Assuming that an objection under that Code section was preserved for appellate review, see Mahsa, Inc. v. Al–Madinah Petroleum, Inc., 276 Ga.App. 890, 894(2)(a), 625 S.E.2d 37 (2005), the charge did not express an opinion as to what had been proved, or endorse the Propounders' view of the case, but rather was directed to instructing the jury regarding the formalities of a valid will. See Separk v. Caswell Builders, 209 Ga.App. 713, 714 –715(4), 434 S.E.2d 502 (1993). Further, the court instructed the jury that nothing that it had said or done during the trial should be interpreted as intimating, hinting, or suggesting how the case should be decided, see Cline v. Lee, 260 Ga.App. 164, 171(3), 581 S.E.2d 558 (2003), and there is no error.
The provision in the preceding paragraph requiring the landlord to make a decision within 90 days did no more than establish that the landlord would breach the contract by failing to make a decision within that time period. See Separk v. Caswell Builders, 209 Ga. App. 713, 714 (1) ( 434 S.E.2d 502) (1993). The trial court erred in construing the contract provision in question as dependent on whether the landlord breached a separate provision requiring a decision to rebuild to be made within 90 days. Separk, supra; OCGA §§ 13-2-2 (9); 13-1-7.