Opinion
FBTCV156048410
01-18-2017
Marinelis Sena, Administrator of the Estate of Tyrone Tillman v. American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #186
Michael P. Kamp, J.
Before the court is the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that they are entitled to immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557b (" Good Samaritan law"). For the reasons set forth below the defendants' motion is denied.
FACTS
The plaintiffs, Marinelis Sena, individually and as the administratrix of the estate of Tyrone Tillman, commenced this action against the defendants, American Medical Response of Connecticut, Inc. (AMR), Brian Walts, William Ostroff, the City of Bridgeport, and Brian Rooney, by service of process on February 10, 2015. In their revised complaint (docket entry no. 161), the plaintiffs allege the following facts. On or about February 11, 2013, Tillman made a 911 call, complaining of difficulty breathing. Subsequently, the 911 dispatcher contacted AMR and AMR dispatched an ambulance to assist Tillman. Upon instruction by the AMR dispatcher, Tillman went outside to meet the ambulance. Walts and Ostroff, licensed emergency medical technicians and employees of AMR, were sent with the ambulance to attend to Tillman. Walts and Ostroff rendered various tests and emergency care to Tillman inside the ambulance. After this treatment, Walts and Ostroff decided to transport Tiliman to St. Vincent's Hospital and provided additional treatment during transit. Tillman was pronounced dead upon arrival at the hospital. In counts one through nineteen, the plaintiffs assert the following claims against AMR, Walts, and Ostroff: professional negligence, gross negligence, respondeat superior, wrongful death, and bystander emotional distress.
On September 22, 2016, the defendants, AMR, Walts, and Ostroft filed a motion for summary judgment and accompanying memorandum in support. The defendants move for summary judgment on the ground that they are entitled to immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 52-557b (" Good Samaritan law"). On October 14, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion. This court heard oral argument on the defendants' motion at short calendar on November 21, 2016. At short calendar, the defendants clarified that their motion is limited to counts one (professional negligence as to Walts), two (professional negligence as to Ostroff), three (respondeat superior as to AMR), fifteen (wrongful death as to Walts), sixteen (wrongful death as to Ostroff), and seventeen (respondeat superior as to AMR).
DISCUSSION
I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD AND ARGUMENTS
" [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820-21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). " [T]he moving party for summary judgment is held to a strict standard . . . of demonstrating his entitlement to summary judgment." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534-35, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). " To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact." Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 228, 116 A.3d 297 (2015).
" Likewise, [t]he existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United States Bank, N.A. v. Foote, 151 Conn.App. 620, 632-33, 94 A.3d 1267, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 930, 101 A.3d 952 (2014). " [T]he rule that the party opposing summary judgment must provide evidentiary support for its opposition applies only when the moving party has first made out a prima facie case for summary judgment . . . [I]f the party moving for summary judgment fails to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the nonmoving party may rest on mere allegations or denials contained in his pleadings . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 320-21, 77 A.3d 726 (2013).
In the present case, the defendants assert that they are entitled to immunity under § 52-557b(b). They maintain that they have produced sufficient evidence to establish that Walts and Ostroff were certified by the American Heart Association; Affidavits of Walts and Ostroff (Defs.' Exs. O, P); and that they rendered first aid to Tillman at the time of his alleged injuries. Thus, the defendants reason that because Walts and Ostroff, AMR's employees, meet the statutory criteria for immunity, AMR is also immune from liability as the employer. The defendants rely on the legislative history of § 52-557b, Superior Court decisions interpreting and applying this statute, and principles of vicarious liability to support the contention that immunity applies in this case. In response, the plaintiffs maintain that a plain reading of § 52-557b does not support the defendants' interpretation as to immunity for AMR. The plaintiffs further argue that the defendants' shortcomings in their motion--namely, their failure to dispute the plaintiffs' allegations of gross negligence and their focus on AMR's immunity preclude summary judgment because statutory immunity under § 52-557b(b) is limited to acts of ordinary negligence.
II
IMMUNITY UNDER GENERAL STATUTES § 52-557b
General Statutes § 52-557b (" 'Good Samaritan law.' Immunity from liability for emergency medical assistance, first aid or medication by injection. School personnel not required to administer or render. Immunity from liability re automatic external defibrillators"), is our state's codification of what has been known as the Good Samaritan law. Section 52-557b(b) provides in relevant part: " A paid or volunteer firefighter or police officer, a teacher or other school personnel on the school grounds or in the school building or at a school function, a member of a ski patrol, a lifeguard, a conservation officer, patrol officer or special police officer of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, or emergency medical service personnel, who has completed a course in first aid offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health or any director of health, as certified by the agency or director of health offering the course, and who renders emergency first aid to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency first aid, which may constitute ordinary negligence . . . The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence ." (Emphasis added.) Implicit in the defendants' motion for summary judgment is that this court must first determine whether there is no genuine issue of material fact that Walts and Ostroff, AMR employees, are entitled to immunity. If Walts and Ostroff are entitled to immunity, this court must, then, decide whether the immunity afforded to WaIts and Ostroff extends to their employer, AMR.
A
Immunity as to Walts and Ostroff
There is no dispute that Walts, a certified paramedic, and Ostroff, a certified emergency medical technicial, qualify as emergency medical service personnel within the meaning of § 52-557b(b). There is also no dispute that Walts and Ostroff have completed training in first aid offered by the American Heart Association. What remains to be determined is whether the defendants have established that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Walts and Ostroff were (1) engaged in emergency first aid within the meaning of § 52-557b, and (2) the alleged harmful conduct constituted ordinary negligence such that would entitle them to immunity. Even if this court were to answer the question whether Walts and Ostroff were engaged in emergency first aid within the meaning of § 52-557b(b), it would be without sufficient evidence to determine, as a matter of law, if Walts' and Ostroff's conduct, as alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint, did not constitute gross negligence. See Bost v. Town of Hamden, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket no. CV-09-5031935-S, (August 29, 2013, Nazzaro, J.) (denying summary judgment on ground that court could not determine as matter of law that defendants' actions did not constitute gross negligence such that would entitle them to immunity under § 52-557b). It would be remiss to overlook the present circumstances in which the plaintiffs have pleaded allegations of gross negligence and the defendants have failed to address the nature or propriety of these allegations in their present motion.
The defendants' arguments focus on the extension of immunity from Walts and Ostroff to AMR and touch on the assertion that Walts and Ostroff were engaged in emergency first aid. By the plain language of § 52-557b(b), this court cannot rely only on the undisputed facts that Walts and Ostroff fall within the class of people afforded immunity and that they received first aid training through programs sanctioned by the law to conclude that Walts and Ostroff are entitled to immunity. Consequently, this court is without sufficient evidence to make a complete analysis on the question of immunity as to these defendants. Therefore, the defendants have not met their burden of proof on summary judgment as to immunity for Walts and Ostroff.
B
Immunity as to AMR
No Connecticut court has directly addressed the question of whether § 52-557b includes for-profit business entities that employ the class of individuals enumerated in the statute. Given that this court lacks clear guidance in the case law on this issue, it must construe § 52-557b to determine if the language itself and the legislative intent underlying its provisions extends immunity to for-profit business entities, like AMR, directly or through their employees. As will be more fully articulated, this court concludes that § 52-557b, by its plain language and by examination of its history and public policy, does not afford immunity to AMR, as a matter of law, regardless of whether Walts and Ostroff are entitled to immunity. In reaching this conclusion, this court engages in the following analyses: (1) plain language interpretation in accordance with General Statutes § 1-2z; (2) extratexual evidence relevant to the scope and purpose of § 52-557b; and (3) relevant judicial authorities from Connecticut and outside jurisdictions.
The defendants cite to Superior Court cases for the proposition that immunity extends to for-profit business entities and employers, like itself. These cases, however, are unpersuasive in that they are conclusory and not telling as to how the courts reached the conclusion that § 52-557b applied to for-profit business entities and employers.
1
Plain Language Analysis
General Statutes § 1-2z provides: " The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes . If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Emphasis added.) " When interpreting a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . General Statutes § 1-2z requires this court first to consider the text of the statute and its relationship to other statutes to determine its meaning. If, after such consideration, the meaning of the statutory text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, we cannot consider extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute. Only if we determine that the text of the statute is not plain and unambiguous may we look to extratextual evidence of its meaning, such as the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment . . . the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and . . . its relationship to existing legislation and common-law principles governing the same general subject matter . . . The proper test to determine whether the meaning of the text of a statute is ambiguous is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Eagen v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 135 Conn.App. 563, 574-75, 42 A.3d 478 (2012).
" As with all issues of statutory interpretation, we look first to the language of the statute . . . In construing a statute, common sense must be used and courts must assume that a reasonable and rational result was intended . . . Furthermore, [i]t is a basic tenet of statutory construction that the legislature [does] not intend to enact meaningless provisions . . . [I]n construing statutes, we presume that there is a purpose behind every sentence, clause, or phrase used in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dorry v. Garden, 313 Conn. 516, 525, 98 A.3d 55 (2014).
The language of § 52-557b(b) makes clear that the following classes of people may claim immunity in accordance with its provisions: " paid or volunteer firefighter or police officer, a teacher or other school personnel on the school grounds or in the school building or at a school function, a member of a ski patrol, a lifeguard, a conservation officer, patrol officer or special police officer of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, or emergency medical service personnel, who has completed a course in first aid offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health or any director of health, as certified by the agency or director of health offering the course . . ." Nowhere within this subsection are for-profit business entities or employers of those enumerated in subsection (b) explicitly included among those eligible for immunity. Furthermore, reciprocal immunity from these classes of people to their employers cannot be inferred from the language of the statute.
Even when examining subsection (b) among the other subsections of § 52-557b, this court is unable to interpret it in such a way that would permit entities, like the defendant to claim immunity from civil actions. Subsection (a) narrowly applies to licensed physicians, registered nurses, medical technicians or other persons trained in pulmonary resuscitation, or persons operating automatic external defibrillators who voluntarily and gratuitously render emergency medical or professional assistance outside the ordinary course of their employment . Subsections (c), (d), and (e) mention corporations and business entities, but within specific contexts, which again, impresses upon this court that immunity cannot be extended, generally, to for-profit business entities outside of these particular circumstances. Subsections (c) and (d) address railroad companies. Subsection (d) is the only part of § 52-557b that explicitly permits an employer to claim immunity. Even so, Subsection (d) is limited to railroad companies that provide emergency medical training or equipment to employees that meet the criteria of subsection (c). Furthermore, subsection (e) addresses immunity from liability as a result of injuries from the use of cartridge injectors. Similarly to subsection (d), subsection (e) limits extension of liability to corporations and to volunteer workers associated with such corporations that meet the specified criteria set out in the sub-parts of subsection (e).
Subsection (c) provides: " An employee of a railroad company, including any company operating a commuter rail line, who has successfully completed a course in first aid, offered by the American Red Cross, the American Heart Association, the National Ski Patrol, the Department of Public Health or any director of health, as certified by the agency or director of health offering the course, and who renders emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation to a person in need thereof, shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injury or death which results from acts or omissions by such employee in rendering the emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation which may constitute ordinary negligence. The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence."
Subsection (d) provides in relevant part: " A railroad company, including any commuter rail line, which provides emergency medical training or equipment to any employee granted immunity pursuant to subsection (c) of this section shall not be liable for civil damages for any injury sustained by a person or for the death of a person which results from the company's acts or omissions in providing such training or equipment or which results from acts or omissions by such employee in rendering emergency first aid or cardiopulmonary resuscitation, which may constitute ordinary negligence . . ."
Subsection (e)(3) provides in relevant part: " A corporation, other than a licensed health care provider, that is exempt from federal income taxation under Section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, or any subsequent corresponding internal revenue code of the United States, as from time to time amended, which provides training in the use of cartridge injectors to any volunteer worker granted immunity pursuant to subdivision (2) of this subsection shall not be liable for civil damages for any injury sustained by, or for the death of, a child sixteen years of age or younger who is participating in a program offered by such corporation, which injury or death results from acts or omissions by such worker in using a cartridge injector, which may constitute ordinary negligence." (Emphasis added.)
Because this court must assume that " the legislature [does] not intend to enact meaningless provisions and " that there is a purpose behind every sentence, clause, or phrase used in an act and that no part of a statute is superfluous"; Dorry v. Garden, supra, 313 Conn. 525; the narrow language of these subsections is significant. As evidenced by the above cited subsections of § 52-557b, had the legislature intended to broaden immunity to employers of those listed as qualified for immunity or to include, specifically, for-profit businesses that provide emergency medical services, such as the defendant, then the legislature could have done so as it had when it expanded immunity to railroad companies in Subsection (d) and corporations exempt from federal income taxation under § 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in subsection (e). If entities are mentioned in § 52-557b, the statute specifically identifies the type of entity and the specific circumstances under which immunity would extend to such entities. There is no ambiguity that entities or employers similar to or the same as the defendant are not deemed qualified for immunity.
In addition, reading the plain language of the statute to confer immunity on for-profit business entities, in general or in their capacity as employers, would lead to absurd results in that it would abrogate the common law in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to do so. " [U]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer generally is liable for intentional torts committed by his employees to the same extent that he is liable for damages arising out of the negligent or reckless conduct of those employees." Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 840 n.16, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). " It is well settled that [i]n determining whether or not a statute abrogates or modifies a common-law rule the construction must be strict, and the operation of a statute in derogation of the common law is to be limited to matters clearly brought within its scope . . . Although the legislature may eliminate a common-law right by statute, the presumption that the legislature does not have such a purpose can be overcome only if the legislative intent is clearly and plainly expressed . . . We recognize only those alterations of the common law that are clearly expressed in the language of the statute because the traditional principles of justice upon which the common law is founded should be perpetuated." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rumbin v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., 254 Conn. 259, 265-66, 757 A.2d 526 (2000).
Subsection (b) states that the individuals listed " shall not be liable to such person assisted for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency first aid, which may constitute ordinary negligence . . . The immunity provided in this subsection does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross, wilful or wanton negligence ." (Emphasis added.) The provisions of subsection (b) necessitate that the trial court determine (1) whether the individual who allegedly caused harm to the plaintiff is within the classes of people set out in the statute, and (2) whether the acts allegedly causing the harm constituted ordinary negligence or gross, wilful, or wanton negligence. Because a trial court must make a finding of negligence, the effect of immunity under this statute is not that an individual was not negligent. Rather, the effect is that if an individual is found to have committed harmful acts that a trial court finds to be ordinary negligence, then that individual is exonerated from liability. A finding of immunity for ordinary negligence is not the same as a finding that the individual did not act negligently. Accordingly, for the purposes of applying § 52-557b(b), if a trial court determines that an employee's act was negligent, whether ordinary or gross, this determination would necessarily implicate an employer's liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
There is no express intent in subsection (b) or other subsections of § 52-557b to alter the common-law rule regarding the liability of employers, like the defendant, in the present case under respondeat superior. Only subsection (d) references alteration of employer liability, but this subsection is narrowly stated to apply to railroad companies that provide emergency medical training or equipment to employees that meet the criteria of subsection (c). To conclude that § 52-557b(b) vicariously immunizes entities such as the defendant when there is no clear intent from the statute's plain language to alter the common law would be in derogation of the common law and beyond this court's authority. See Osborn v. Elm City Livery, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. X02-CV-00-0167619-S (August 2, 2002, Sheldon, J.) (32 Conn.L.Rptr. 620, 621, ) (" [I]t is not this Court's job to write new laws, but rather to enforce such laws as the legislature has enacted. Here, then, the Court must be guided by the legislature's words, not by its own sense of what might be good public policy"). As a result of applying our well-established and controlling principles of statutory interpretation to § 52-557b, it is inapplicable to AMR as a matter of law.
2
Extratextual Evidence
The above analysis is dispositive of the determination regarding the issue of whether AMR is afforded immunity through its employees. Nevertheless, extratextual evidence--that is instructive in understanding and interpreting § 52-557b merits discussion given the absence of authority on the specific question of immunity presented here.
a
Background on § 52-557b
The nomenclature " Good Samaritan" finds its origin in a Bible parable. In this parable, " a man on the way from Jerusalem to Jericho is robbed, beaten, and left for dead. Two passers-by of significant social and religious status see the injured man, but choose to cross to the other side of the road. A third traveler of less repute, a Samaritan, comes to the man's aid, takes him to an inn, tends to him through the night, and then pays the innkeeper the next morning to continue the man's care." TransCare Maryland, Inc. v. Murray, 431 Md. 225, 227, 64 A.3d 887 (2013).
This parable was also referenced during the 1963 Senate session when this state first considered passage of a Good Samaritan law: " I would recall though in discussing the name of this bill that the story of the good Samaritan recalls tells [sic] of two or three Levites who passed by and left the man lying by the road before the good Samaritan came along." 10 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1963 Sess., p. 1692 (remarks of Senator Falsey).
The Maryland Supreme Court in TransCare Maryland, Inc. also provided a succinct overview of the foundation of Good Samaritan laws: " Under the common law, there is no general duty to provide assistance to those in peril . . . Moreover, under general principles of tort law, one who voluntarily chooses to aid another owes that person a duty of care; a failure to exercise such care may result in legal liability . . . This risk of potential liability led to the unsatisfactory result that health care professionals capable and willing to provide emergency medical services had (in theory, at least) a disincentive to do so.
" Beginning in California in 1959, legislatures in every state enacted laws designed to eliminate this disincentive and to encourage medical professionals (and often, volunteers in general) to provide emergency assistance by granting them immunity from liability for ordinary negligence . . . From the outset, such laws have generally been labeled the 'Good Samaritan Act' or 'Good Samaritan Law, ' both in Maryland and elsewhere." (Citations omitted.) TransCare Maryland, Inc. v. Murray, supra, 431 Md. at 232-33. The history of Connecticut's Good Samaritan law begins with Public Act 63-205. When enactment of a Good Samaritan law was proposed to the General Assembly, the debate among legislatures focused on the central purpose of the bill and the scope of immunity provided by the bill. See 10 H.R. Proc., Pt. 3, 1963 Sess., p. 1172-83; 10 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1963 Sess., p. 1682-95. As to the central purpose of the bill, there was discussion as to whether the bill would be enacted with the purpose of protecting physicians from exposure to liability or of ensuring the public health and safety in that those in peril at the scene of an accident would be assisted. In introducing the bill in the House of Representatives, Representative Later stated: " This is known as the Good Samaritan bill that simply provides that no physician, who in good faith, renders emergency care shall be liable for civil damages where he renders such care without compensation. It provides [that] doctors as a practical result [do] not stop at the scene of an accident now because we are afraid of being sued. But the doctor, a trained person who can best render aid. This bill simply provides that when a doctor treats without compensation is an emergency that he shall not be liable for damages." 10 H.R. Proc., supra, p. 1173; see also id., 1176 (remarks of Representative Durtis: " I lived many years with my doctor brother in New York and he would never stop and give assistance out in a public accident because he was afraid of the suits that would be brought against him for giving aid to the needy and that is one thing that we need this bill very badly").
To the contrary, Representative Cunningham remarked: " Mr. Speaker, maybe the intent of this bill is to protect doctors, but I think that the real purpose is to protect ourselves and if we get into some accident on the highway or someplace else it would be very nice to know that the doctors weren't just sailing by because they were afraid of being sued." Id., 1175; see also id., 1179 (remarks of Representative Belden: " [I]t isn't a question of [that] doctors favor this legislation or not, it's a question of what we think is right for the best interest of the public."), 1176 (remarks of Representative Stevens: " It has been said that doctors have been sued that is because the doctors are afraid to stop and this should be brought out because I think this would help the general public not the doctors"), 1180 (remarks of Representative Satter: " I think this bill reflects in a way the kind of judgment sometimes legislators have to make. Namely, a balance of the public interest. In this case two considerations. On the one hand relieving a doctor of liability in an emergency situation where he may be clearly at fault and on the other hand being certain that medical attention will be afforded to a person on the scene of an accident. Seems to me that when the balance is stated in that way it should be on the side of assuring there will be adequate medical attention at the scene of an accident."); 10 S. Proc., supra, p. 1686 (remarks of Senator Falsey: " I don't think that we should approach this bill from the point of view of protecting doctors. Testimony that I've heard is to get treatment for people who need it . . ."
Given the above cited perspectives on Public Act 63-205, it is clear that while the legislature understood that the provisions would necessarily benefit physicians in that they would not face liability for ordinary negligence during the course of providing assistance in emergency situations, the primary purpose of the proposed Good Samaritan law was to protect the public and ensure its safety. The Good Samaritan law would have the effect of incentivizing physicians to respond to medical emergencies with the ultimate goal of enhancing public safety and assuring the public that they are more likely than not to get medical assistance in dire situations.
As to the scope of the bill, there were discussions during both the House and Senate sessions regarding inclusion of individuals who are not licensed to practice medicine by law, but are still qualified to provide certain medical treatment or assistance in emergencies such as nurses and police officers. See 10 H.R. Proc., Pt. 3, supra, p. 1174 (remarks of Representative Keilty), 1174-75 (remarks of Representative Bigos), 1175 (remarks of Representative McLoughlin). The remarks addressing expansion of the Good Samaritan law to include more than licensed physicians concerned the reality that there were categories of professionals who were trained or otherwise qualified to also render medical assistance. In response to these remarks, other legislators expressed that, at the time of the bill's proposal, no concerns were raised as to liability of nurses or firefighters. 10 H.R. Proc., Pt. 3, supra, p. 1174 (remarks of Representative Later: " The serious problem has been with the doctors, we have heard of nothing nor was one stated at the hearing where nurses had ever been sued. The doctors are the ones who are"), 1176 (remarks of Representative Spiegel: " At no time during the hearings, not until I just walked into this room, had anyone ever advised of his desire to have nurses included, police included, or anyone else . . . [I]t is not felt that there is any need has been demonstrated on behalf of nurses policeman or anyone else . . ."). Thus, the opposition to inclusion of other categories of people qualifying for immunity expressed the belief that the focus should be on physicians when the main concern brought forward was lawsuits against physicians and the effect of those lawsuits on the public safety. Id.
Furthermore, legislators expressed concerns about extending immunity to more people as a general matter. See 10 H.R. Proc., Pt. 3, supra, p. 1177-78 (remarks of Representative Scoville: " Pretty soon it will be the bartender and the bus driver who will want to come in and say as long as I act in good faith there is no reason why I should be liable for my negligent act"), 1178 (remarks of Representative Webber: " I rise to tell you that I'm strongly in favor of this bill and the way it's written. If we include all the other members of the so call army of first aid experts, I can foresee some very serious problems. Some of our so call amateur doctors or some of the people who might have had two weeks of first aid training in the army might stop at the scene of an accident might stop to help a patient and know nothing about what he's doing or in his own mind he would think that he was a graduate physician, that could cause very serious harm to the patient and resulting in the permanent injury. I would suggest very strongly for the reason that the bill remain as it's written"); 10 S. Proc., supra, 1688 (remarks of Senator Relihan regarding proposed amendment to remove " licensed under the provisions of Chapter 370 of the General Statutes or members of the same profession licensed to practice in any other State of the United States": " I feel that this amendment would extend immunity to 'witch doctors and herb doctors' and all sorts of other people who come along and render assistance and do more harm than good"), 1688 (remarks of Senator Gladstone: " [This amendment] would permit anybody stopping along the way to render voluntarily and seriously medical aid to an injured person without any regard to any liability for any service he did. I think that's an extremely dangerous and should not be passed").
Given the statute's current language, § 52-557b evidently expanded to cover more categories of people than contemplated at its inception in 1963. The significance of the above cited legislative history, however, is the overall sentiment expressed by various legislators toward broadening the reach of immunity. The overall sentiment was concern that expanding the scope of immunity would lead to abuse of immunity and to harm to the public. Moreover, § 52-557b came into its current form over a long history of amendments starting in 1967 into 2011. The specific categories of individuals that qualify for immunity under § 52-557b have expanded over a number of years by legislative fiat and have been narrowly defined within § 52-557b. To date, the history of § 52-557b suggests that the preservation of public health and safety has been the main public policy goal underlying the provisions of § 52-557b and that the means of fulfilling this public policy goal was to create an incentive in the form of immunity. See 12 H.R. Proc. 1967 Sess., p. 3584 (remarks of Representative Neiditz and Representative Lenge regarding expansion of immunity to firefighters, police officers, and ambulance personnel).
If this court were to construe the statute in the way that the defendants propose, it could increase harm to the public, which the legislature sought to avoid by creating the incentive of immunity. It would diminish the general legal accountability that employers have for the harmful actions of their employees. It may motivate for-profit business entities to cut costs wherever they can. For example, such a construction of § 52-557b could incentivize for-profit business entities and employers, like the defendant, to take shortcuts in training and reeducation. As a result, harmful acts by their employees may touch the boundary of gross negligence such that immunity would apply, exonerate the employees and their employers, and severely limit injured plaintiffs' sources of compensation for their injuries. Had the legislature intended to alter the liability of employers for the harmful acts of their employees in the specific context of rendering emergency medical services, it would have done so explicitly as exemplified by the addition of § 52-557b(e) and as discussed earlier in this court's discussion. On the basis of the conclusions drawn from the legislative history construing § 52-557b to include for-profit business entities and employers of individuals covered by the statute would undermine the legislative intent of the statute.
b
Relevant Judicial Authorities from Connecticut and Outside Jurisdictions
Our courts have favorably cited to the Restatement (Second) on Agency as reliable authority on the law of agency. See Alvarez v. New Haven Register, 249 Conn. 709, 722, 735 A.2d 306 (1999) (regarding damages); Maag v. Homechek Real Estate Services, Inc., 82 Conn.App. 201, 208, 843 A.2d 619, cert. denied, 269 Conn. 908, 852 A.2d 737 (2004) (citing to Alvarez ); Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 503-04, 656 A.2d 1009 (1995) (regarding damages). In analogous cases to the present case, our Superior Courts have also cited to the Restatement (Second) on Agency as prevailing common law and as support in concluding that our law on agency does not support the proposition that an agent's immunity from liability is reciprocal to the principal.
In Avenoso v. Mangan, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-05-4009152-S (February 14, 2016, Tanzer, J.) (40 Conn.L.Rptr. 637, ), the court decided a similar question of immunity on a motion for summary judgment. The defendants, a volunteer soccer coach and soccer club, moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' negligence claims on the ground that the coach was immune from liability under the federal Volunteer Protection Act (VPA) and that because the coach was immune then the soccer club was also immune given the plaintiffs' claims against the club were based solely on vicarious liability. Id., 639, . Although the Act specifically states that the immunity afforded to volunteers does not affect the liability of nonprofit organizations and governmental entities for the resulting harm, the trial court noted: " Such a result is consistent with the prevailing common-law rule that '[i]n an action against a principal based on the conduct of a servant in the course of employment . . . [t]he principal has no defense because of the fact that . . . the agent had an immunity from civil liability as to the act.' 1 Restatement (Second) Agency § 217, pp. 468-75 (1958)." (Emphasis added.) Id., 640, .
Section 14503 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides in relevant part: " [N]o volunteer of a nonprofit organization or governmental entity shall be liable for harm caused by an act or omission of the volunteer on behalf of the organization or entity if . . . (1) the volunteer was acting within the scope of the volunteer's responsibility in the nonprofit organization or governmental entity at the time of the act or omission, [and] (3) the harm was not caused by willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the individual harmed by the volunteer . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 14503(a)(1), (3).
Subsection (c) of 42 U.S.C. § 14503 provides: " Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the liability of any nonprofit organization or governmental entity with respect to harm caused to any person."
The trial court, Cosgrove, J., also favorably cited 1 Restatement (Second) Agency § 217 in denying a motion for summary judgment on the ground that even though the fire marshal, the agent, was afforded statutory immunity, the Mystic Fire District, a political subdivision and principal, could not also claim immunity from vicarious liability under what is now General Statutes § 29-298(c). See Pinos v. Mystic Fire District, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV-09-5012096-S, (March 30, 2011). In Pinos, the court disagreed with the Mystic Fire District's argument that because its agent was immune liability, that it, as the principal, was also immune. Id. In addition to looking at the plain language of the statute to find that it did not include municipal fire districts, the court stated: " [U]nder the law of agency, the fact that the fire marshal, acting as an agent of the Mystic Fire District, has statutory immunity does not affect the Mystic Fire District's liability to the plaintiff. According to the Restatement (Second), Agency § 217: 'In an action against a principal based on the conduct of a servant in the course of employment . . . (b) The principal has no defense because of the fact that . . . (ii) the agent had an immunity from civil liability as to the act.' Comment (b) to Restatement (Second), Agency § 217 provides in relevant part: '[W]here the principal directs an agent to act, or the agent acts in the scope of employment, the fact that the agent has an immunity from liability does not bar a civil action against the principal.' 'Immunities exist because of an overriding public policy which serves to protect an admitted wrongdoer from civil liability. They are strictly personal to the individual and cannot be shared.' 1 Restatement (Second), Agency § 347, comment (a) (1958)." Id.
General Statutes § 29-298 (c) provides: " No local fire marshal, deputy fire marshal, fire inspector or other inspector or investigator acting for a local fire marshal, who is charged with the enforcement of this part, may be held personally liable for any damage to persons or property that may result from any action that is required or permitted in the discharge of his official duties while acting for a municipality or fire district. Any legal proceeding brought against any such fire marshal, deputy fire marshal, fire inspector or other inspector or investigator because of any such action shall be defended by such municipality or fire district. No such fire marshal, deputy fire marshal, fire inspector or other inspector or investigator may be held responsible for or charged with the costs of any such legal proceeding. Any officer of a local fire marshal's office, if acting without malice and in good faith, shall be free from all liability for any action or omission in the performance of his official duties."
Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly applied a plain language analysis and looked to principles of common law to determine whether statutory immunity, in the context of medical treatment, extends to employers or entities. These courts found that because the statutes at issue did not explicitly include employers, institutions, or corporations, immunity could not extend to these entities; in the absence of explicit language including such entities, these courts concluded that the legislature intended to exclude them and include only those categories of individuals enumerated in the statutes. Moreover, these courts looked to 1 Restatement (Second) Agency § 217 to conclude that inclusion of entities and employers would be in derogation of the common law embodied in § 217 and in their jurisdictions' case law given the absence of clear statutory language or legislative intent to alter the common law. See e.g., Taplin v. Chatham, 390 Mass. 1, 4, 453 N.E.2d 421 (1983) (concluding that language of immunity statute specifically stated that enumerated individuals would not " be personally in any way liable, " that evidence that legislature did not intend to immunize employers whose employees qualified for immunity, and that common-law rule as set out in case law and in Restatement (Second) on Agency, stating that agent's liability does not extend to principal, supported proposition that immunity statute did not extend to defendant municipal employer); Murray v. Plainfield Rescue Squad, 210 N.J. 581, 592-96, 46 A.3d 1262 (2012) (concluding that plain language of immunity statute that included rescue squad members, but not rescue squad entity, that no evidence showed legislative intent to include rescue squad as entity, and that common-law rule as set out in case law and in Restatement (Second) of Agency, stating that agent's liability does not extend to principal, supported proposition that immunity statute did not extend to rescue squad as entity); Regester v. Chester, 568 Pa. 410, 421-24, 797 A.2d 898 (2002) (concluding that plain language of immunity statute extended only to designated individuals and did not convey intention to extend immunity to institutional, corporate, and organizational entities, that no evidence showed legislative intent to include these entities, and that common-law rule as set out in case law adopting the Restatement (Second) on Agency, stating that agent's immunity does not confer immunity upon principal, supported proposition that immunity statute did not extend to defendant hospital); Krachman v. Ridgeview Institute, Inc., 301 Ga.App. 361, 363-65, 687 S.E.2d 627 (2009) (concluding that plain language of immunity statute extended only to designated individuals, that no evidence demonstrated legislative intent to confer immunity on hospitals or other mental health facilities, and that common-law rule as set out in case law and in Restatement (Second) of Agency, stating that agent's liability does not extend to principal, supported proposition that immunity statute did not extend to defendant mental health facility).
In the present case, it is undisputed that the alleged harmful acts were done by AMR employees (agents) and that the plaintiffs make claims against AMR in its capacity as the employer (principle) for vicarious liability. In accordance with the above cited authorities, even if this court were to find that AMR's employees, Walts and Ostroff, could be immune from liability, this immunity would be personal to Walts and Ostroff and would not extend to the AMR as the employer. Such a result is not only consistent with prevailing common law, but also with the plain language of the statute that narrowly defines the classes of individuals and entities that qualify for immunity. Therefore, as a matter of law, AMR is not entitled to immunity under § 52-557b(b) for the alleged negligent acts of its employees, Walts and Ostroff.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that AMR is not entitled to immunity under General Statutes § 52-557b as a matter of law and that there exist genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants Walts and Ostroff are entitled to immunity. under the same statute.