Had the framers intended to create, as matter of constitutional, rather than statutory, law, a State Merit System which included features such as tenure and the right of appeal, they could have so provided. See McCafferty v. Medical College of Ga., 249 Ga. 62, 68 ( 287 SE2d 171) (1982) (constitutional provision granting Board of Regents " `the powers and duties as provided by law existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1945. . .'"), overruled on other grounds, Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78, 80 (1) ( 377 SE2d 674) (1989). However, they did not do so. Nothing in Art. IV, Sec. III, Par.
See OCGA § 50-21-1; Ga. L. 1982, p. 495, a statute waiving sovereign immunity for actions ex contractu.McCafferty, a 4-3 decision, was recently overruled as to the meaning of the words "sue and be sued" in the case of Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78, 80 ( 377 S.E.2d 674) (1989). In Self we said: "We now hold that in any instances in which an entity is given the power `to sue and be sued' that language means only that the entity has the status and capacity to enter our courts, and does not signify a waiver of sovereign immunity against suit."
(c) Appellant's contention that the Authority and Grady have waived sovereign immunity due to the legislative grant to the hospital authorities established under the Hospital Authorities Law of the power to "sue and be sued" (OCGA § 31-7-75) is without merit. Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78, 80 (1) ( 377 S.E.2d 674); Litterilla, supra at 346. Further, appellant's argument that Self should not be given retroactive operation was decided adversely to this contention in Litterilla.
" (Emphasis supplied.) Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78, 80 (1) ( 377 S.E.2d 674) (1989). This unequivocal ruling means that Knowles, Shubert, and Andrews are no longer controlling, and since the "sovereign immunity rule [as it existed] prior to 1973 has now been made a part of our Constitution," Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 133 (1) ( 249 S.E.2d 573) (1978), the application of the immunity doctrine to hospital authorities must be determined by reference to the constitutional provision.
In fact, the Authority, here, may be entitled to immunity from suit under Georgia law. Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78, 377 S.E.2d 674 (1989). However, a defendant may not "conflate sovereign immunity with regard to a state created tort with Eleventh Amendment immunity for a federal cause of action."
That case held: "we construe the intent of the General Assembly on reiterating the sue or be sued language to be an express waiver of sovereign immunity for hospital authorities." Id. at 426, 297 S.E.2d 28. Andrews was overruled, however, in Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78, 377 S.E.2d 674 (1989). In Self, the Georgia Supreme Court stated:
And we have applied this principle in many cases since. See, e.g., Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys. v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657, 658 (2), 469 S.E.2d 22 (1996) ; City of Thomaston v. Bridges, 264 Ga. 4, 6, 439 S.E.2d 906 (1994) ; Toombs County v. O'Neal, 254 Ga. 390, 391-392 (2), 330 S.E.2d 95 (1985) ; Aldrich v. State, 220 Ga. 132, 135, 137 S.E.2d 463 (1964) ; Hancock, 211 Ga. at 432 (1), 86 S.E.2d 511 ; Griffin v. Vandegriff, 205 Ga. 288, 293, 53 S.E.2d 345 (1949) ; see also McCafferty v. Med. Coll. of Ga., 249 Ga. 62, 70, 287 S.E.2d 171 (1982) (Gregory, J., concurring specially), overruled on other grounds by Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78, 79 (1), 377 S.E.2d 674 (1989) (adopting special concurrence). Many of our sister states apply a similar principle.
Only that interpretation incorporated into the Constitution concerns us in this particular case. McCafferty v. Med. Coll. of Ga., 249 Ga. 62, 70, 287 S.E.2d 171 (1982) (Gregory, J., concurring specially) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78, 79 (1), 377 S.E.2d 674 (1989) (adopting special concurrence). See also Griffin v. Vandegriff, 205 Ga. 288, 291(1), 53 S.E.2d 345 (1949) ; Scalia & Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322-326 (West 2012) (explaining the prior-construction canon that if a provision is enacted with words or phrases that had previously received authoritative construction by a jurisdiction's court of last resort, the words and phrases are to be understood according to that construction).
We limit our review here to that issue. The Court of Appeals held, in part, (1) that the Hospital is a governmental entity that is entitled to sovereign immunity unless it is waived; (2) that under the rule of Self v. City of Atlanta, 259 Ga. 78 ( 377 S.E.2d 674) (1989) the "sue and be sued" language in the Hospital's enabling statute does not constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity; (3) that Self must be applied retroactively. Hospital Auth., supra. Although there is arguable merit to the position that hospital authorities are not entitled to assert sovereign immunity, we do not presently address this issue.
Id. at 734, 95 S.E.2d 659. More than three decades later, Knowles was overruled by Self v. City of Atlanta , 259 Ga. 78, 377 S.E.2d 674 (1989), which found that the "sue and be sued" language "should be read as providing an entity with the status and capacity to enter courts, not as waiving sovereign immunity." Id. at 79-80 (1), 377 S.E.2d 674.