" '[W]here adoption of a particular legal standard dictates the outcome of a case based on undisputed facts, we may address that issue as a question of law.' " Kelly v. Nicholson, 463 F.3d 1349, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (quoting Halpern v. Principi, 384 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see Sellers v. Wilkie, 965 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Robinson v. O'Rourke, 891 F.3d 976, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Groves v. Peake, 524 F.3d 1306, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The Secretary has not shown that the facts that are material under the correct standard are in dispute, and on those facts, the post-Act version of the fee statute applies.
See Akers v. Shinseki, 673 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012) ("[T]to qualify as an informal claim, a communication must: (1) be in writing; (2) indicate an intent to apply for benefits; and (3) identify the benefits sought."); Sellers v. Wilkie, 965 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
Mrs. Evans's arguments that the VA failed to fulfill its "duty to assist" Mr. Evans in filing and substantiating his claim depend on the unreviewable factual determination that Mr. Evans did not file a claim on October 4, 1969. Appellant's Br. 13; see also Sellers v. Wilkie, 965 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (explaining that the "duty to assist begins upon receipt of a formal [or informal] claim that identifies the medical condition for which benefits are sought"). Accordingly, we cannot address that issue.
A "[v]eteran need not refer explicitly to the name of an illness, injury, or condition" on his claim form. Sellers v. Wilkie, 965 F.3d 1328, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) upheld the Board of Veterans' Appeals' denial of the earlier effective date based on its finding that Mr. Sampson's original claim did not show an intent to claim benefits for sleep apnea. See Sampson v. Wilkie, No. 19-1638, 2020 WL 2296966, at *2 (Vet. App. May 8, 2020); see also Sellers v. Wilkie, 965 F.3d 1328, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2020) ("The essential requirements of any claim, whether formal or informal are: (1) an intent to apply for benefits, (2) an indication of the benefits sought, and (3) a communication in writing.") (quoting Browoski v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 79, 84 (2009)). The Veterans Court noted that Mr. Sampson's initial claim specifically requested that the VA "consider this an application for service connected disability for PTSD."
We emphasize that this inquiry does not require that the VA embark on a fishing expedition to explore any potential condition which the record may support as a basis for benefits, nor does the VA have to attempt to read the mind of the claimant; the VA need only explore those conditions which may be reasonably considered within the scope of the claim. See Sellers v. Wilkie , 965 F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (holding that a veteran's claim must identify, "at least at a high level of generality," the sickness, disease, or injuries for which compensation is sought and that 38 C.F.R. ยง 3.159, that is, the VA's duty to assist in developing claims, only applies once the VA "comprehends the current condition [up]on which the claim is based").A main concern raised by the government and by the Veterans Court with respect to applying the Clemons lenient-claim-scope rule to a request to reopen filing is that doing so "ignores important principles regarding the finality of decisions."