Opinion
21A-CR-1944
05-09-2022
Daniel J. Senteney, Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff,
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Barbara J. Simmons Batesville, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court Trial Court Cause No. 49D34-1909-CM-38251. The Honorable Richard Hagenmaier, Magistrate
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Barbara J. Simmons Batesville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Alexandria Sons Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ROBB, JUDGE
Case Summary and Issue
[¶1] Following a bench trial, Daniel Senteney was convicted of intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor. Senteney appeals, raising one issue for our review which we restate as whether there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Concluding the State presented sufficient evidence to support Senteney's intimidation conviction, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] On September 29, 2019, Officer Kyle Hoover of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department was dispatched to a gas station because of a reported disturbance. When Officer Hoover arrived, Senteney and several of his family members were at the gas station. Officer Hoover was informed that prior to his arrival, Senteney's son and the gas station clerk had gotten into an altercation that led to the gas station clerk pushing Senteney's son.
Officer Hoover described the number of family members as "a lot of people" in "multiple vehicles[.]" Transcript of Evidence, Volume 2 at 25.
[¶3] Senteney was "very agitated" and "very hostile" toward Officer Hoover, Transcript of Evidence, Volume 2 at 24, and adamant that Officer Hoover needed to arrest the gas station clerk because his son was a minor, see id. at 25. Senteney told Officer Hoover "that he would wait for the police to leave and he would beat the gas station attendant's f*cking ass once officer's [sic] left if [Officer Hoover] didn't arrest him." Id. Although Officer Hoover was unaware of Senteney's "abilities . . . whether he could carry [the threat] out[, ]" id. at 27, he did not believe Senteney was bluffing due to his "physical demeanor, his emotional state, and the . . . vast amount of people that were there" and refused to leave, id. at 25. Senteney was then arrested.
[¶4] On September 30, 2019, the State charged Senteney with intimidation as a Class A misdemeanor. The charging information stated:
On or about September 29, 2019, [] Senteney did communicate a threat to [Officer] Hoover, another person, with the intent that [Officer] Hoover be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out[.]Appellant's Appendix, Volume II at 19.
[¶5] Following a bench trial, the trial court found Senteney guilty. The trial court sentenced Senteney to 365 days but suspended the entire sentence. Senteney now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[¶6] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence required to support a conviction, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Instead, we consider only the evidence supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Morris v. State, 114 N.E.3d 531, 535 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018), trans. denied. We consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the judgment. Silvers v. State, 114 N.E.3d 931, 936 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018). "We will affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). The evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; it is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from the evidence to support the judgment. Silvers, 114 N.E.3d at 936. However, we review matters of statutory interpretation de novo because they present pure questions of law. Gardiner v. State, 928 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Ind. 2010).
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[¶7] Senteney challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his intimidation conviction. The State bears the burden of proving all elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Taylor v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1293, 1301 (Ind. 1992); see also Ind. Code § 35-41-4-1(a). "A person who communicates a threat with the intent . . . that another person be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out" commits intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(4). Pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(d)(1), "[t]hreat" includes the expression, by words or action, of an intention to "unlawfully injure the person threatened or another person[.]" (Emphasis added.)
[¶8] Senteney contends that Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(a)(4) requires that the recipient of the threat be actually "placed in fear[.]" Brief of Appellant at 10. Senteney also argues that "[t]here was no testimony that Officer Hoover was 'placed in fear' that the threat would be carried out[, ]" id. at 9, and therefore, the evidence was insufficient to convict him of intimidation, see id. at 7. "Fear" is defined as "[t]he strong, negative feeling that a person experiences when anticipating danger or harm." Black's Law Dictionary 726 (10th ed.).
Senteney relies only on the dissent in Holloway v. State for this contention. 51 N.E.3d 376, 379 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (Bailey, J., dissenting), trans. denied. We do not find Senteney's citation to a dissent persuasive. Senteney also notes that Officer Hoover testified that he did not know whether Senteney had the ability to carry out his threat; however, Senteney's ability is not determinative. See Holloway, 51 N.E.3d at 378 (affirming Holloway's intimidation conviction and noting that "Holloway cites no authority for the proposition that a person must be capable of inflicting injury when the statement is made[.]").
[¶9] However, our supreme court has stated:
"[T]rue threats" under Indiana law depend on two necessary elements: that the speaker intend his communications to put his targets in fear for their
safety, and that the communications were likely to actually cause such fear in a reasonable person similarly situated to the target.Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 964 (Ind. 2014) (addressing a conviction pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(a)(2)) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1077 (2015). When determining whether the communications at issue would cause a similarly situated reasonable person to fear for the safety of themselves or someone else, we employ the perspective of an "objectively reasonable person[.]" Id. at 969.
Senteney does not challenge the intent of his statement. We also note that the defendant in Brewington was charged under Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(a)(2) (2008) for communicating a threat with the intent to place another person in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act, 7 N.E.3d at 958, thus the supreme court used the phrase "in fear for their [own] safety" in its first element, id. at 964. However, pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-45-2-1(d)(1), expressions of an intention to harm a third party also constitute a threat; therefore, we conclude our supreme court's language in Brewington also includes fear for the safety of another.
[¶10] Here, Senteney stated to Officer Hoover "that he would wait for the police to leave and he would beat the gas station attendant's f*cking ass[.]" Tr., Vol. 2 at 25. Officer Hoover testified that Senteney was "very agitated" and "very hostile" toward him. Id. at 24. Further, Officer Hoover did not believe Senteney's threat was a bluff due to his "physical demeanor, his emotional state, and . . . [the] vast amount of people that were there" and refused to leave. Id. at 25. It was, therefore, reasonable for the trial court, as factfinder, to determine that Senteney's threat would cause an objectively reasonable person, similarly situated to Officer Hoover, to fear that the threat would be carried out. Thus, there was sufficient evidence of intimidation.
Conclusion
[¶11] We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support Senteney's intimidation conviction.
Accordingly, we affirm.
[¶12] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Molter, J., concur.