The parol evidence rule excludes evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements or negotiations to change or modify the terms of a binding integrated agreement. See Del Rosario v. Camacho, 6 N.M.I. 213, 227 (2001) (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts ยงยง 213, cmt. a, b, 215 (1981)); Seol v. Saipan Honeymoon Corp., App. No. 96-011 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 1999) (Opinion at 4)). In Del Rosario, the court stated that it "considers parol evidence, not to determine that a party meant something other than what he said, but only to show what he meant by what was said."
But the authorities on which he relies do not support this inflexible reading. See Weir v. Crown Equip. Corp., 217 F.3d 453, 458-59 (7th Cir. 2000) (though trial court found many of plaintiff's proffered accident reports were "vague, incomplete, and otherwise confusing," it nonetheless admitted the most clearly relevant reports); Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 758 F. Supp. 1182, 1184-85 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (EEOC probable cause determination excluded under Rule 403 due to its "demonstrable lack of probative value"); Seol v. Saipan Honeymoon Corp., 5 N. Mar. I. 238, 241 (1999) (trial court, in fairness, should have excluded incomplete exhibit because plaintiffs' counsel refused to produce the second page). Rather, in this Circuit, "application of the rule of completeness is a matter for the trial judge's discretion."
; Seol v. Saipan Honeymoon Corp., 1999 N. Mar. I. LEXIS 13, App. No. 96-011 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 1999) (Opinion at 4). The court considers parol evidence, not to determine that a party meant something other than what he said, but only to show what he meant by what was said. Sablan v. Cabrera, 4 N. Mar. I. 133, 140 n.40 (1994).