As explained in the Court's previous Order, the Court adopts the more common interpretation that "willfully" or "knowingly" requires only that an unlawful act be done intentionally or volitionally, as opposed to inadvertently, and not that Defendant must have known that its conduct would violate the statute. See, e.g., Alea London Ltd. v. Am. Home Servs., Inc., 638 F.3d 768, 776 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that the treble damages TCPA requires mere "knowing" conduct, not wanton or malicious conduct); Davis v. Diversified Consultants, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 217, 226-27 (D. Mass. 2014), Harris v. World Fin. Network Nat. Bank, 867 F. Supp. 2d 888, 896-97 (E.D. Mich. 2012); Sengenberger v. Credit Control Servs., Inc., 2010 WL 1791270, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2010); Bridgeview Health Care Ctr. Ltd. v. Clark, 2013 WL 1154206, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2013); but see, e.g., Texas v. Am. Blastfax, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 892 (W.D. Tex. 2001). Because the plain text of the TCPA makes a caller strictly liable for making any violative calls, interpreting "willfully" to require a volitional act does not render the enhanced damages provision redundant with the basic liability framework of the TCPA.

Because the award in excess of $8.1 billion violates due process, the Court will not exercise its discretionary authority to increase the award. The Court, therefore, will not address the split of authority on the requirements to prove knowing violations (see e.g., Lary v. Trinity Physician Financial & Insurance Services, 780 F.3d 1101, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 2015) (must prove actual knowledge that the act violated the TCPA); contra e.g., Sengenberger v. Credit Control Services, Inc., 2010 WL 1791270, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2010) (must only prove the act was intentional, not accidental)) or whether the enhanced award would constitute punitive damages see Alea London Ltd. v. American Home Services, Inc., 638 F.3d 768, 778 (11th Cir. 2011) (enhanced awards up to $1,500 under the TCPA were more compensatory than punitive). G. Counts VII and VII California Claims

See In re Monitronics Intern., Inc., 2014 WL 316476, at *5 (N.D.W.V. Jan. 28, 2014) (collecting cases). Sengenberger v. Credit Control Servs., Inc., 2010 WL 1791270, at *6 (N.D.Ill. May 5, 2010). Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 312(f)).

Other courts have concluded that consent can be revoked, but only through writing. E.g., Starkey v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC, 2010 WL 2541756, *5–6 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010); Cunningham v. Credit Management, L.P., 2010 WL 3791104, *5 (N.D.Tex. Aug. 30, 2010); Moore v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC, 2011 WL 4345703, *11 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2011); Moltz v. Firstsource Advantage, LLC, 2011 WL 3360010, *6 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011); Sengenberger v. Credit Control Services, Inc., 2010 WL 1791270, *4 (N.D.Ill. May 5, 2010). In those cases, the courts relied on the fact that the cases involved debt collection calls and that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act generally applies to debt collection.