Id. at 790, 568 P.2d at 1236. Sena School Bus Co. v. Board of Education, 101 N.M. 26, 677 P.2d 639 (Ct.App. 1984), concerned NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-23, which was challenged on equal protection grounds. That statute placed a two-year statute of limitations on a claim derived from a written contract with government entities.
Despite vocal criticism of the "confusion" created by individualized statutes of limitations, most Federal Courts of Appeals and state courts have continued the settled practice of seeking appropriate factual analogies for each genus of § 1983 claim. See, e. g., Gashgai v. Leibowitz, 703 F.2d 10 (CA1 1983); McClam v. Barry, 225 U.S.App.D.C. 124, 697 F.2d 366 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Brown v. United States, 239 U.S.App.D.C. 345, 742 F.2d 1498 (1984); Blake v. Katter, 693 F.2d 677 (CA7 1982); White v. United Parcel Service, 692 F.2d 1 (CA5 1982); Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, Ohio, 679 F.2d 632 (CA6 1982); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (CA3 1974) (en banc); Miller v. City of Overland Park, 231 Kan. 557, 646 P.2d 1114 (1982); Sena School Bus Co. v. Santa Fe Board of Education, 677 P.2d 639 (N.M.App. 1984); Arquette v. Hancock, 656 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.App. 1983); Moore v. McComsey, 313 Pa. Super. 264, 459 A.2d 841 (1983); Leese v. Doe, 182 N.J. Super, 318, 440 A.2d 1166 (1981). As these courts have recognized:
Id. Defendant also relies on two other cases, Sena Sch. Bus. Co. v. Bd. of Educ., 1984-NMCA-014, 677 P.2d 639, and Gathman-Matotan Architects & Planners, Inc. v. Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 1990-NMSC-013, 787 P.2d 411, which the Court likewise finds distinguishable because they do not analyze the central issue of this case - the applicability of the discovery rule. Defendant argues that Quarrie was decided after this suit and Plaintiff must show that the decision should apply retroactively to this case.
The first reason stems from the fact that governmental entities enter into more contracts than many entities in the private sector. Sena Sch. Bus Co. v. Board of Educ., 101 N.M. 26, 29, 677 P.2d 639, 642 (Ct.App. 1984) (discussing reasonableness of two-year statute of limitations under Section 37-1-23(B) for equal protection analysis). The volume of public contracts is such that unless they are put to writing, the terms as to any one would likely be long forgotten in the event a dispute arose.
See, e.g., Bell v. Chisom, 421 So.2d 1239, 1242 (Ala. 1982); Bonds v. Calif. ex rel. Highway Patrol, 138 Cal.App.3d 314, 322, 187 Cal.Rptr. 792, 797 (1982); Seifert v. Standard Paving Co., 64 Ill.2d 109, 116, 355 N.E.2d 537, 539-41 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Rossetti Contracting Co. v. Court of Claims, 109 Ill.2d 72, 92 Ill.Dec. 521, 485 N.E.2d 332 (1985); Anderson v. City of Detroit, 54 Mich. App. 496, 499, 221 N.W.2d 168, 169-70 (1974); Green-Glo Turf Farms, Inc. v. State, 347 N.W.2d 491, 494-95 (Minn. 1984); Sena School Bus Co. v. Board of Education of Sante Fe Public Schools, 101 N.M. 26, 29, 677 P.2d 639, 642 (N.M.Ct.App. 1984); Lumpkin v. Albany Truck Rental Services, Inc., 70 A.D.2d 441, 442, 421 N.Y.S.2d 714, 716 (N Y App. Div. 1979).Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925, 938 (Utah 1977) (Crockett, J., concurring); see, e.g., Troyer, 722 P.2d at 160-62; infra note 52 and accompanying text; cf. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980) (contrary to reason to deny governmental immunity to a public employer and then grant it to the very employee allegedly causing injury).
Schs., 1984-NMCA-014, ¶ 16, 101 N.M. 26, 677 P.2d 639 ("We do not give advisory opinions.").
Such matters are beyond the scope of this appeal, and we decline to weigh in on them. See James, 1980-NMCA-043, ¶ 9 (providing that our appellate review of a denial of a Rule 1-060(B) motion is limited to whether the denial was an abuse of discretion); cf. Sena Sch. Bus Co. v. Bd. of Educ. of Santa Fe Pub. Schs., 1984-NMCA-014, ¶ 16, 101 N.M. 26, 677 P.2d 639 ("We do not give advisory opinions."). We instead leave them for the district court in the quiet title action to resolve in the first instance as appropriate.
[MIO 3] We disagree. It is not this Court's practice to address issues that are not necessary for the disposition of an appeal, as to do so would be tantamount to providing an advisory opinion, which this Court will not do. Sena Sch. Bus Co. v. Bd. of Educ. of Santa Fe Pub. Schs, 1984-NMCA-014, ¶ 16, 101 N.M. 26, 677 P.2d 639. We therefore do not address the question raised by Plaintiffs. {5} Plaintiffs disagree with the assertion in our notice that expert testimony is needed to value a case for settlement purposes.
We also must not interpret Section 60–1A–28.1 as to future exclusions, as doing so would be improperly advisory. See Sena Sch. Bus Co. v. Bd. of Educ. of Santa Fe Pub. Sch. , 1984–NMCA–014, ¶ 16, 101 N.M. 26, 677 P.2d 639 (stating the rule that this Court does not issue advisory opinions). The district court inexplicably listed Section 60–1A–28.1 as only one of its reasons for granting the summary judgment motions; we must look to the other reasons that the district court enumerated in deciding whether the racetracks are entitled to summary judgment.
1985); (2) what the appropriate standard of review is for that provision; (3) whether the trial de novo pursuant to Section 3-19-8(C) is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine contravening New Mexico Constitution, article III, Section 1; and (4) whether Plaintiffs are required to request a supersedeas and stay pursuant to SCRA 12-207 in pursuing an appeal in this case. See Sena School Bus Co. v. Board of Educ., 101 N.M. 26, 29, 677 P.2d 639, 642 (Ct.App. 1984). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court's order on the jurisdictional issues of standing and timeliness of filing the petition for writ of certiorari and remand to the district court for determinations consistent with this opinion.