Opinion
NO. 2012-CA-000167-MR
04-19-2013
ELIZABETH SELLIN APPELLANT v. EDUCATION PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS BOARD APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Charles W. Arnold Lexington, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Whitney A. Crowe Frankfort, Kentucky Cassie L. Trueblood Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 11-CI-01551
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: ACREE, CHIEF JUDGE; KELLER AND MAZE, JUDGES. MAZE, JUDGE: Appellant, Elizabeth Sellin (hereinafter "Sellin") appeals the Franklin Circuit Court's order dismissing her suit against Appellee, the Education Professional Standards Board (hereinafter "EPSB"). Sellin's suit sought a hearing on the merits of an accusation of misconduct against her which the EPSB dismissed prior to a hearing being held. Having reviewed the record in this case, we find that the trial court properly dismissed Sellin's suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judge Michelle M. Keller concurred in this opinion prior to her appointment to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Release of this opinion was delayed by administrative handling.
Background
The trial court's summary of the uncontroverted facts best relates the events giving rise to this appeal and we include it below.
The EPSB is the state agency responsible for teacher certification in Kentucky. Included in the EPSB's jurisdiction is the power to revoke, suspend or refuse to issue or reissue certificates granted by the EPSB. On May 27, 2009, the EPSB received a complaint from a parent that Plaintiff Sellin struck a student during class. The superintendant of Jessamine County Schools, Lu Young, also sent a report regarding the matter pursuant to her duty as a local superintendant to report teacher misconduct under KRS 161.120(2). According to the Jessamine County Board of Education minutes from June 29, 2009, [Sellin] was issued a public reprimand for the incident.(Internal citations omitted).
On July 7, 2009, the EPSB initiated disciplinary case #0907442 against Plaintiff Sellin based on the allegations from the parent and Lu Young. The EPSB sent notification of the complaint by certified mail to Sellin. Counsel for Sellin filed a rebuttal to the charges, which was presented to the EPSB, along with a summary of the allegations, on September 14, 2009. The EPSB voted to admonish [Sellin] for using inappropriate force with a student.
On October 13, 2009, the [EPSB] received notice that Sellin wanted to appeal her admonishment pursuant to [KRS] 161.120(4). The admonishment issued by the EPSB was set aside pursuant to the statute, and the case was assigned to its counsel, Hon. Alicia Sneed, to fully investigate and prepare for an administrative hearing. After attempting and failing to reach a settlement in the matter, Sneed recommended to the EPSB that the case be
dismissed. After again reviewing the matter at its September 21, 2010 meeting, the EPSB dismissed Sellin's disciplinary case. On October 21, 2011, Sellin filed the complaint in the present case.
Kentucky Revised Statutes
While the complaint was dismissed, the order dismissing stated, "[t]he dismissal may not be based upon the merits of the case, but rather some other aspect, such as weak facts, incomplete reporting, lack of cooperation from witnesses, etc.; therefore, subsequent action on this complaint is not prohibited." This order, along with record of the complaint, remained in Sellin's EPSB file after dismissal.
Sellin asked the trial court to order the EPSB to hold an administrative hearing on the merits of the claim against her. As the basis for this claim, Sellin argued that, although the claim was dismissed, it was subject to re-opening at any time. Sellin argued that she was entitled to full due process in eliminating the possibility of future action against her, as well as in clearing her name and reputation. EPSB moved the trial court to dismiss Sellin's suit and the trial court granted the motion, finding that the EPSB's dismissal of the complaint "granted [Sellin] all the relief to which she is entitled" and ended the adverse action of the EPSB against her. The trial court found Sellin's claim of possible future action "highly speculative" and "insufficient to support the finding of a current case or controversy that would make this dispute justiciable." Accordingly, the trial court held that the case must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under CR 12.02. This appeal follows.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
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Standard of Review
In asking for an administrative hearing, Sellin seeks this Court's review of the trial court's order dismissing her suit for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. "The court should not grant [a motion to dismiss] unless it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of his claim." In making this decision, the circuit court is not required to make any factual determination; rather, the question is purely a matter of law. James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 883-84 (Ky. App. 2002) (quoting Pari-Mutuel Clerk's Union v. Kentucky Jockey Club, 551 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ky. 1977)). Stated another way, the court must ask if the facts alleged in the complaint can be proved, would the plaintiff be entitled to relief? Id. Hence, through the lens of this question, we review the trial court's order dismissing de novo.
Analysis
"It is fundamental that a court must have jurisdiction before it has authority to decide a case. Jurisdiction is the ubiquitous procedural threshold through which all cases and controversies must pass." Wilson v. Russell, 162 S.W.3d 911, 913 (Ky. 2005). If no case or controversy exists, the court lacks jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Maricle, 15 S.W.3d 376 (Ky. 2000). Furthermore, "a court will not decide speculative rights or duties which may or may not arise in the future, but only rights and duties about which there is a present actual controversy presented by adversary parties, and in which a binding judgment concluding the controversy may be entered." Veith v. City of Louisville, 355 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Ky. 1962). Under this premise, the trial court determined that EPSB's dismissal, without prejudice, of its complaint against Sellin eliminated any case or controversy which then existed. The trial court concluded that it was then required to dismiss the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the issue. We agree.
KRS 161.120 states, in relevant part,
(5) (a) The Education Professional Standards Board shall schedule and conduct a hearing in accordance with KRS Chapter 13B:
1. Before revoking, suspending, refusing to renew, imposing probationary or supervisory conditions upon, issuing a written reprimand, or any combination of these actions regarding any certificate;(9) The board may reconsider, modify, or reverse its decision on any disciplinary action.
2. After denying an application for a certificate, upon written request filed within thirty (30) days of receipt of the letter advising of the denial; or
3. After issuing a written admonishment, upon written request for a hearing filed within thirty (30) days of receipt of the written admonishment . . . .
A "case or controversy" ceased to exist in the present case when the EPSB exercised its statutory right under KRS 161.120(9) to modify and reverse its decision to admonish Sellin. At all points since dismissal of the claim, there was no party which represented interests adverse to those Sellin now asserts. Hence, by its very definition in the law, no "controversy" exists. Further, Sellin's argument that the potential for future action by the EPSB entitles her to a hearing asks this court to make a finding regarding speculative rights under speculative circumstances. Pursuant to Veith, we refuse to make such a finding. In sum, a case or controversy does not exist for purposes of CR 12.02 and Sellin's claim, even if proven, could not be successful under any set of facts. Therefore, the trial court properly dismissed Sellin's case.
Conclusion
The trial court having properly found that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of Sellin's claim, the order of the Franklin Circuit Court dismissing that claim is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Charles W. Arnold
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Whitney A. Crowe
Frankfort, Kentucky
Cassie L. Trueblood
Frankfort, Kentucky