Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-06957-JF.
September 16, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff was formerly employed by the defendant as a "trainman." He was terminated from that employment, and, in this action, asserts that his termination and other adverse personnel actions violated his rights under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 706 et seq.
Conrail has filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that plaintiff's claims are preempted by the Railway Labor Act, and, alternatively, that Conrail is entitled to summary judgment on the merits.
Plaintiff was hired by Conrail in 2000. He filled out a medical questionnaire, and disclosed that he had 100% loss of hearing in his left ear; the medical examination confirmed that fact. Plaintiff was, however, fully qualified for the position of trainman, and performed his duties in that job without any difficulty.
In May 2000, plaintiff was informed that he was being "force assigned" to the position of engineer, and would be required to attend a training school for that position. The record makes clear that plaintiff did not, in fact, meet the physical requirements for an engineer position, because of his hearing loss. When plaintiff failed the physical examination for the engineer position, he sought to continue his employment as a trainman, but was, instead, placed on unpaid medical leave, and eventually discharged from employment.
Conrail takes the position that, under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, Conrail was required to transfer plaintiff to the engineer position, and could not thereafter permit him to continue as trainman. Defendant therefore argues that, since interpretation and application of a collective bargaining agreement is involved, plaintiff's claims are precluded by the mandatory arbitration provisions of the Railway Labor Act.
The leading case on this issue is the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Brown v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 254 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2001). After a lengthy and thorough analysis of the subject, the Seventh Circuit summarized its holding as follows:
"A claim brought under an independent federal statute is precluded by the RLA only if it can be dispositively resolved through an interpretation of a CBA. This occurs `only when a provision of the collective bargaining agreement is the subject of the dispute or the dispute is substantially dependent upon an analysis of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.' (citation omitted) Therefore, an employer cannot ensure the preclusion of a plaintiff's claim merely by asserting certain CBA-based defenses to what is essentially a non-CBA-based claim . . . nor will a claim be precluded merely because certain provisions of the CBA must be examined and weighed as a relevant but nondispositive factor in deciding a claim or a defense."254 F.3d at 668.
The issue, then, is whether the resolution of plaintiff's claims is substantially dependent upon the interpretation of the CBA, so that the correct interpretation of the CBA would conclusively resolve plaintiff's claims. In the Brown case, the accommodation which plaintiff sought was inextricably intertwined with the seniority provisions of the CBA, arguably would have required creation of a new position subject to posting and advertising, and would have been conclusively determined by the correct interpretation of the CBA. In our case, while defendant contends that the CBA, as interpreted by the defendant, would dispose of plaintiff's claims, I am not persuaded.
Defendant argues that, under the CBA, a trainman who is ordered to undergo engineering training but is not qualified to be an engineer cannot remain in the position of trainman. But the contract provisions relied upon cannot reasonably be interpreted in that fashion. Article XII, § 2 of the CBA states:
"Candidates for Engineer Training School (ETS) shall be selected in seniority order from qualified candidates at a location . . . All applicants must satisfy the company's minimum employment standards for engine service before being accepted into the ETS."
And an addendum providing interpretive guidance states:
"If no qualified applicants are available in the seniority district, trainmen who satisfy the company's engine service employment standards (emphasis added) and who entered service after May 31, 1985 shall be required to attend ETS in the following sequence:
1. Furloughed trainmen in seniority order.
2. Active trainmen in inverse order of seniority."
I do not believe the defendant can be permitted to preclude plaintiff from obtaining judicial vindication of his ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims by asserting patently nonmeritorious CBA defenses.
Thus, if the factual situation were as presented by plaintiff — that he was forced to apply for the engineer job and lost his trainman job because his disability made him unqualified to be an engineer, interpretation of the CBA would not resolve this case; the issue would be whether the defendant was asserting the CBA defense as a pretext for discrimination. That issue would not be resolved in arbitration proceedings; plaintiff's claims would not be completely disposed of in the RLA proceedings.
I need not dwell upon this issue, however, because I conclude that plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of discrimination under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. When plaintiff was first hired, he disclosed his hearing impairment, was found qualified for the trainman position, and was hired. Two years later, in connection with his proposed transfer to the engineering position, plaintiff filled out a medical questionnaire in which he asserted, not only his hearing loss, but also a wide range of other impairments, including the following:
"Epilepsy, seizures or fits; loss of consciousness, dizziness or fainting spells; neck or back injury/pain; numbness, weakness or paralysis; eye disorder or visual difficulty; stomach, liver or kidney problem; sleep disorder; mental illness (e.g., depression, anxiety); allergies; and other illnesses or injuries."
It is therefore not at all surprising that the defendant's medical personnel placed a "medical hold" on plaintiff's employment, and requested further clarification. Plaintiff was notified of this in May 2002. It was not until December 5, 2002, that plaintiff tendered further medical information to the defendant. That submission consisted of a December 5, 2002, letter from one Jack Tumasz, D.O., to plaintiff's attorney, stating that the plaintiff
"has been under care in the past for anxiety and depression [but] is currently without symptoms . . . Mr. John Serbin is not considered disabled from his current occupation. It is also found that he does not carry a diagnosis of seizures, epilepsy, or fits, loss of consciousness, dizziness or fainting spells, neck or back pain or injury, numbness, weakness, paralysis . . . He is, however, unable to perform job description of engineer, secondary to his hearing loss left ear."
There are two possibilities: either plaintiff was suffering from, or subject to recurrence of, physical and mental conditions which would render him unqualified for the trainman position as well as the engineer position, or plaintiff had intentionally misrepresented and overstated his ailments in order to avoid being transferred to the engineer position. In either case, the actions taken by Conrail could not reasonably be found to violate plaintiff's rights under the ADA or the Rehabilitation statute. Defendant's motion for summary judgment will therefore be granted.
An order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of September 2004, upon consideration of defendant's motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment, and plaintiff's response, IT IS ORDERED:
1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
2. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to close the file.