Opinion
23-cv-03897-EMC
08-08-2024
RICHARD SEPULVEDA, Plaintiff, v. ENCARNACION PEREZ, et al., Defendants.
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
EDWARD M. CHEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Richard Sepulveda has filed suit against Defendants Encarnacion Perez (individually and doing business as El Malecon Mariscos Restaurant); Vicente Perez (individually and doing business as El Malecon Mariscos Restaurant); and EP Real Estate Holdings LLC. According to Mr. Sepulveda, the individual defendants own and operate a restaurant which is located in Oakland, California, and EP Real Estate owns the real property where the restaurant is located. See Compl. ¶ 3. Mr. Sepulveda alleges that he has physical disabilities that require him to use a walker, and that, when he went to the restaurant on two different occasions, he encountered various barriers that prevented him from accessing it. See Compl. ¶¶ 4, 6, 12. Mr. Sepulveda has asserted the following causes of action against Defendants: (1) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); (2) breach of state statutory protections (under the California Health & Safety Code) for persons with physical disabilities; (3) violation of California Civil Rights Acts; and (4) violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act.
Currently pending before the Court is Judge Ryu's report and recommendation (“R&R”) with respect to a motion for default judgment filed by Mr. Sepulveda. In his motion, Mr. Sepulveda seeks a default judgment on two of the above claims - specifically, the ADA and Unruh Act claims. See Docket No. 16 (Mot. at 9). The ADA provides for injunctive relief only (plus attorneys' fees); the Unruh Act allows for monetary relief, including statutory damages in certain circumstances. See R&R at 14, 17; see also Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2021). Judge Ryu recommends that Mr. Sepulveda's motion for default judgment be granted and that Mr. Sepulveda be awarded the following relief: “$4,000 in statutory damages[;] $2,660 in attorneys' fees[;] $1,007 for costs[;] [and] an injunction requiring Defendants to provide an accessible parking space, accessible dining tables in the exterior dining area, and a restroom compliant with federal law.” Docket No. 28 (R&R at 19).
Although Judge Ryu ordered that Mr. Sepulveda promptly serve a copy of the R&R on Defendants, he only recently effected service. See Docket No. 30 (proof of service). Thus, the time for Defendants to object to the R&R has not yet expired.
The Court has reviewed Judge Ryu's R&R. The R&R, however, does not address the issue of supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim - specifically, whether this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
In Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit held that a district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an Unruh Act claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (providing that a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if, “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction”).
The Ninth Circuit noted first that the circumstances of the case were exceptional. It began by taking into account that the Unruh Act expands the remedies available to a plaintiff under the ADA. See id. at 1169.
[I]n response to these remedies being abused by "a very small number of plaintiffs' attorneys," the California legislature banned certain pre-litigation demands and imposed heightened pleading requirements. Further refining this statutory equilibrium, the legislature later imposed additional requirements on "high-frequency litigants." High-frequency litigants - those who filed "10 or more complaints" within the last twelve months - were now required to plead additional facts (such as why they were near the defendant's business) and pay an additional $1,000 filing fee for each new case brought.Id. at 1169-70; see also Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.50 (addressing high frequency disability access litigants). There were exceptional circumstances to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim because “it would not be fair to defendants and an affront to the comity between federal and state courts to allow plaintiffs to evade California's procedural requirements by bringing their claims in federal court.” Vo, 49 F.4th at 1172 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Sepulveda admits he is a high-frequency litigant. See Compl. ¶ 70; see also R&R at 16 (noting that, per the complaint, Mr. Sepulveda “had filed 39 complaints alleging a construction-related accessibility claim during the 12 months prior to filing this complaint”).
The Ninth Circuit then found that there were compelling reasons for declining supplemental jurisdiction - taking into account “what best serves the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction doctrine articulated in [United Mine Workers v.] Gibbs [383 U.S. 715 (1966)].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). These factors weighed in favor of declining supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim because, even though “every violation of the ADA in California is automatically a violation of the Unruh Act,” Arroyo, 19 F.4th at 1206, the district court had yet to rule on the ADA claim. The Ninth Circuit noted that the case before it was distinguishable from Arroyo where it had found that the lower court erred in declining supplemental jurisdiction.
The fatal flaw we identified in the Arroyo district court's order was that it waited until a "very late stage" of the litigation to decline supplemental jurisdiction. The district court there did not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim until after it ruled on the ADA claim. This meant that - notwithstanding our court's clear acknowledgment that many of the Gibbs values could have been furthered by refusing supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim in that case - doing so at that late point in the litigation would not actually effectuate any of those values. Instead, it would merely create duplicative work for the state court. Arroyo summed up the dynamic well: "it is simply too late to undo the now-sunk costs already incurred by litigating this matter to its now-inevitable conclusion."
None of that is true in this case. The district court here declined supplemental jurisdiction over Vo's Unruh Act claim well before it ruled on the merits of the ADA claim. The district court's order therefore completely sidesteps the core concern articulated in Arroyo. Moreover, the district court here analyzed Vo's situation under the Gibbs values and determined that the values of fairness and comity favored not retaining jurisdiction over the claim. Given these very real concerns, in addition to the deferential standard of review, we see no reason to hold that the district court abused its
discretion in determining there were compelling reasons to decline jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim.Vo, 49 F.4th at 1172. As in Vo, this case is at the very early stages of litigation, and the Court has issued no substantive ruling on the ADA claim.
In light of Vo and Arroyo, the Court orders Mr. Sepulveda to show cause as to why the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act claim -especially as he concedes he is a high-frequency litigant, which thereby implicates specific procedural requirements imposed by the California legislature if the Unruh Act claim were litigated in state court. See, e.g., Sepulveda v. Isa, No. 24-cv-00620-TSH, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107337 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2024) (issuing similar order to show cause); see also Sepulveda v. Isa, No. 24-cv-00620-TSH (Docket No. 17) (recommending that the district court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Sepulveda's Unruh Act, CDPA, and California Health and Safety Code claims); Sepulveda v. Taqueria, No. 23-cv-01781-LJC, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232259, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2023) (citing Arroyo and Vo in “conclud[ing] that this case presents ‘exceptional circumstances' such that ‘there are other compelling reasons for declining [supplemental] jurisdiction' over Mr. Sepulveda's state law claims”), adopted by 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3023 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2024); Sepulveda v. Kobaree, No. 23-cv-02368-RS, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136036, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2023) (noting that “Plaintiff is no doubt familiar with this legal backdrop, as numerous courts have dismissed his state law claims on this basis”).
Mr. Sepulveda shall file a response to this order to show cause within two weeks of the date of this order. At the time he files his response, Mr. Sepulveda shall also serve a copy of his response on all Defendants and file a proof of service testifying to such.
In addition, the Court orders Mr. Sepulveda to serve a copy of this order on all Defendants within three days and file a proof of service attesting to such.
IT IS SO ORDERED.