Opinion
Record No. 1120-92-1
April 6, 1993
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
A. William Charters (George J. Dancigers; Heilig, McKenry, Fraim Lollar, on brief), for appellants.
No brief or argument for appellee.
Present: Chief Judge Koontz, Judges Baker and Willis.
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
On appeal from an order of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission awarding benefits to Mary E. Green, Sentara Hampton General Hospital contends that the commission erred in holding that a letter of December 10, 1987 was a proper filing of Green's claim with the commission. Sentara argues that the letter was insufficient for that purpose and that Green's application was time-barred under Code § 65.2-601. Under the facts of this case, we find no error in the commission's determination and affirm its award.
On June 24, 1987, while employed as a registered nurse by Sentara, Green suffered an acute low-back strain. Sentara filed its First Report of Accident on July 13, 1987. The commission issued a "blue letter" to both parties.
On August 17, 1987, Green returned to work. Between then and February 28, 1988, Green worked intermittently with periods of temporary/partial and temporary/total incapacity. During this period, Sentara made voluntary payments, including medical benefits, to Green. From time to time, Green requested an agreement. However, the parties never entered into an agreement and no award was entered.
On December 10, 1987, Green's counsel wrote a letter to Virginia Sisak, Sentara's representative, requesting information concerning matters such as Green's medical expenses and her missed time from work. A copy of this letter was sent to the commission and was received by it on December 14, 1987. The reference line states that it concerns "Mary E. Green, Worker's Compensation Claim." The letter also refers to Green's claim, identifies Sentara as Green's employer, reports the date of Green's injury, and describes Green's resulting injuries.
Sentara's insurance carrier and Green's counsel exchanged correspondence regarding this claim through May 26, 1989. On January 31, 1990, the carrier informed Green's counsel that the statute of limitations had run. On February 1, 1990, Green requested that the matter be referred to the commission's hearing docket. No hearing was scheduled. On June 12, 1991, Green wrote the commission and requested a hearing on this matter.
On October 9, 1991, the deputy commissioner found that Green's application was barred by Code § 65.2-601. On May 22, 1992, the full commission reversed the deputy commissioner, finding that the December 10, 1987 letter, written by Green's counsel and sent to the employer, was a valid and timely claim for workers' compensation benefits.
Sentara contends that the December 10, 1987 letter was insufficient in two regards. First, it was not addressed to the commission, but, rather, to Sentara's representative with a copy to the commission. Therefore, Sentara argues, the letter was not intended to place the commission on notice of a claim or to seek relief from it. Second, the letter references a back injury said to have occurred June 24, 1986, not June 24, 1987, the date of the injury involved in this case. Sentara correctly states that the statute of limitation period is jurisdictional, and that a claim is barred if it is not filed within the prescribed time limit. Musick v. Codell Construction Co., 4 Va. App. 471, 473, 358 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1987).
We disagree with Sentara's contentions. Addressing its arguments in inverse order, we note that the commission found the 1986 referenced date to be a mere scrivener's error. The record supports this conclusion. No one was misled. All the parties understood that the injury referred to was the June 24, 1987 back injury.
The commission has wide discretion in liberally permitting informal letters to be treated as valid claims for workers' compensation benefits. See Greene v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Inc., 13 Va. App. 486, 490, 413 S.E.2d 650, 653 (1992) (the commission exercised that discretion liberally by permitting informal letters and inquiries from pro se claimants to be treated as applications for change of condition and hearing).See also Reese v. Wampler Foods, 222 Va. 249, 278 S.E.2d 870 (1981). Moreover, "[t]he Industrial Commission is not bound by technical rules of pleading or practice, but conducts its investigations in such manner as in its judgment will expeditiously and accurately determine the substantial rights of the parties." Trammel Crow Co. v. Redmond, 12 Va. App. 610, 614, 405 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991).
The December 10, 1987 letter, sent to Sentara's representative and copied to the commission, fairly informed the commission of Green's claim. The commission received the letter on December 14, 1987. The letter identified Green's employer, the date of the accident, the resulting injuries, and that a claim existed. This letter satisfied the requirements and purposes for the filing of a claim as contemplated by Code § 65.1-87, now Code § 65.2-601. Accordingly, Green's attorney filed her claim well within the applicable two year statute of limitation period.
We affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.