Opinion
Civil 3:19-CV-1089
06-16-2023
SELECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE SOUTHEAST, Plaintiff, v. WINOLA CONSTRUCTION CORP., et al., Defendants.
Mariani, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Introduction
In litigation there is often a direct correlation between the outcome achieved by a party and the effort expended by that party. We are reminded of this truism as we turn to the instant case. This lawsuit involves breach of contract claims relating to the alleged failure of the defendants, Winola Construction and William Buckley, to pay the full premiums owed on policies issued to the defendants by Selective Insurance Company.
Selective Insurance has now filed a motion for summary judgment, which asserts that it is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. (Doc. 7). This motion is supported by some four hundred pages of exhibits, consisting largely of the pertinent insurance policies, along with a detailed affidavit describing the policy terms, and the chronology of the defendants' alleged non-payment of full premiums following a premium audit conducted by Selective Insurance pursuant to the terms of these insurance policies. (Id.)
Presented with this potentially dispositive motion, the defendants repeatedly failed to respond to the motion within the time frame prescribed by the rules of this court. This neglect on the defendants' part compelled the court to enter a show cause order directing the defendants to respond to the motion by a date certain or be deemed not to oppose the motion. The defendants failed to comply with this order, filing their brief several days after this court ordered deadline. Moreover, the two-page brief initially submitted by the defendants failed to comply with the requirements prescribed by the rules of this court, was utterly unsupported by any evidentiary material, and was woefully inadequate as a response to a summary judgment motion. Furthermore, despite being provided additional opportunities to correct these flaws, the defendants have steadfastly failed to do so.
On these facts, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that summary judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff on this contractual claim.
II. Factual Background and Procedural History
On June 25, 2019, Selective Insurance Company filed a complaint against Winola Construction, and one of its principals, William Buckley. (Doc. 1). This complaint alleged that the defendants had acquired commercial and workers' compensation insurance policies from Selective in December of 2016, but had failed to pay the full premium due and owning on these policies. Thus, according to the complaint the defendants owed some $139,000 in unpaid premiums. (Id.) Based upon these averments, Selective brought breach of contract, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims against Winola and Buckley. (Id.)
Following service of this complaint upon the defendants in October of 2019 Selective provided initial discovery disclosures to the defense consisting of some 469 pages of material. (Doc. 10, Ex. A). Despite these fulsome initial disclosures by Selective, it is undisputed that Winola and Buckley never provided reciprocal initial reciprocal disclosures to Selective at this time.
After a number of months of inaction on the part of the defendants, on March 3, 2020, Selective Insurance filed a motion for summary judgment, along with a brief, a proposed statement of undisputed material facts, an affidavit from Dedra Johnson, an employee of Selective Insurance, and more than 400 pages of supporting exhibits. This thoroughly documented summary judgment motion explained that on December 15, 2016, Selective issued two insurance policies to the defendants.
Insurance Policy No. S 214877502 was a commercial insurance policy issued to “WINOLA CONSTRUCTION CORP WILLIAM BUCKLEY” as insureds. This policy set forth an estimated premium but also specifically provided notice to Winola and Buckley that the commercial policy was issued “with an estimated premium” and following the expiration of the policy, information would be obtained from defendants through a contractually approved audit process “to determine the final premium under the policy.” Thus, the defendants were on written notice that the final, full amount of the premium would be set after this audit took place.
During the course of the commercial policy's one year term, endorsements were executed which affected the amount of the premium owed under the policy. After the expiration of the commercial policy, Selective conducted the audit provided for by the policy and issued a Final Audit Statement, which assessed an additional premium of $44,096, for a total final premium amount due under the policy of $79,281. Presented with this audit result and invoice, Winola only made a partial payment of $40,225, leaving an unpaid balance of approximately $39,056.
On December 15, 2016, Selective also issued a workers' compensation insurance policy to Winola and Buckley. Like the commercial policy, this workers compensation policy was issued “with an estimated premium” and with the express written understanding that, following the expiration of the policy, information would be obtained from Winola through an audit process “to determine the final premium under the policy.” The initial estimated premium was on this workers' compensation policy was $47,065. During the course of the policy's one year term, endorsements were executed which affected the amount owed under the premium. After the expiration of the workers' compensation policy Selective conducted the audit provided for by the terms of the po0licy and issued a Final Audit Statement, which assessed an additional premium of $100,328, for a total final premium of $153,825.
Once again Winola only made a partial payment on this policy remitting payments totaling $53,497. Thus, the outstanding premium balance still owed under the workers' compensation policy was approximately $100,328, and the total amount owed on both policies was initially calculated at $139,384. On or about March 1, 2019, Selective submitted an invoice to Winola and Buckley for the outstanding balance of $139,384 owed on both policies, but that invoice remained unpaid.
Based upon this straightforward factual narrative, Selective sought summary judgment in its favor on these breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit claims. Selective having filed this summary judgment motion on March 3, 2020, under the rules of this court Winola and Buckley had 21 days in which to respond to the motion. This motion response deadline passed without any action whatsoever on the defendants' part to respond to the motion. Ultimately some seven weeks after the motion was filed, on April 28, 2020, the district court was compelled to file a show cause order which explained to the defendants in clear and precise terms their responsibilities as litigants, stating that:
On March 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment accompanied by a supporting brief, statement of material facts, and exhibits. (Doc. 7). As of the date of this Order, Defendants have failed to file a brief in opposition to Plaintiff's motion or otherwise respond to the motion.
Pursuant to the Middle District of Pennsylvania Local Rules, “[a] brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.6. “Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion.” Id.
ACCORDINGLY, THIS 28TH DAY OF APRIL, 2020, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT within 7 days of the date of this Order, Defendants shall SHOW CAUSE why this Court should not deem Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment unopposed.(Doc. 8).
The defendants failed to comply with this seven-day filing deadline, which would have required them to file their tardy response no later than May 5, 2020. Instead, they responded to this court's order on May 8, 2020 by filing a two-page opposition to this thoroughly documented summary judgment motion. (Doc. 9). This response was both untimely and inadequate on several scores. Initially it did not comply with our Local Rule 56.1, which directs that:
The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required in the foregoing paragraph, as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Statements of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a motion shall include references to the parts of the record that support the statements.
L.R. 56.1.
In this case, no such statement of facts was provided. In fact, the defense response was utterly devoid of any evidentiary support, was unaccompanied by any affidavit or declaration, and cited to no evidence in the record. Instead, this meager unsigned two-page response consisted of little more than a boilerplate discussion of the legal standard for summary judgment, coupled with a bald and factually unsupported assertion that the defendants disagreed with the premium assessment, along with an equally unsupported claim that the motion was premature. (Id.)
According to the defendants, the motion was premature because some entirely undefined discovery was needed. (Doc. 9, at 2). However, as Selective pointed out in its reply brief, such discovery had been provided by the plaintiffs and it was the defendants who were delinquent and had never provided reciprocal discovery. (Doc. 10). Moreover, it is axiomatic under Rule 56 that a party citing to some alleged need for discovery to respond to a summary judgment motion must explain “by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). Winola and Buckley never tendered the affidavit required by law.
The record on this summary judgment motion remained in this state of disarray for more than a year until July 2, 2021, when the district court, acting with commendable patience, entered an order that directed as follows:
1. Within 21 days of the date of this Order, i.e. July 23, 2021, Defendants shall provide Plaintiff with all initial disclosures required pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1)(A).
2. All fact discovery, limited to the material factual issues set forth supra, shall be completed within 60 days of the date of this Order, i.e. no later than August 31, 2021. No extensions of time to complete discovery will be granted absent compelling circumstances.
3. Defendants shall file a brief in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 7) and response to Plaintiff's Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Doc. 7- 3), no later than September 15, 2021. Plaintiff may file a brief in response to Defendants' opposition brief no later than September 29, 2021.(Doc. 14). The district court later extended this briefing deadline for the defendants to November 1, 2021. (Doc. 26).
Despite receiving these multiple extensions of time, Winola and Buckley never filed a proper brief in opposition to this motion for summary judgment. Instead, the only halting effort they made to litigate this case entailed the filing of a statement of facts, (Doc. 31), on October 29, 2021, which once again was devoid of any evidentiary support, cited to no evidence in the record, and failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1's clear instruction that: “Statements of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a motion shall include references to the parts of the record that support the statements.” L.R. 56.1.
While the defendants remained non-compliant with their summary judgment briefing obligations, Selective Insurance was able to file a reply brief, which further buttressed its motion based upon the initial disclosures belatedly made by the defendants. Those defense disclosures largely confirmed the accuracy of Selective's premium audit. Specifically, in its reply brief Selective Insurance explained that:
Defendants' QuickReport documents and associated handwritten notes reflect $486,429.72 in “drywall” work, which agrees with Selective's rounded $486,430 figure for this work. (ECF No. 21, at 24). Defendants' QuickReport documents reflect payroll of $1,356,284.41 in WC wages for “ceilings” work. (ECF No. 21, at 22-23). This difference of $34,197.60 in ceilings-related payroll, if accurate, is valued at $1,672.26 ($34,197.60 X 4.89% rate for ceiling installation). Defendants' QuickReport documents reflect payroll of $460,053.35 in gross wages for “carpentry” work, with $458,027.60 in WC wages for “carpentry” work after deducting $2,025.75 in OT premium. (ECF No. 21, at 25). This difference of $2,025.75, if accurate, is valued at $226.67 ($2,075.75 X 10.92% rate for carpentry commercial structures). Defendants' payroll records agree that the amount of Clerical Office Employees' payroll during the audit period is $87,385.48. (ECF No. 21, at 21).
Accordingly, with the exception of $1,898.93 ($1,672.26 + $226.67), the parties' documents agree on the accuracy of the audits performed for the WC Policy. Defendants' Rule 26 Disclosures offer no evidence
to address the accuracy of the premium calculation for the Commercial Policy in this matter. Accordingly, there is no issue of material fact to preclude this court from entering summary judgment in favor of Selective for the amount of no less than $137,485.07.(Doc. 33 at 5).
Thus, after a painfully prolonged process the summary judgment record in this case is now closed. And while the defendants have never fully complied with their obligations as litigants, it now appears undisputed from the defendants' own records that Winola and Buckley owe Selective Insurance $137,485.07 in unpaid premiums. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of Selective on its breach of contract claim in the amount of $137,485.07.
III. Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment - Standard of Review
The plaintiff has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Through summary adjudication, a court is empowered to dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a), and for which a trial would be “an empty and unnecessary formality.” Univac Dental Co. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 465, 468 (M.D. Pa. 2010). The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248-49.
The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence that it believes shows an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145-46 (3d Cir. 2004). Once the moving party has shown that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's claims, “the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group. Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006), accord Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). If the non-moving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Summary judgment is also appropriate if the non-moving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the non-moving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id., at 252; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In making this determination, the Court must “consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 794 (3d Cir. 2007).
Moreover, a party who seeks to resist a summary judgment motion by citing to disputed material issues of fact must show by competent evidence that such factual disputes exist. Further, “only evidence which is admissible at trial may be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Countryside Oil Co., Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 928 F.Supp. 474, 482 (D.N.J. 1995). Similarly, it is well-settled that: “[o]ne cannot create an issue of fact merely by . . . denying averments . . . without producing any supporting evidence of the denials.” Thimons v. PNC Bank, NA, 254 Fed.Appx. 896, 899 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported . . ., an adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denial.” Fireman's Ins. Co. of Newark New Jersey v. DuFresne, 676 F.2d 965, 968 (3d Cir. 1982); see Sunshine Books, Ltd. v. Temple University, 697 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1982). “[A] mere denial is insufficient to raise a disputed issue of fact, and an unsubstantiated doubt as to the veracity of the opposing affidavit is also not sufficient.” Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 1969). Furthermore, “a party resisting a [Rule 56] motion cannot expect to rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions.” Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981)).
Finally, it is emphatically not the province of the court to weigh evidence or assess credibility when passing upon a motion for summary judgment. Rather, in adjudicating the motion, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the opposing party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992). Where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true. Id. Additionally, the court is not to decide whether the evidence unquestionably favors one side or the other, or to make credibility determinations, but instead must decide whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; see also Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1363. In reaching this determination, the Third Circuit has instructed that:
To raise a genuine issue of material fact . . . the opponent need not
match, item for item, each piece of evidence proffered by the movant. In practical terms, if the opponent has exceeded the “mere scintilla” threshold and has offered a genuine issue of material fact, then the court cannot credit the movant's version of events against the opponent, even if the quantity of the movant's evidence far outweighs that of its opponent. It thus remains the province of the fact finder to ascertain the believability and weight of the evidence.Id. In contrast, “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); NAACP v. North Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 476 (3d Cir. 2011).
Moreover, to promote the orderly and fair resolution of summary judgment motions this court adopted Local Rule 56.1. Compliance with Local Rule 56.1 is an important procedural corollary to summary judgment practice. To facilitate the process of resolving summary judgment motions this Court, through Local Rule 56.1, has directed that:
A motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.56, shall be accompanied by a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried. The papers opposing a motion for summary judgment shall include a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required in the foregoing paragraph, as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Statements of material facts in support of, or in opposition
to, a motion shall include references to the parts of the record that support the statements.L.R. 56.1. (emphasis added.)
The ability of this Court to regulate summary judgment practice through enactment of Local Rule 56.1 has long been recognized by the appellate courts, which have repeatedly sustained district court efforts to enforce compliance with this rule. See, e.g., Aubrey v. Sanders, 346 Fed.Appx. 847 (3d Cir. 2009); Smith v. Addy, 343 Fed.Appx. 806 (3d Cir. 2009); Conn v. Bull, 307 Fed.Appx. 631 (3d Cir. 2009). Further, as we have noted, “[t]he purpose of this rule is obvious: it enables the court to identify contested facts expeditiously and prevents factual disputes from becoming obscured by a lengthy record.” Pinegar v. Shinseki, No. 07-313, 2009 WL 1324125, *1 (M.D.Pa. May 12, 2009). To achieve this goal a party opposing a motion for summary judgment must supply “a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, . . ., as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Statements of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a motion shall include references to the parts of the record that support the statements.” L.R. 56.1.
Thus, Local Rule 56.1 requires counsel to analyze the record evidence, identify relevant inferences of fact reasonably drawn from that evidence, and provide to the court a material statement of facts to which there is no genuine issue. See Gantt v. Absolute Machine Tools, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-1354, 2007 WL 2908254, at *3 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 4, 2007). The purpose of this rule is to “structure a party's summary judgment legal and factual theory into a format that permits and facilitates the court's direct and accurate consideration of the motion.” Savidge v. Donahoe, No. 08-2123, 2011 WL 3568274, *2 (M.D.Pa. Aug. 12, 2011).
Given the important purposes served by Local Rule 56.1 in providing structure and coherence to summary judgment presentations, this court has broad discretion in addressing the failure of parties to fully comply with this rule. In the exercise of that discretion we may deem admitted facts which are not properly contested by a party opposing a summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Aubrey v. Sanders, 346 Fed.Appx. 847 (3d Cir. 2009); Smith v. Addy, 343 Fed.Appx. 806 (3d Cir. 2009); Conn v. Bull, 307 Fed.Appx. 631 (3d Cir. 2009). We can also strike pleadings that do not comport with the requirements of this local rule. See Hartshorn v. Throop Borough, No. 07-01333, 2009 WL 761270, at *3 (M.D.Pa. Mar.19, 2009).
B. Selective is Entitled to Summary Judgment in its Favor.
Turning first, to Selective Insurance's breach of contract claim, we find on the current record that the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. In this regard:
The law governing the interpretation of contracts under Pennsylvania law is familiar and well-settled. “When a written contract is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone.” Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 619 F.2d 1001, 1010 (3d Cir.1980) (citation omitted); Mace v. Atl. Ref. & Mktg. Corp., 567 Pa. 71, 785 A.2d 491, 496 (Pa.2001). A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 935 F.2d 1428, 1431 (3d Cir.1991). Under Pennsylvania law, ambiguous contracts are interpreted by the trier of fact, and unambiguous contracts are interpreted by the court as a matter of law. Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1011 n. 10.Panther Mountain Lodge, Inc. v. Waymart Windfarm, L.P., No. 3:08-CV-755, 2010 WL 4942262, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 23, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:08CV755, 2010 WL 4942227 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2010).
Further, in order to sustain a breach of contract claim, Selective “must prove three elements: “(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of the contract, and (3) resultant damages.” Odgers v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., No. 3:15-CV-329, 2022 WL 19827570, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 15, 2022) (quoting Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v, Law Firm of Malone Middleman, P.C., 137 A.3d 1257 (Pa. 2016)).
In this case, the well-documented summary judgment motion submitted by Selective reveals that the parties entered into two unambiguous written agreements; namely, commercial and workers compensation insurance policies. The express written terms of those agreements provided for an initial estimated premium which could then be adjusted by Selective based upon an audit of Winola's records. By executing this agreement, and accepting the benefits of these policies, Winola and Buckley agreed to a determination of these premiums through this audit process.
In this case, when that contractually authorized audit was conducted, the audit disclosed that more than $130,000 in additional premiums were due and owing on the policies. Winola and Buckley were notified of their contractual obligation to make these additional premium payments but failed to do so. On these undisputed facts, Selective is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on this breach of contract claim, in the amount that Selective asserts has been confirmed both by its audit and by the records belatedly produced by the defendants--$137,485.07.
In contrast, the defendants' efforts to evade and avoid summary judgment are unavailing. These efforts have been halting, dilatory, incomplete, and have failed to comply with the requirements of either Rule 56 or our Local Rule 56.1. Thus, the defendants' initial meager response to this motion was a tardy two-page submission which did not comply with Local Rule 56.1 and was devoid of any evidentiary support. Further, to the extent that this initial response suggested the need for further discovery, Winola and Buckley failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 56 which clearly states that a party seeking to avoid summary judgment by citing to the need for discovery must explain “by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d). No such affidavit was ever submitted by the defense. In any event, after the defendants belatedly made initial discovery disclosures in 2021 at the court's direction, Selective asserts, without contradiction, that those defense disclosures largely confirmed its own audit results and showed that an additional $137,485.07 in premiums were due and owing. Thus, the defendants' discovery-based objections to summary judgment fail both procedurally and substantively.
Moreover, when the district court allowed Winola and Buckley additional time to respond to the summary judgment motion through the filing of an additional brief and a proper statement of facts as required by Local Rule 56.1, they failed to do so. Thus, the defendants never submitted a supplemental brief to the court, and the statement of facts which they belatedly tendered in October of 2021 failed to comply with Local Rule 56.1 since it was unsupported by any evidence and ignored the clear command of the Local Rule that: “Statements of material facts . . . in opposition to, a motion shall include references to the parts of the record that support the statements.” L.R. 56.1. Thus, the district court repeatedly provided the defendants the opportunity to come into compliance with our rules governing summary judgment practice, but they have neglected to do so. Therefore, this court is “entitled to deem the [plaintiff's] statement of facts as admitted.” Smith v. Addy, 343 Fed.Appx. 806, 808 (3d Cir. 2009). Following such a course in the instant case is appropriate in the exercise of the court's discretion given the nature, extent, and duration of the defendants' defaults under Local Rule 56.1. Furthermore, once these essentially undisputed facts are deemed admitted, it is evident that Selective is entitled to summary judgment in its favor on this breach of contract claim.
III. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that that summary judgment be granted in favor of Selective on its breach of contract claim in the amount of $137,485.07.
Because we have concluded that summary judgment is appropriate on Selective's breach of contract claim, we have not separately addressed the plaintiff's quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims. We note, however, that: “It is true that a party may not seek relief under the quantum meruit doctrine while also admitting that a valid contract established the value of the services rendered by that party.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Muskin Leisure Prod., Inc., No. 3:CV-05-0253, 2006 WL 2642387, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2006) citing Hershey Foods Corp. v. Ralph Chapek, Inc., 828 F.2d 989, 999 (3d Cir. 1987); Constar, Inc. v. National Distribution Centers, Inc., 101 F.Supp.2d 319, 324 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 21 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.