superior Court judge interviews applicants, and grand jurors and alternates are selected through a lottery process. It is apparent to the court that, based upon defendants' description of the grand jury selection process, any exclusion of the Hispanic, Asian and non-White populations from the first stage of the grand jury selection process — recruitment — would lead directly to exclusion in the three remaining stages of the process. Nevertheless, defendants ask the court to assume that had plaintiffs applied for grand jury membership, "they likely would have either been selected as a grand juror or designated as an alternative." (Dfs.' Memo. Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at 11:3-8). The court refuses to make such an assumption, which would thereby deny plaintiffs the opportunity to challenge the alleged discriminatory nature of the grand jury selection process. As the selection process is directly linked to the recruitment process, plaintiffs do not lack standing simply because they did not receive an opportunity to apply for grand jury membership.
B. Third party standing
Defendants contend that plaintiffs lack standing because they are "asserting claims on behalf of racial groups to which they do not belong." (Dfs.' Memo. Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at 14:20-21). They further contend that a "plaintiff lacks standing to assert claims on behalf of third parties." (Id. at 14:24). As noted earlier, plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction regarding the systematic exclusion of three populations, Hispanics, Asians, and non-White persons, from the grand jury selection process. (Pls.' FAC at ¶ 62). However, all plaintiffs are of Hispanic descent. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-8).
Under the constitutional requirements of standing, a plaintiff's alleged injury must be "fairly traceable" to the defendant's alleged conduct. In the case at hand, plaintiffs' injury, systematic exclusion from the grand jury recruitment and selection process, including service as a juror or foreman, is fairly traceable to defendants' alleged exclusion of Hispanics from these processes. However, as plaintiffs are all Hispanics, their injuries are not fairly traceable to the alleged exclusion of Asian and non-Whites.
While courts have permitted a party to bring actions on behalf of third parties, plaintiffs here do not satisfy the stringent requirements for such situations. The test for third party standing requires that the plaintiff suffer an injury in fact, that the plaintiff have a close relation to the third party, and that the third party is hindered from protecting his or her own interests. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11 (1991). In this case, plaintiffs do not have "a close relation" with Asians and non-Whites for purposes of third party standing. In Powers, the court found that an excluded juror and criminal defendant had a "close relationship" because first, they shared a "common interest in eliminating racial discrimination from the courtroom[,]" and second, the criminal defendant would be a "motivated, effective advocate" for the excluded juror's rights because a victory in the case might result in the overturning of his conviction. Id. at 414. While plaintiffs and persons of Asian descent and non-Whites likely share the common interest of prohibiting defendants from allegedly discriminating against them in the grand jury recruitment and selection processes, it is doubtful whether plaintiff would be a "motivated, effective advocate" for Asians' and non-Whites' constitutional rights. Plaintiffs' ability to win this suit is not necessarily dependent upon their claims of alleged discrimination against Asians and non-Whites. As such, they do not have the same incentive to serve as an effective advocate on behalf of Asian and non-White populations.
Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiffs argue they are members of a "non-White" recognizable, distinctive group for purposes of standing, their argument fails. The court has explained that "persons challenging grand-jury selection practices on th basis of statistical disparities must first establish which `identifiable groups' have been excluded."Quadra v. Superior Court of City and County of San Francisco, 378 F. Supp. 605, 614 (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)). Plaintiffs argue that they are "entitled to present evidence to show that . . . non-white ethnic minorities who have been excluded" from grand jury participation here form a "cognizable group." (Pls.' Reply, filed July 28, 2006, at 7:23-26). However, the Ninth Circuit has held that "[a]ny group which might casually be referred to as `non-whites' would have no internal cohesion, nor would it be viewed as an identifiable class by the general population," such that it might challenge a grand jury selection process. United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1982); see also United States v. Luong, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1127 (E.D. Cal. 2003) (J. Shubb). Therefore, plaintiffs do not have standing to bring their claims as they arise from defendants' alleged exclusion of "non-Whites" from the grand jury recruitment and selection processes.
Accordingly, plaintiffs have standing to bring their claims regarding defendants' alleged constitutional violations only to the extent those violations arise out of the systematic exclusion of Hispanics in the grand jury recruitment and selection processes.
C. Due process claim
Additionally, defendants challenge plaintiffs' standing to assert their due process claim on the ground that, "the right of members of the public . . . not to be excluded from a grand jury due to racial discrimination is based on the right to equal protection." (Dfs.' Memo. Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at 15:13-15). Defendants contend that only criminal defendants may assert a due process right to a nondiscriminatory grand jury selection process, citing the Supreme Court's decision inCampbell v. Louisiana. However, plaintiffs' right to bring a due process claim against defendants for their alleged conduct goes to the merits of plaintiffs' claims. The court will not address this issue where the parties were directed only to address issues relating to standing and 11th Amendment immunity.
D. Discriminatory intent
Finally, defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing because plaintiffs "can not show any discriminatory intent in the Yolo County jury selection process as a matter of law." (Dfs.' Memo. Re: Sov. Imm. and Standing at 11:11-12). Defendants rely upon plaintiffs' failure to establish a prima facie equal protection case under the test set forth in Castaneda v. Partida. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). However, whether plaintiffs have established defendants' discriminatory intent is an issue on the merits. As such, the court will not consider this argument at this time.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court may properly assert jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims against defendants pursuant to the Young exception to 11th Amendment immunity. However, with respect to claims against defendant Weaver, the court may assert jurisdiction over them only to the extent they relate to defendant Weaver's alleged discriminatory conduct with respect to the grand jury recruitment process. Furthermore, plaintiffs have standing to sue for defendants' alleged constitutional violations arising from the systematic exclusion of Hispanics from the recruitment and selection processes of the Yolo County Grand Jury. Plaintiffs do not, however, have standing to bring their claims against defendants as they arise from the alleged systematic exclusion of Asians and "non-Whites" from the same processes.IT IS SO ORDERED.