Opinion
Civil No. 05-2082 (JAF).
December 8, 2005
ORDER
I. Background
On October 11, 2005, Plaintiff, the Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Plaintiff" or "the Senate"), filed the present action against Defendants, Aníbal Acevedo Vilá ("the Governor"), Juan Carlos Méndez, and Ileana Fas Pacheco in their official capacities ("Defendants"), seeking injunctive relief under the Federal Relations Act ("FRA"), 48 U.S.C. § 821 ("Section 37") (2003). Docket Document No. 1. On October 19 and 20, 2005, we issued an opinion and order dismissing the case, holding that the controversy between the parties did not raise a federal question. Docket Document Nos. 19, 20.
On November 3, 2005, Defendants filed a motion seeking attorneys' fees, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Docket Document No. 24. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants' motion on November 24, 2005. Docket Document No. 29.
II. Legal Analysis
In the United States, the general rule is that, in the absence of legislation providing otherwise, litigants must pay their own attorney's fees. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 415 (1978). In order for attorney's fees to be awarded, a prevailing defendant must "establish that the plaintiffs' suit was totally unfounded, frivolous, or otherwise unreasonable."Casa Marie Hogar Geriatrico, Inc. v. Rivera-Santos, 38 F.3d 615, 618 (1st Cir. 1994).District courts have an inherent power to grant attorney's fees to a prevailing party when the losing party has "acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Dubois v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 270 F.3d 80 (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 33 (1991). This power should be used "sparingly and reserved for egregious circumstances," and must be "used with great circumspection and restraint, employed only in compelling situations." Id. (internal citations omitted).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, district courts may also award attorney's fees when an attorney "unreasonably and vexatiously" multiplies proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. In the First Circuit, behavior is vexatious when it is "harassing or annoying." Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d, 626, 632 (1st Cir. 1990).
In the case at hand, Defendants seek attorneys' fees and sanctions, alleging that Plaintiff raised frivolous and vexatious claims under the FRA that have repeatedly been resolved by a "myriad of courts all across the federal judiciary." Docket Document No. 24. The crux of Plaintiff's case centered on whether a dispute between the Senate and the Governor over the 2005 budget gave rise to a federal question under § 37 of the FRA.
In making a determination regarding whether a plaintiff's suit is unfounded, frivolous or otherwise unreasonable, a court must "resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or without foundation." Christiansburg Garment Co., 434 U.S. at 421-22. Although it is clear that § 37 of the FRA did not federalize local Commonwealth separation-of-powers conflicts, Plaintiff's complaint raised a novel legal claim that had heretofore not been analyzed by a federal court. Although Defendants argue that this court's prompt handling of the matter reflects the frivolous nature of Plaintiff's claim, the expedited schedule utilized to resolve this matter was, in fact, driven by the extreme politically and time-sensitive nature of the controversy.
We are not convinced that Plaintiff's complaint was so unreasonable or without foundation as to rise to the level of egregiousness required for us to impose sanctions. Nor do we find Plaintiff's attorneys' actions to be sufficiently annoying or harassing to award attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
In accordance with the foregoing, we DENY Defendants' request for attorney's fees, with each party to bear its own costs and fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.